• About
    • Welcome
    • Prayer Partners
    • Ministry Partners
    • Angel Partners
    • How to Promote
    • Crowdfunding
    • Statement of Faith
    • The Desert Warrior
    • The Temptations of the Cross (A Novel)
    • Jesus was an Alien (and Other Stories of Faith)
  • Desert Warrior
    • Tears of the Desert Warrior – The Absurdity of an Abnormal Existence
      • Prologue
      • Introduction
      • 1. The Secular Problem of Evil
      • 2. The Essence of Religion
      • 3. The Heart of the Human Experience
      • 4. The Moral Interpretation of Religion
      • 5. Finding Life in the Face of Death
      • 6. Reality, Language and Meaning
      • 7. The Myth of Human Morality
      • 8. The Dangers of the Divine Ethic
      • 9. The Religious Problem of Evil
      • Conclusion
    • Whispers of the Desert Warrior – Evidence of the God who is There
      • Prologue
      • Introduction
      • 1. The God Who is There
      • 2. The Breath of Life
      • 3. Pride and Prejudice
      • 4. The Divine Perspective
      • 5. Return to Babel
      • Conclusion
    • God of the Desert Warrior – Evil and the Goodness of God
      • Prologue
      • Introduction
    • The Desert Warrior – Finding Strength in Difficult Times
      • Series Introduction
      • Prologue
      • Introduction
    • The Way of a Desert Warrior – How the Desert can give you Courage
      • Prologue
      • Introduction
    • The Heart of a Desert Warrior – How Reality can set you Free
      • Prologue
      • Introduction
    • The Life of a Desert Warrior – How a Conversation can Change your Life
      • Prologue
      • Introduction
  • Family Secrets
    • Family Secrets – Chapter One
    • Family Secrets – Chapter Two
    • Family Secrets – Chapter Three
    • Family Secrets – Chapter Four
    • Family Secrets – Chapter Five
    • Family Secrets – Chapter Six
    • Family Secrets – Chapter Seven
    • Family Secrets – Chapter Eight
    • Family Secrets – Chapter Nine
    • Family Secrets – Chapter Ten
    • Family Secrets – Chapter Eleven
    • Family Secrets – Chapter Twelve
    • Family Secrets – Chapter Thirteen
    • Family Secrets – Chapter Fourteen
  • Jesus was an Alien
    • Preface
    • Created For His Pleasure
    • 1. Charles Benton. Neighbor.
    • 2. The Wedding
    • 3. Midnight in the Garden of Good and Evil
    • 4. Truth in Flip Flops
    • 5. Jesus was an Alien
    • 6. Lucifer at the Cross
    • 7. The Way of the Desert Warrior
    • 8. The Anointing
    • 9. The Tower of Babel
    • 10. The Eight Year Old Evangelist
    • 11. Dr. House. Brilliant. Idiot.
    • 12. The Old Lady and the Giant
    • Return of the Prodigal
  • Seeking Jerusalem
    • Seeking Jerusalem – Days 1 to 10
      • Day 1 – The Plan
      • Day 2 – The Confession
      • Day 3 – The Rebuke
      • Day 4 – The Denial
      • Day 5 – The Judgment
      • Day 6 – The Power and The Glory
      • Day 7 – Holiness
      • Day 8 – The Cost (1)
      • Day 9 – The Cost (2)
      • Day 10 – Transfiguration
    • Seeking Jerusalem – Days 11 to 20
      • Day 11 – Desert Warriors
      • Day 12 – Revealing the Glory
      • Day 13 – Maturity
      • Day 14 – Spiritual Conversations
      • Day 15 – Hard Questions
      • Day 16 – The Weakness
      • Day 18 – Your Life Ministry
      • Day 19 – The Gift of Significance
      • Day 20 – Joshua
      • Day 17 – Spiritual Warfare
    • Seeking Jerusalem – Days 21 to 30
      • Day 21 – True Confessions
      • Day 22 – The Courage of Confession
      • Day 23 – Brokenness
      • Day 24 – The Culture of Grace
      • Day 25 – FaithWalk
      • Day 26 – Dr. House. Brilliant. Idiot.
      • Day 27 – Healing Power
      • Day 29 – Spiritual Unity
      • Day 28 – Spiritual Trust
      • Day 30 – The Anointing
    • Seeking Jerusalem – Days 31 to 40
      • Day 31 – The Sanctification Gap
      • Day 32 – The Sweet Spot
      • Day 33 – Hosea and Gomer
      • Day 34 – The Wedding
      • Day 35 – The Delivery
      • Day 36 – The Struggle
      • Day 37 – The Helper
      • Day 38 – The Secret
      • Day 39 – Messianic Prophesy
      • Day 40 – The Gathering Darkness
    • Seeking Jerusalem – Days 41 to 50
      • Day 41 – Dark Night of the Soul
      • Day 42 – The Divine Irony
      • Day 43 – Truth on Trial
      • Day 44 – The Descent into Hell
      • Day 45 – Death Comes in Darkness
      • Day 46 – The Divine Sting
      • Day 47 – Divine Visitation
      • Day 48 – The Kingdom Come
      • Day 49 – Transformation
      • Day 50 – The Road to Jerusalem
  • Temptations
    • Prologue
    • 1. Death of a Warrior
    • 2. The Old Man in the Temple
    • 3. Memories from the Past
    • 4. Battle Over Jerusalem
    • 5. Passover in the Holy City
    • 6. The Shedding of Blood
    • 7.Messianic Prophecy
    • 8. Ten Divine Words
    • 9. The Days of Artistry
    • 10. Breaking the Alliance
    • 11. The Covenant of Promise
    • 12. Birth Pangs
    • 13. Temptation in the Desert
    • 14. Prophet, Priest, and King
    • 15. Mobilizing the Forces
    • 16. The Gathering Darkness
    • 17. The Dark Night of the Soul
    • 18. The Divine Irony
    • 19. Truth on Trial
    • 20. The Descent into Hell
    • 21. Death Comes in Darkness
    • 22. The Divine Sting
    • 23. Divine Visitations
    • 24. Thy Kingdom Come
    • 25. Transformation
    • Epilogue
  • The Roman Road
    • Walking the Roman Road of Salvation – Days 1-10
      • Day 1 – All Roads Lead to Rome
      • Day 2 – “Let me Introduce myself….”
      • Day 3 – “….and my Ministry”
      • Day 4 – The Fight with Peter
      • Day 5 – Getting our Hearts in the Right Place
      • Day 6 – Getting our Heads on Straight
      • Day 7 – ……and the Demons tremble.
      • Day 8 – The Five Pillars of Evangelism
      • Day 9 – Truth in Flip Flops
      • Day 10 – A Conversation with Jesus
    • Walking the Roman Road of Salvation – Days 11-20
      • Day 11 – Jesus Was An Alien
      • Day 12 – Don’t Kill the Messenger
      • Day 13 – The Holy Hiatus
      • Day 14 – The Dilemma of Love
      • Day 15 – The Enigma of Evil
      • Day 16 – Dr. House. Brilliant. Idiot.
      • Day 17 – The Good, the Bad and the Ugly
      • Day 18 – No Wonder God is Upset
      • Day 19 – Suppressing the Truth
      • Day 20 – A Law Unto Themselves
    • Walking the Roman Road of Salvation – Days 21-30
      • Day 21 – Intelligent Design for Stupid Fools
      • Day 22 – Evil is it’s Own Punishment
      • Day 23 – The Revelation of Wrath
      • Day 24 – But for the Grace of God
      • Day 25 – I’m A Good Guy
      • Day 26 – The Sin of Jonah
      • Day 27 – Reality is the Ultimate Judge
      • Day 28 – Obedience is the Ultimate Goal
      • Day 29 – The Heart is the Ultimate Standard
      • Day 30 – Blasphemer or True Heart
    • Walking the Roman Road of Salvation – Days 31-40
      • Day 31 – Sin Addiction
      • Day 32 – Friendship with God
      • Day 33 – Breaking the Alliance
      • Day 34 – Religious Virtues
      • Day 35 – Spiritual Warfare
      • Day 36 – The Path
      • Day 37 – The Holy Guarantee
      • Day 38 – Charlie Benton. Neighbor.
      • Day 39 – The Sacred Moment
      • Day 40 – The Nature of Our Struggle
    • Walking the Roman Road of Salvation – Days 41-50
      • Day 41 – The Quality of Our Struggle
      • Day 42 – Walking In The Spirit
      • Day 43 – More Than Conquerors
      • Day 44 – Living Sacrifices
      • Day 45 – Love Must Be Sincere
      • Day 46 – The Secret
      • Day 47 – Resurrection Maturity
      • Day 48 – Kingdom Evangelism
      • Day 49 – Seeking Jerusalem
      • Day 50 – Walking with Purpose

Desert Warrior Ministries

~ A Burden of Glory

Desert Warrior Ministries

Category Archives: Hermeneutics

Review of Existencia y Hermenéutica by Paul Ricoeur

03 Saturday Sep 2016

Posted by Bert Amsing in Hermeneutics

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Book Reviews, Existence, Hermeneutics, Paul Ricoeur

  1. Nombre y apellido del alumno Bert Amsing
  2. Fecha June 21, 2016
  3. Título del texto leído Paul Ricoeur

Existencia y Hermenéutica

  1. ¿De qué trata el artículo o capítulo leído?

Paul Ricoeur, in his chapter “Existencia y hermenéutica,” in his book El Conflicto de las Interpretaciones, gives us the foundation for understanding how the process of hermeneutics reveals our existence.

  1. ¿Cuál es la idea central del autor?

His central idea is that a linguistic philosophy, by providing a general theory of interpretation (which is what he is trying to do here), has the potential to bring the otherwise conficting interpretations/hermeneutics into a unified concept of man’s existence.

  1. ¿De qué nos quiere convencer?

Ricoeur wants to convince us that the hermeneutic of psychoanalysis reveals an architecture of being dependent on desire, the hermeneutic of the phenomenon of spirit reveals a theology of being dependent on spirit and the hermeneutic of the phenomenon of religion reveals an eschatology of being dependent on the sacred and that these three major ways of interpreting human existence are ultimately parts of a whole that is the holy grail of philosophy.

  1. ¿Cuáles son los puntos fuertes y los puntos débiles del texto?

Right at the beginning of this chapter, Ricoeur already starts off on the wrong foot with his interpretation of St. Augustine’s use of allegory.  As was pointed out in another review, St. Augustine did not use allegory as his main (or only) hermeneutical tool but Ricoeur uses it justify all biblical interpretation as a hermeneutic in the sense of having a surface meaning and a deeper meaning.  The manner in which Ricoeur uses this one concept of biblical hermeneutics to apply it to the whole of the biblical text fits his own philosophical assumptions but is not true to the biblical worldview.  In fact, this is a major issue and forms one of the basic differences between a secular and a Christian approach to a general theory of interpretation.  This fundamental concept of hermeneutics as revealing that which is hidden and thereby having a multiplicity of meanings is the basis of Ricoeur’s entire approach but it is not how the Bible looks at it and is in danger of being nothing more than a modern version of the gnostic heresy.

From a biblical point of view, the problem is not in the text but in man.  Ricoeur is willing to admit this to an extent and in a different way later on in this same article but he still maintains that the biblical text cannot be accepted as it stands.  Not only does it need to be stripped of its supernatural cultural trappings and fundamentally re-interpret its myths, but as religious language it is fundamentally symbolic language (rather than historical or scientific language) and therefore consists of a surface meaning and a hidden meaning.  In fact it is the stripping away and the re-interpreting that is an integral (but not complete) part of the process of hermeneutics which is to get to the real meaning behind the words.

None of this is the biblical perspective on how interpretation works.  There is a mixture of language types in the biblical text.  Some of it is historical language (eg. the Gospel of Luke, Acts of the Apostles etc).  Some of it is poetry (eg. Psalms) and some of it is narrative.  It isn’t only symbolic language and it certainly isn’t all allegory.  On the one hand, it needs to be interpreted just like any other collection of literary works within its own cultural, historical and linguistic context but it also must be understood within its own biblical history and canon of the Old Testament, the newer interpreted in the light of what came before, biblical theology and redemptive history, simply because it is one story and has one supernatural author.  The OT provides the theological and conceptual/linguistic context for the New Testament while, at the same time, the New Testament provides a new and fresh revelation of the acts and words of God in human history.

Still the fundamental problem does not reside in the biblical text but rather in our ability to understand it because of the noetic effects of sin both before and after salvation (in lesser measure).  Since Ricoeur rejects that interpretation of the human condition, he has reinterpreted the biblical text as a source of symbolic figures that need to be interpreted through various stages.

  1. ¿Qué aspectos no entendí?

The article in itself was understandable.  What needs more work is the integration and distinction of this “secular” general theory of interpretation from a “religious” or, more specifically, a “Christian” general theory of interpretation.  On the one hand, it is clear that “secular” does not mean “neutral” or “objective” vis a vis a “religious” or “Christian” point of view.  That is evident in Ricoeur´s own bias against the supernatural, his anti-historical view of the biblical text, his existential and phenomenological presuppositions and his general misunderstanding of the biblical text (as well as his continued violation of his own rules of interpretation when it comes to dealing with the biblical text).

On the other hand, what is not clear is whether all religious hermeneutics/interpretations of reality/existence can be brought under this “secular” general theory of interpretation without doing damage to their view of the world.  What is clear is that the “Christian” point of view is radically opposed to the foundational elements of this “secular” approach and reserves the right to elaborate an alternative approach that may use the general structure/approach but with a different foundation than the philosophical anthropology of Ricoeur and his existential and phenomenological assumptions.

Taking the supernatural element of Christianity at face value and the biblical text as revealed from a God-who-is-there (and therefore as authoritative and inspired) as rooted in the historical events of the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, understood in its own historical/cultural/linguistic context based on the theological/conceptual context of the Old Testament, reveals an entirely different direction for a Christian philosophy of interpretation/hermeneutics that is not merely “totalitarian” or even “eschatological.”

It, at least, claims to be a pivotal event/word that is not only necessary but key to a self-understanding of man’s existence in this dark and dangerous world that holds any real hope to overcoming evil in the heart of man.  Looked at as two concentric circles that intersect in the middle, one would be a secular approach and the other would be a biblical approach in terms of its foundational elements and in the middle there would be some overlap and coherence in method and approach that may need some restatement but is in basic agreement.  That is the task of a Christian philosophy of hermeneutics that remains to be done.

  1. ¿Cómo se puede aplicar el contenido a la tarea hermenéutica?

If, by the work of hermeneutics, we mean the actual work of the exegete to understand the biblical text, very little.  If we mean the development of a Christian general theory of interpretation/hermeneutic that goes beyond the rules of exegesis and provides a linguistic philosophy based on Christian presuppositions that can incorporate and re-interpret other forms of hermeneutics (eg. phsycoanalysis, other religions, philosophy itself, including a phenomenology of spirit and religion) while maintaining their integrity as a secular approach to understanding the nature of man’s existence.

This Christian approach is not merely apologetic any more than the secular approach is, but it is in dialectical opposition and as an exercise in distinctive apologetics it has much value.  At the same time it must go beyond apologetics to provide a more ample biblical worldview that can truly engage with the individual and social problems that face our world and speak both judgment and hope, destruction and interpretation to use Ricoeur’s words, into each situation while maintaining God’s eternal perspective and agenda, his theodicy and his commitment to the cross of Christ as the exclusive solution to the problem of evil.  It is both a judgment on the “secular” approach to meaning as well as proclamation of hope for those who abandon the “secular” approach to life and embrace the “supernatural” approach as proclaimed through the biblical text.

Bert Amsing

Master’s Program – FIET

Review of Lenguaje y Teología de la Palabra (Part 3) by Paul Ricouer

03 Saturday Sep 2016

Posted by Bert Amsing in Hermeneutics

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Book Reviews, Critique of Religion, Hermeneutics, Language of Faith, Paul Ricoeur, Theology of the Word

  1. Nombre y apellido del alumno Bert Amsing
  2. Fecha June 19, 2016
  3. Título del texto leído Paul Ricoeur

Lenguaje y Teología de la Palabra (Part III)

  1. ¿De qué trata el artículo o capítulo leído?

Paul Ricoeur, in his chapter “Lenguaje y Teología de la Palabra,” develops his view of the science and philosophy of language and its application to the biblical text.

  1. ¿Cuál es la idea central del autor?

Ricoeur’s central idea is that language is both a science and an art in the sense of bringing the contributions of philosophy and theology into an overall view of how language works.

  1. ¿De qué nos quiere convencer?

Ricoeur wants to convince us that a structural approach to the science of language needs to be balanced with a philosophy of language based on existential and phenomenological contributions as a prerequisite to approaching the biblical text and that this approach to language is supported by a theology of the word as discerned from the biblical text itself.

  1. ¿Cuáles son los puntos fuertes y los puntos débiles del texto?

Paul Ricoeur, in his last chapter on the Language of Faith, makes a connection with our present topic when he states, “el último desafío tiene que ver entonces con lo que acabo de caracterizar como el centro mítico poético de la imaginación, que es al mismo tiempo el lugar de origen de la palabra y del hombre como palabra (p. 48).”  The atheism of modern culture may be a necessity rooted in our “maturity” as free agents who must create our own destiny but find ourselves both to be “originally good but radically evil.”  The affirmation of atheism may be true and necessary but it is not enough.  There must also be an affirmation of the possibility of a new being, a new existence, by remembering what it means to be truly human.  It is the past wisdom, the foundational texts, the origin of man that must speak a creative word into the imagination of modern man in order to awaken him to the possibilities of the future.

Ricoeur says, “mi propio confesión es que el hombre se instituye por la palabra, es decir, por un lenguaje que no es tanto hablado por el hombre, sino que es hablado al hombre (p. 48).”  In other words, the “creative word” spoken to modern man will remind him that he must root himself in the “mythic-poetic centre of the imagination” if he hopes to discover the possibility of what he could become by remembering what it means to be truly human.  “Para terminar diré que aquello que conforma nuestra respuesta a la apología de la necesidad y de la resignación, es la fe en que el hombre es instituido en el corazón de su potencia mítico-poética, por una palabra creadora (p. 48).”  He would even go so far as to reference the Good News as the source of that “creative word” which motivates us to become the kind of human beings that can balance our atheism with faith in the possibility of the human spirit to dominate our world within the bounds of a love for the individual which is what makes us truly human.  That is his question at the end of his section on the language of faith.  “¿Acaso la Buena Nueva no es la motivación de la posibilidad que tiene el hombre a través de una palabra creadora? (p. 48).”  This is the real introduction to our present chapter on Language and a Theology of the Word in which he brings the science, philosophy and theology of language (or the “word”) together into an integrated whole.

The problem is that Ricoeur is entirely at odds with the biblical text he uses as his ultimate source of motivation for a “creative word.”  His language sounds vaguely religious and indirectly true but, in fact, it is entirely in opposition to the biblical message and approach to hermeneutics.  Without forgetting his bias against the supernatural, his anti-historical presuppositions about the biblical text itself, his commitment to a philosophical anthropology based on existentialism and phenomenology, his celebration of a critique of religion and the biblical worldview resulting in the celebration of a “mature” rational humanity in charge of its own future, his optimistic positivism of man’s ability to overcome evil in the human heart and in society simply by remembering the importance of love for the individual as a way of becoming truly human and as an antidote to the necessary atheism of modern man, we must remember that all of this is in the background despite his religious sounding rhetoric.  The antidote to modern atheism is faith in man’s ability to rise above his own self-destructive tendencies by accessing the mythic-poetic center of his imagination through a creative word that is spoken to modern man from ancient times (through foundational texts such as the Bible) about what it truly means to be human.  Ricoeur strips the biblical text of its supernatural origins and character as the revelation of God about man’s condition and what God has done about it through the person and work of Jesus Christ and then he gives it an existential and phenomenological foundation through his philosophical anthropology and finally, with all supernatural truth stripped away and the remainder re-interpreted from his philosophical point of view, he then appeals to the Bible´s “creative word” about the virtue of love as being the answer/solution to all of modern man’s soul-less affirmation of his freedom and atheism.

This is a far cry from the biblical worldview which is necessarily supernatural/spiritual and which calls modern man to re-evaluate his own self-destructive behavior rooted in an ill-advised feedom from the-God-who-is-there.  Ricoeur’s project is doomed to failure because it lacks the power of a new reality created by God through the person and work of Jesus Christ on the cross.  Language has power but not “creative” power in the sense of “creating something out of nothing.”  And that is what mankind needs.  His situation is beyond remedy and he, himself, cannot defeat the evil within.  There is no residual good to build on, no mythic-poetic center of the imagination that has the power to overcome the fundamental selfishness of the human heart in rebellion against its creator/father.  In a difficult and dangerous world, only the temporal/eternal providence of a creator/father can provide the external context for the battle against the low-trust, survival mentality of the human ego.  Only the agape love of a new relationship with our creator/father restored through the person and work of Jesus Christ and guaranteed by the presence of the Holy Spirit can provide the internal context for the healing of the human heart in its brokenness and humility before the throne of God.  Yes, the virtue of love is the solution to evil (that isn´t anything new) but it must be a healing before it can be a battle,  it must be toward God before it can be toward man;  it must be created in reality before it can be “named” and “owned” and “lived out.”

To suggest, as Ricoeur does, that to value “love of neighbor” above power or possessions (tener, poder y valer), may, in fact, be a solution but he provides no source of “power” to overcome the evil in the human heart that will never prioritize love over power or possessions especially when the chips are down and push comes to shove.  We barely do it for the ones we love, and few are those who would claim that it is a virtue in their own lives much less a virtue directed towards those we consider our “enemies.”  We all know that (and have for centuries) but Ricoeur has an optimistic positivism that seems to think that “the mythic-poetic center of the imagination” has its own power through the use of language to create a new future for mankind on the brink of destruction.  It isn’t clear whether Ricoeur suffers more from an inadequate anthropology or a lack of humility about his own secular presuppositions as over and against the message of the biblical text as it stands.  But, as Jesus pointed out time and again,  the deaf cannot hear and the blind cannot see because they do not want to hear and they do not want to see.  In any event, this is the conceptual context of his attempts to create a theology of the word (which sounds biblical but is thoroughly secular).

Still, there may be some contributions to a biblical hermeneutic that Ricoeur can provide in his attempt to bring together the science, philosophy and theology of language (or the “word”).  To that end, let us explore some of Ricoeur´s thoughts about “language and a theology of the word.”

Ricoeur points out that there are multiple forms and usages for the word “word” especially within the biblical text.  We speak of the Word of God (with a capital “W”) and we consider Christianity to be all about understanding that spoken “Word,” which became flesh.  There is the preaching of the “Word” and the attempt by the exegete through the hermeneutical process to create a new “word” that is intelligible for our time.  Finally, it is all of these things together that allows us to “reconquistar y reafirmar la significación de la Palabra original que pone en movimiento esta continuidad de palabras (p. 143,144).”  But already here, in Ricoeur’s description of the different ways we use the word “palabra” in the bible and Christian community we find his particular interpretation imposed onto the biblical text.  Certainly we can agree that “en ese sentido, toda teología es una teología de la Palabra (p. 144)” but we have learnt to look deeper into what Ricoeur actually means by the words he uses.

In general, we can start with a critique of his interpretation of the biblical text using his own hermeneutical method.  He claims, as we saw in our last review, to respect the true and original meaning of the foundational texts but means by that, that the true and original meaning can only be discerned after stripping it of its supernatural cultural trappings and giving it a “pre-comprehensional foundation” rooted in his philosophical anthropology.  That is not the same thing as having respect for the foundational text and allowing its “creative word” speak into the situation of modern man.  To be specific, Ricoeur uses his general understanding of the biblical text and Christian linguistic context as his only recourse to understanding the form and content of this word “Palabra.”  He even breaks his own “minimal expectations” of the expectations of structuralism in the science of language which he goes on to discuss later on.

Here are some specific problems that betrays his bias against the supernatural and his anti-historical presuppositions about the biblical text.  First of all, although he talks about the word becoming flesh in Jesus Christ, he does not believe that “all of creation was created by the power of his word.”  It is a “word” without creative ex nihilo power that is totally “encerrado” in its linguistic expression.  Secondly, even when talking about the word-made-flesh in Jesus Christ, he describes it as “Dios como la Palabra en Cristo (p. 144),” which is to say that in the human person we name as Jesus Christ, God expresses his “Word.”  This is a far cry from the pre-existent, second person of the Trinity, emptying himself to become human and it is a typical doctrine of modern liberalism.  Never forget, that for Ricoeur, the supernatural does not exist.  God does not exist.  Jesus is not divine but merely a man who understood what it truly meant to be human through love of neighbor as a priority over power and possessions.  Perhaps, because of that very humanity, we could say that he was well-grounded in the mythic-poetic center of his imagination and from that place could speak (and live out) a “creative word” through his example and speech that must be rediscovered and reaffirmed by the exegete through the hermeneutical process and preached to modern man as a calling to not forget that love of the individual is the only way to be truly human and is the only antidote to modern atheism and when people respond to that calling to enter into a new existence based on the domination of the world through science and technology but limited by love rather than empowered by greed and manipulation, perhaps, then, we can overcome evil in the human heart and society.  Needless to say, this is not Christianity.  Finally, a word needs to be said about this “proceso de la palabra (p. 144),” by which he means “la conexión interna e íntima entre la Palabra de Dios, Dios como la Palabra en Cristo y la Palabra de la predicación primitiva y su actualización en la predicación moderna (p. 144).”

If we re-interpret Ricoeur’s re-interpretation of the biblical text and restore its supernatural nature and character and get rid of his philosophical anthropology (or at least analyze it according to and in subordination to the biblical text), this statement can become true, but we already knew this.  It isn’t any great revelation by Ricoeur.  God creates the world and mankind through the power of his word, man rebels against his authority, God intervenes in word and deed and commits that intervention/revelation to a written communication using human language and a historical/cultural/linguistic context, choosing a particular community in the Old Testament through which he could establish the theological/conceptual context of what man’s problem really is in relation to God and how God solves it through the person and work of Jesus Christ in his incarnation, teaching and ministry as well as through his death and resurrection, which the early Christians saw and heard with their own eyes and ears but committed also to written communication under the supernatural direction of the Holy Spirit and which the modern exegete, in humility and community, allowing the Scripture to interpret itself as much as possible, reaffirms the ancient message and creates a new method or medium for proclaiming it to modern man.

This “process of the Word” from ancient times to today, which covers the distance between ancient man and modern man despite their scientific worldviews (whether pre- or post-) is possible precisely because it is the Word of God made powerful by the supernatural care and intervention of God through his Holy Spirit within man and despite man.  It is also possible because both ancient and modern man suffer from the same ontological problem of separation from God despite his scientific worldview.  There is a basic “analogy” between ancient man and modern man (in all cultures and throughout all time).  The fact that our modern “materialistic success” in the fields of science and technology doesn’t change the fact that we are still radically evil and are in danger of self-destruction from the very success that we celebrate (whether through nuclear bombs, environmental breakdown or the threat of a customized, perhaps weaponized, super virus).  The arrogance of each age is basically the same and is obvious in the perennial dangers of evil as well as our longing for the solutions that the virtue of love can give us.  There is nothing new under the sun except the particular form of arrogance that each generation prides itself on.

In any event, this is the understanding of the concept of “Word” that we get from the biblical text.  If this is what Ricoeur means by “the process of the word” (which it is not), then we would agree.  We could even go further, as Ricoeur does, and point out that all language, not just the biblical text, finds its origin in the social/relational nature of God in Trinity and has been given expression in the creation of man “in the image of God.”  But man is not language any more than Jesus is only language.  Jesus is the “word-made-flesh” not because of his nature as the “creative language” of God but because of his relationship with his Father and the Holy Spirit.  Jesus said that it was his food and drink to do the will of the Father and that was expressed in his ministry, death and resurrection.  It was expressed in his loving obedience to his Father empowered by the Holy Spirit which came upon him at his baptism (not because of his divine nature).  What God intends, the Son speaks and acts upon in the power of the Spirit.  Jesus as the Word of God is the intention of God made real (in creation and providence), and made flesh (in the incarnation).  It is a spiritual relationship, not an ontological one, between the will of God and the empowered loving obedience of the Son.  It is not a necessary obedience rooted in ontology but rather a chosen obedience as the expression of love.  Jesus learnt obedience through his sufferings, the book of Hebrews tells us.  How can that be?  In perfect agreement/knowledge there is perfect acquiescence but in the cauldron of battle, where even what is perfectly good is taken away, Jesus must choose loving obedience over fellowship/agreement and allow God the Father to be in charge.  His intention, the will of God the Father must prevail even when (and especially when) the end is not entirely known from the beginning (as in the Garden of Eden) or the path is abhorrent to a sacred soul (as in the Garden of Gethsemane) that must bear the sins of the world upon the cross and have his Father’s face turned from him when it is that very face, that fellowship, that defines his very existence, even as a man.  Being the “Word” of God is a calling, a relationship, not simply a language, although language is necessary since we are social beings and our love in word and in deed, even in this dark and dangerous world, must reflect the agape love that exists in the relationship of the Godhead itself.  We only see a glimpse of this glory but it is enough to blind us with its power and illumination of our lost condition before our creator/father.  Ricoeur’s poverty lies in his secular concept of language, trying to transpose its power from the realm of science and technology to the realm of metaphysics and the human condition and failing.

Not only is man endowed with the gift of language (in all its glory and limited power) as a tool for social intercourse and developing knowledge in the domination of creation, there is also a “linguistic” effect of the fall from grace.  Creation, Fall and Babel reveal the nature of human language in the context of the rebellion.  Language, in deception and falsehood, was used in the Garden to thwart the will of God rather than to fulfill it.  This truth alone, which Ricoeur strips away with all of the other supernatural “myths” found in the biblical text that he doesn’t believe, this truth alone establishes that language in and of itself is not the issue.  It was the Devil, an angel already in rebellion against God who uses deception and manipulation to influence mankind to declare their emancipation from their creator/father (which Ricoeur celebrates).  It was his evil intention that was given expression in his words.  Evil is a relational concept that expresses a rupture between the intention of God and the loving obedience of man.  In fact, it was the doubt thrown upon the intentions of God towards mankind that the Devil expressed in his language.  First of all, doubt attacked the relationship of trust between man and God and then it gave room for desire to bloom independently of God’s will.  It was the intention of man to fulfill his own desires/intentions without reference to God that gave rise to sin and evil and, ultimately, death.  Yes, God had given man dominion over the earth but not without his supervision and involvement as their creator/father.  How many mistakes we could have avoided, how many problems we could have solved long since if we had his guidance and support.  God never wanted man to be a robot or an unthinking lap dog adoring his master.  He was to dominate the earth, explore the far reaches of creation, learn and create and develop within the relationship with their creator/father so that they could be guided and protected.  There is nothing wrong with desire and passion so long as it is grounded in love for God and neighbor (even Ricoeur would agree at least with the neighbor part).

The point of this brief development of “a theology of the word/language” in counterpoint to Ricoeur is to say that language is an expression of intention/desire/knowledge and results in action/praxis/comprehension.  The details of how that happens is interesting and helpful but doesn’t change the fact that language alone is of little value because it lacks the power of praxis (and our praxis does not have the power to create something out of nothing or to fix our ontological “brokenness” in our being or to bridge the moral/relational gap between God and man when mankind is the one who rebelled against his maker).  Yes, there is a “linguistic” effect from the fall in the sense that the intention/heart of man is now more guarded, more hidden even from himself (the blindness and deafness to our own arrogance, the celebration of what we should be ashamed of) as well as towards others.  Even God is hidden from us and his intentions toward us unknown unless he intervenes and reveals himself in word and deed.

But this is the fundamental problem of communication in a dark and dangerous world where mankind (including Ricoeur) wants to recreate paradise on earth without God in a Babel-building exercise that God is determined to interfere in and destroy.  The story of Babel (another “myth” without historical basis for Ricoeur but maintaining some of its power as a symbol of an existential truth about the human condition) reminds us that God has intensified the problem of communication between people precisely in order to slow down the march of evil throughout history.  Leaving aside whether or not all languages can be traced back to the approximate time of the original Babel, the meaning of Babel hasn’t changed.

Ricoeur (and others throughout the ages) may make a moral claim against a God who would curse his own creation, allow suffering and pain and death to be the natural result of the rebellion, throw mankind out of paradise, divide mankind through a multiplicity of languages thereby magnifying the problem of communication, bring judgment upon peoples and nations and exclusively choose only one person and miraculously create a nation ex nihilo from two people who were unable to have children because of their extreme old age, send his own people into exile as punishment for their sin and then, above all, condemn a holy man to a horrible death on a cross, not in the name of social justice, feeding the poor, solving the problems of the world or making life less dangerous and difficult but rather only and first of all to deal with evil in the human heart defined as sin/rebellion against God, even if it means sacrificing everything else upon the altar of that final, ultimate, primordial healing and reconciliation with a supernatural being that we aren’t even sure is there and aren’t even sure we would trust if he was there.  He seems to be too callous to our present sufferings in service to a higher calling that we aren’t even sure is true or that it will make much difference in our lives (especially as seen from the outside) even if it were true.

Yes, the Babel-builders will make their moral claims against God and against the church, but God has his own moral claims to make and they carry a special weight in light of the fact that most of our difficulty in this life comes from this evil within and our unwillingness to pay the ultimate price to prioritize the value of the individual (and God) over power and possessions.  In the end, we must realize that the earth belongs to the Lord and he will intervene when necessary, judge when necessary, punish when necessary, show mercy when necessary and do whatever is necessary, even to taking on the eternal punishment for sin upon his own shoulders if necessary (and it was) in order to solve the real problem that faces the human race whether ancient or modern.

In other words, language is both a gift and a curse depending on the intention of the human heart towards another and therefore carries content and calls others to consider joint action toward a common intention.  Man is not language but language is an expression (and not the only one or even the most important one) of the heart and intention of man.  Language is an expression of the relationship between one and another, rooted in intention and expressing itself in action.  Language does not have power independent of praxis any more than intention does.  When praxis is defined as obedience to intention, it can be expressed or not as the case may be.  Praxis is certainly empowered through joint intention and therefore would need language to express itself.  Some of the most important things in life, such as love and hope and significance and the existence of cognition, morality or self-awareness cannot be expressed in language completely but must include other ways of knowing on the level of intuition, experience or trust/faith.  If language is only a rational system of significance (as useful as that may be) it does not fully express the human heart any more than the language of science and technology fully reveals reality.

What Ricoeur does is transpose both the role of language and its relative power in the field of science and technology to the world of metaphysics and fails.  He fails because he doesn’t go deep enough into a theology of the word/language that the biblical text reveals.  By stripping away the supernatural, he is left with a powerless, secular concept of language that is imported from the field of science and technology into the field of metaphistics and is left wanting.  Why?  Because in the real world, it simply doesn’t work.  Evil is not overcome in the human heart or in society by language but by power.  In this case, the power of the agape love of God expressed on the cross and resulting in the resurrection.  In other words, we need to have love before we can express love which is what “attachment theory” teaches in terms of human intercourse and which is exactly the point of the Christian message in terms of the human-divine relationship.

There is much more to be said about the structuralist approach to the science of language and Ricoeur’s own attempt to marry the science of language to a philosophy of language based on his existential and phenomenological philosophical anthropology and his abortive attempt to apply it to the biblical text in order to reveal a “creative word” that would call modern man into a new faith in his own power to overcome the evil within.  But that project ultimately fails because Ricoeur does not allow the biblical message to speak for itself with its own supernatural interpretation of the human condition in terms of the human-divine relationship and the solution that God provides in Christ empowered by the Holy Spirit.

  1. ¿Qué aspectos no entendí?

Paul Ricoeur’s discussion on the elements of a structuralist approach to language is quite specific and needs a general understanding of the vocabulary and concepts in order to fully assimilate what he has to say.  More work needs to be done on linguistic analysis in general and structuralism as an approach to language in specific before any real analysis can be done as to whether it is helpful to the task of a biblical hermeneutic.

  1. ¿Cómo se puede aplicar el contenido a la tarea hermenéutica?

Ricoeur falls short of showing how this approach can be used effectively in a biblical hermeneutic.  He promises to apply his ideas to biblical theology and the key words that make up that approach to Scripture, but never gets around to anything more than some dubious general statements that have more to do with his existential and phenomenological approach to language than anything else.  Perhaps some of the comments on a structuralist approach to language would be helpful but even that was rather obvious and pedantic.  So, not much to go on in general.

Bert Amsing

Master’s Program – FIET

Review of La Critica de la Religión y el Lenguaje de la Fe (Part 2) by Paul Ricoeur

03 Saturday Sep 2016

Posted by Bert Amsing in Hermeneutics

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Book Reviews, Critique of Religion, Hermeneutics, Language of Faith, Paul Ricoeur

  1. Nombre y apellido del alumno Bert Amsing
  2. Fecha June 18, 2016
  3. Título del texto leído Paul Ricoeur

La Crítica de la Religión y el Lenguaje de la Fe (Part II)

  1. ¿De qué trata el artículo o capítulo leído?

Paul Ricoeur, in his chapter “La Crítica de la Religión y el Lenguaje de la Fe” deals with his proposed hermeneutical method in two movements.  The first was a deconstructivstic critique of religion and the second was a reinterpretation of religious language.  We dealt with the first one in a previous review and will now turn to the second half of his discussion.

  1. ¿Cuál es la idea central del autor?

The central idea of this second part to the hermeneutical process of exegeting the biblical text is to find a language of faith that is comprehensible to modern man.

  1. ¿De qué nos quiere convencer?

Paul Ricoeur wants to convince us that his “pre-comprehension” of the human condition along existential and phenomenological lines provides the needed bridge for a language of faith that is understandable to modern man.

  1. ¿Cuáles son los puntos fuertes y los puntos débiles del texto?

Ricoeur begins this section with a question that gets at the heart of the modern problem with religion.  He says, ¿cómo transmitir a los demás y a nosotros mismos el sentido del querigma, de manera tal que se transforme en un discurso comprensible? (p. 30).”  This is the problem of communication and it is based on Ricoeur’s conviction that “en nuestra cultura encontramos infinidad de personas que no rechazan la fe simplemente por propia decisión sino que, para plantearlo correctamente, no pueden darse cuenta de “qué se trata” – y por lo tanto preguntan – qué quieren decir los términos “estar perdido o ser salvado” (p. 30).”

Since this issue is at the heart of Ricoeur’s entire approach, it deserves special attention right at the beginning.  The first thing to do is to clarify, in terms of Ricoeur’s own thinking, what he means by this “problem of communication (p. 30)” between religion and modern man.  As discussed in the previous review on the critique of religion, Ricoeur claims that the problem is much deeper that what he indicates here.  If it were really simply a question of “qué se trata” or what does it mean to “estar perdido” o “ser salvado,” the Bible is very clear and the answers are close at hand.  The real issue is not “comprensión” but “credibility” or acceptability (which Ricoeur deals with in more depth later on).  Modern man simply cannot accept the supernatural elements of the biblical text which it considers to be part of a pre-scientific worldview.  Ricoeur, himself, believes that these elements are nothing more than cultural trappings of the gospel and must be removed (demythologizing) to find the kerygma of the gospel so that it can be proclaimed without hindrance or misunderstanding to modern man who (in Ricoeur’s view) desperately needs to hear it.  But this is precisely the problem with Ricoeur’s entire approach and before we go any further, we must deal with the problem to which Ricoeur wants to provide a solution with his hermeneutical approach.

If the real issue is that modern man cannot accept a pre-scientific view of the world as expressed through the supernatural elements of the biblical text, that question ought to be dealt with directly.  Perhaps the question ought to be, first of all, whether or not the scientific, rational world view of modern man is correct (especially in terms of whether or not it totally or fully reveals reality).  Secondly, even if the conclusion is that a scientific worldview fully reveals reality and is therefore correct, the question still remains whether or not the biblical text itself considers the supernatural elements of the kerygma to be essential to its message or not.  And finally, to return to the critique of religion for a moment, the question is whether or not the modern critique of religion (as per the three masters of suspicion) is, in fact, a critique also of the biblical text and message and whether or not that critique is, in fact, correct or not.

To deal with the third question first (as the broadest context for the other two), the contention of this author is that a critique of religion is not the same thing as to critique the biblical text/message and that there is a “moral gap” (due to sin and evil in the human heart) between the indicative and the imperative of the biblical message that cannot be ignored.  Even further, the critique of religion of the three masters of suspicion (Marx, Freud and Nietzsche) cannot be understood apart from their own presuppositions about the historicity, veracity and validity of the biblical text and its message.  It isn’t just about their hermeneutical method (as Ricoeur claims) but about the presuppositions behind their (and Ricoeur’s) thinking.  The core elements of those presuppositions have to do with taking for granted the attacks of the 18th and 19th century on the historicity (and therefore veracity) of the biblical text as if the issue has already been decided (which it most certainly has not).

Although there is ample evidence for the historicity of the biblical text and message, the present author would agree that a rational, scientific approach to reality has won the day and that, therefore, the supernatural elements of the gospel message now bear “the onus of proof” in the modern mind.  But a number of things still must be said.  First of all, the biblical message will always bear the onus of proof in a world in rebellion against their creator/father.  The “will to freedom” from divine authority is the default position of every heart and the gap can only be bridged from the side of divine love and mercy.  It is in the nature of faith that it has a foundation of evidence but cannot be finally proved with certainty except eschatologically.  We accept that basic truth which arises from the biblical message itself, which is a proclamation containing both an invitation as well as a warning to modern man.

Secondly, even though the biblical text reminds us that the onus of proof can only be fulfilled by the gift of faith, it is not a faith without evidence.  There is a growing body of thoughtful evidence in multiple fields of inquiry as to the historicity of the biblical stories and of the text itself in comparison with other historical events and texts.  In addition, solid scholarly work has been done by conservative scholars over the past two hundred years to counteract the arguments against the historicity of the biblical message.  Although the supernatural content of the biblical message seems to require a higher level of probability (or even certainty) for the historical veracity of its content, when it is compared to other historical inquiries of texts and events, there is an overwhelming amount of evidence to consider.  What needs to be remembered is that the historicity of the supernatural events essential to the biblical message are key to understanding its message.  It is a kerygma rooted in history.

Thirdly, Ricoeur’s own thought is already outmoded based on the scientific advances of the last thirty to fifty years which has brought the “supernatural” or “transcendent” back into modern thought.  This is true not only because of the relativity and subjectivity of modern thought but also because of the development of the Big Bang theory and it’s “final” scientific verification in the study of the background radiation of the universe.  Despite Stephen Hawking´s attempts to base the Big Bang theory in the “eternal necessity” of gravity, due to the scientific laws of physics, there is no way known to man to avoid the “singularity” of a creation ex nihilo.  Even Einstein could not admit, for personal rather than scientific reasons, that this intelligent and creative force which gave rise to the Big Bang of creation, was also personal (which would indicate a Western view of God as a transcendent being outside of our experience of space and time.  Even though mankind has no other experience of an intelligent and creative being that is not also personal, there is a reluctance in the heart of man to accept this scientific evidence.  In addition, this has given rise to a new attempt at natural theology in the Kalam Cosmological Argument as well as a more robust Teleological Argument for the existence of God based on intelligent design theory.  And more can be said, none of it conclusive but all of it part of a cumulative evidential argument that gives a strong foundation of probability (rather than certainty) to the supernatural elements of the gospel.  Modern man is not so closed off from the supernatural as Ricoeur supposes.

Fourthly,  post modern philosophy has already debunked the entire edifice of modern thought based on the object/subject dichotomy and has reached the pinnacle of modern subjectivity and post modern relativity.  Although this author would not agree with those conclusions, Ricoeur obviously does while at the same time providing a critique of religion based on modern presuppositions which have since been overturned.  This procedure would, at the very least, put his conclusions to the test.  He, himself, believes that, based on postmodern subjectivity and relativity, religion and philosophy have to do with mankind and Dasein rather than with any supernatural reality outside of man.  In other words, Ricoeur’s beliefs about religion (and the biblical text), namely, that it is about mankind and Dasein on the one hand and that it has nothing to do with a supernatural reality on the other hand, are imposed upon the text and form part of the pre-comprehension/presuppositions of the hermeneutical method.  This is in direct contradiction to Ricoeur’s own directive which is to respect the biblical text itself as the source of your presuppositions about how to read its message.

Finally, Ricoeur, himself, provides an interesting critique of modern rationalistic thought in order to provide a “espacio para creer” for modern man which is far more telling than his critique of religion.  If, on the one hand, we accept that institutionalized religion (and religious thought in general) suffers from “the moral gap” between the indicative of the biblical text and the imperative of living it out in society and if we accept, on the other hand, that the secular, scientific, rational worldview of modern man has been undermined philosophically and practically (no one believes any more that it fully reveals reality as Freud did in his time), then there is an “espacio para creer” for modern man that does not remove the supernatural element from the gospel message (which, according to the biblical text, is essential to the kerygma and not merely cultural trappings).

There is still a problem of credibility for modern man since a supernatural reality is still relatively foreign to the worldview of the modern age.  But that problem of credibility is directly connected to the proclamation of the kerygma that a real, objective supernatural being which we call God, not only exists but makes a claim on our allegiance and obedience, interprets our existence and gives identity, purpose, significance and therefore meaning to our lives.  Certainly, a proclamation of the importance of love for the individual as a reminder of our true humanity can be made without the supernatural elements of the gospel, as Ricoeur would claim, but it will lack the power to make any real changes in the heart of man and our joint existence in society (which is the goal after all, even according to Ricoeur).

To sum up this problem of communication between the modern mind and the religious mind, Ricoeur claims that the problem lies with religion based on the destruction/critique of the three masters of suspicion (Marx, Freud and Nietzsche).  But a closer look at Ricoeur’s (and the three masters of suspicion’s) presuppositions about the historicity of the biblical text, the supernatural essence of the biblical message and the distinction between religion and the biblical text (among other things) leads us to the conclusion that Ricoeur’s entire approach to the hermeneutical method is on uncertain ground.

At the very least, an Evangelical approach to hermeneutics can be presented where the problem lies not in the biblical text (even if it does lie in religion itself) but in mankind himself.  This is the true scandal of the cross that it exposes the will to freedom from divine authority as the fundamental desire of mankind and rejects the will to believe in a love restored.  The scandal of the cross (its necessity, manner and meaning) reveals the true interpretation of the human condition and our inability to deal with it on our own terms.  Only in the brokenness/destruction of our arrogance before God can our shame be turned into love at the foot of the cross.  Even so, this author recognizes that the gap cannot be closed without the “will to believe in a love restored” which is a gift of regeneration resulting in the three religious/relational virtues of faith, hope and love and expressing itself in peace and joy.  It is paradise restored through a restored relationship with the owner and creator of paradise.  There is no other way back to the garden and all the Babel building in the world will not change that.  There is no power in a faith without a supernatural reality outside of man rooted in the historical fact of the cross and resurrection of Jesus Christ.

If we want to talk about the “maturity” of man, let’s talk about a “maturity” in modern philosophy that concludes that there is no objective reality, no meaning, no morality, no foundation to rationality, no criteria for truth, no certainty of anything beyond our own subjective reality (which is also at question).  But rather than to celebrate this “maturity” or allow it to drive us to despair, let it be a goad (as reality/nature was always meant to be) to drive us back to the biblical text in humility to discover who we truly are.  This is the “maturity” of a prodigal who finds himself in the pig sty of life, wallowing in self-pity and impotence who is faced with the continuing arrogance of celebrating his poverty and “going it alone” or finding the humility to return to his father in confession and repentance.  That is a “maturity” that is worth pursuing and to that end, we can continue with Ricoeur´s discussion if for no other reason than to show its internal inconsistencies and ultimate poverty due to its inability to discover the real power of the gospel.

So, in order to continue with Ricoeur’s argument, we will have to allow him his presuppositions.  He begins by stating that “la distancia existente entre nuestra cultura y aquella en la que se halla inscripta la proclamación, el querigma (p. 30),” which he calls “una situación hecho.”  Of course, we would disagree as to what that distance consists of and whether the problem is on the side of mankind or on the side of the biblical text.  Ricoeur clearly believes that the problem is with the supernatural elements of the biblical text when he says, “no se trata de una distancia relativa a teorías teológicas muy elaboradas, sino que ya en el propio Evangelio observamos un cuadro cultural constituido por nociones y categorías extrañas a nuestra cultura (p. 30).”  And, of course, hermeneutics is all about overcoming this cultural distance.  In that sense, we would agree but point out that there are two elements to this distance.  One is the biblical text and the other is modern man.  Perhaps allowing the biblical text to provide a hermeneutic of modern man will teach us a clearer way to enter into a dialogue about the biblical proclamation as a destruction/critique of our commitment to rationalism (already in retreat) on the one hand, and our “will to freedom” at all costs on the other.  To say that the biblical text does not need a hermeneutic would not be correct, but if that hermeneutic is meant to overcome the distance between modern man and the biblical text, it must begin with a biblical anthropology (rather than a philosophical anthropology) and then, in humility, allow scripture to interpret itself within the interpreting/believing community where issues of historical context, linguistic analysis and cultural trappings can rightly be addressed.

Ricoeur even mentions Kierkegaard, who at the very least, reminds the exegete that he must “ser contemporáneos de Cristo (p. 30)” in the sense of “la adhesión individual a las raíces de la fé (p. 31).”  Whether or not Kierkegaard understood those “roots of the faith” as including the supernatural essence of the biblical message or not, what is clear is that Ricoeur does not.  In fact, he considers it to be a problem “del que no me ocuparé en este trabajo (p. 31).  Earlier, quoting Bultmann, he had made a distinction between the psychological (including the individual experience of faith of the exegete) and the methodological elements of the hermeneutical task, clearly aligning himself with the latter rather than the former.  He tries to separate the supernatural nature of biblical hermeneutics from the supernatural nature of the biblical text in order to find common ground with modern man.  It is a project doomed to failure.  He says that his goal is to “abordarlo en el plano de la comprensión del lenguaje, de la articulación del discurso cristiano (p. 31).”  The question is how to articulate a language of faith without first of all understanding the content of that faith and the answer is that you can’t.  Even Ricoeur implicitly accepts this truth since he must provide his own interpretation of the human condition along the lines of his philosophical anthropology in order to provide a pre-comprehension or context for understanding the preaching of the cross and its scandal for modern man.

Ricoeur then states that since this cultural distance rooted in the supernatural nature of a pre-scientific worldview is a fact (which it isn’t), then he would also like to categorize it as a “problem.”  He claims that there are two ways to deal with this problem.  Starting with the work of destruction/critique (through demystifying and demythologizing the traditional message), it allows us “la certeza de nuestra propia cultura mediante un discurso como el que sigue:  “nosotros, hombres modernos, tenemos hoy una cierta seguridad acerca de lo físico, lo histórico, de aquello que es verdadero y de lo que es falso, de aquello que se puede creer y de lo que no se puede creer (p. 31).”  If this sounds arrogant, it is and, even more, it isn’t true.  All efforts at “certainty” in questions of philosophy and theology have failed.  Ricoeur, himself, has admitted this himself but he would suggest that our age is characterized by technological and scientific advances in the practical application of science (ultimately based on a biblical worldview) that has created a certain level of certainty in practical, everyday matters that is easily transposed into matters of ultimate concern (i.e. metaphysics).  That transposition is the problem.  It is unwarranted and Ricoeur knows it and will go on to discuss this issue later on.  But right now, he claims that this is the legitimate conclusion to the first work of demystification and demythologization of the first half of his approach.  In fact , he says, “en otras palabras y remitiéndonos al análisis del tema precedente, lo creíble y lo increíble de nuestro tiempo, tendrá carácter normativo (p. 31 italics mine).”

Certainly he goes on to say “quisiera demostrar ahora por el contrario, que la tarea hermenéutica, de aquel que quiere interpretar, no consiste tan sólo en asumir lo “creíble y lo increíble” de su tiempo, sino también en cuestionarlo (p. 31).”  We will go on to see what he means by that in detail later on but, suffice it to say, that the first movement is not set aside by the second; which is to say that the “carácter normativo” of the first is not set aside by the “questioning” of the second.  This is true because Ricoeur already has, in his own pre-comprehension of his task, a bias against the supernatural in agreement with modern culture on the one side and an idea of how to question society (and thereby help it “remember” its true humanity) without resorting to the supernatural on the other side.  He is so excited by his proposal that he compares his approach to Kierkegaard by saying that “se abre ante nuestros ojos toda una manera distinta de hacernos contemporáneos del texto de antaño (p. 31).”  But this is done without the supernatural and by changing the object of our faith from the relational scandal of the cross to his interpretation of the human condition using his own form of philosophical anthropology.

His language is interesting but it is the form of religion without its power.  He claims that he is opening up an “espacio del discurso” donde la cuestión acerca de ser creado, de ser justificado o condenado, de ser aniquilado o glorificado pueda tener sentido como elemento previo de la fe (p. 31).”  Of course, there are two problems here.  The first is that there is a big difference between a space to dialogue/discuss and a space to believe.  The first does not create the second.  More than language is needed.  The second is that the content of this language of faith is essential and filling it with philosophical anthropology along existential and phenomenological lines is not the same thing as to fill it with the supernatural message of the gospel and the preaching of the cross.  The fact that it is more understandable to modern man does not mean that it is true to the biblical text.  And if you argue that Ricoeur does not respect the biblical text as having a supernatural element and therefore he is within his rights to fill that content or re-state that content in any way he pleases, the question still remains as to whether this proclamation of calling modern man to remember his basic humanity by focusing on the love for the individual in a society that increasingly objectifies people in terms of their performance or utility, actually works.  Is this a message with transforming power which will motivate people to sacrificially love the other even to the point of allowing themselves to be persecuted, thrown to the lions, become destitute, impoverished and socially outcast for the sake of the message as a testimony of its veracity and power in their lives?  The answer is no.

Ricoeur enters into his analysis of modern society by reminding us that “el problema de la distancia cultural no se reduce sólo al cambio del vehículo, sino que entraña también el olvido de la cuestión radical efectivamente vehiculizada por el lenguaje de antaño (p. 31).”  From this point onward, Ricoeur’s analysis is greeted with open arms.  He says, “ello significa dar batalla al olvido, es decir a nuestra propia alienación con referencia al contenido de la cuestión radical (p. 32).”  We may disagree as to what that radical question is and what the content of the answer is, but in any event, regardless of the answers given, the analysis of the alienation of modern society and its forgetfulness of what it means to be truly human is valuable.  He calls this change of direction a “des-construcción de las seguridades del hombre moderno (p. 32).”  You might even call this a “light” version of a hermeneutic of suspicion, which he calls “un tipo de duda que revertiremos sobre nosotros mismos, es decir sobre aquel que duda (p. 32).”  And in this very critique/doubt of the “certainties” of modern society, he will reveal the positive process of “la recolección de sentido (p. 32).”  That, of course, consists in his interpretation of the human condition along philosophical anthropology lines which would be acceptable to modern man.

Ricoeur begins his analysis of the secularization of modern man (which is found both in society and in mankind himself) by looking at two “rasgos fundamentales del proceso de secularización (p. 32).”  The first line of questioning is exactly what we have mentioned earlier, “la extensión de la “racionalidad” a todos los sectores y a todos los registros de la realidad (p. 32).”  There is less room for mystery and paradox in a culture where everything is a problem to be solved.  On the one hand, the transparency/understanding of things (through science and technology) has benefitted us greatly but on the other hand “lo psíquico y cósmico sagrado” has been pushed into the background.  Although that has radically changed in the last thirty years, there is still an appreciation of his analysis for those who still find themselves drawn to a secular humanistic worldview.  But Ricoeur doesn’t stop there and attempts to dig deeper with his second line of questioning.  He claims that the very process of secularization, seen as the rejection of the supernatural cultural trappings of religion, has brought mankind “a la madurez como un ser responsible de su destino (p. 32).”  This is something to be celebrated but it does bring about its own challenges because the objectification of nature through science in service to technology has transposed itself into “la praxis humana (p. 32).”  This process of objectifying/understanding/explaining everything in service to its pragmatic value has become a way of life.  Ricoeur says, “en este sentido, la técnica representa un nuevo régimen ontológico (p. 33).”  He mentions things like “el control de la natalidad,” and “la eutanasia” which have become possible to a degree never before imagined, but the exercise of this technology on the basis of a pragmatic utilitarianism is the danger.  He claims that “nacimiento y muerte son finalmente eliminados como eventos cargados de significado y como destino instructivo (p. 33).”

Of course, if you are a materialistic secular humanist, this won’t bother you but if you believe that human nature is the final frontier of human knowledge full of mystery and the “cósmico sagrado,” then you may want to leave room for a wider perspective.  At least in this, we would agree with Ricoeur.  He summarizes it this way.  He says, “es un problema de la existencia y en ese sentido es cuestionable.  Un hecho inmenso se transforma ahora en un gran problema (p. 33).”

Ricoeur now introduces the concept of “love for our neighbor” as the great solution to this problem (which may be true but not sufficient) by appealing to the Old Testament (which he earlier derided as “old and obsolete.”).  He says,

“Es un hecho inmensa porque no podemos soñar con el pasado ni lamentarlo.  Esas    nostalgías no tienen sentido.  En cierto modo, el destino del hombre consiste en dominar todas las cosas, incluida tal vez su misma vida.  Esta gran empresa de desacralización, de profanación del universo en sus aspectos cósmico, biológico, psíquico, se inscribe en la misma línea del tipo de destino que se anuncia desde el Antiguo Testamento.  Allí el hombre es llamado a señorear sobre los otros seres de la creación – así lo señalan el primer capítulo del Génesis y el Salmo 8 – mientras que tenga el amor al prójimo como limite y regla de todos los usos.  Propiamente hablando, no existe universo sagrado sino que por el contrario, el Antiguo Testamento proclama ya el profundo significado de la teología de la desacralización (p. 33,34).”

First of all, it needs to be said that “picking and choosing” what you want to use out of the Bible without understanding its context or believing in its fundamental, supernatural message, is a questionable hermeneutic.  Even granting Ricoeur’s presuppositions and bias against the supernatural, why does he attempt to use the authority and language of the biblical text to support his views.  Discussion of the virtue of love for your neighbor as a solution to modern problems abound outside of a discussion of any one religion or of any religion whatsoever.

Secondly, the biblical text is very clear that the “only” rule is not love for your neighbor but rather love for God (enter the supernatural) and then love for your neighbor (as defined and directed by God).  On these two hang all of the teaching of the Old and New Testament.  But the biblical message also demonstrates that we are not capable or motivated enough to accomplish this great virtue of love for God and man on our own or on the basis of law.  It must become a new way of living, a new ontology, a new mode of existence made possible by the grace of God through the cross of Christ enabling us to receive the presence of the Holy Spirit who inscribes the law of love on our hearts and both motivates and empowers us to fulfill that law in our homes and society.

Thirdly, Ricoeur equates the “domination/exploration/understanding” of creation (including ourselves) as a process of “desacralización,”  when, in fact, the biblical text says exactly the opposite.  It is under the authority of God that we, as his children, are called to exercise our “image of God” abilities to explore and dominate this creation that he has given us.  To reject the supernatural element of the biblical text on the basis of pre-conceived ideas is not hermeneutics of any kind.  Ricoeur equates science and technology with the secularization of society and, although they did go hand in hand, they were two different processes that do not have a clear cause and effect relationship.  Many early scientists were believers and many modern scientists continue to be believers.  Science has for many years been separated from questions of metaphysics and ultimate questions (other than in the area of cosmology).  Certainly there have also been many scientists who have rejected a supernatural/biblical worldview and credited their commitment to a scientific, materialistic worldview which has taken its place but that connection is not a necessary one as recent studies have shown and a rational, scientific approach to creation does not pre-suppose a materialistic or a secular worldview (in fact, quite often, the contrary).  Ricoeur, himself, is here making a plea for a less materialistic worldview and leaves open the possibility of a religious interpretation of life and the human condition (so long as it is based on his philosophical anthropology).

Ricoeur then gets to the heart of the issue when he says “en efecto, la desconcertante paradoja de esta gran conquista de la racionalidad y la responsabilidad consiste en que comprende al mismo tiempo el olvido de la cuestión referida al orígen, como también al sentido de nuestra vida (p. 34).”  Once again, true but only if this “olvido” is relational and supernatural in its object.  To define it as Ricoeur does is to rob it of its power.  To define it as the Bible does, is to infuse it with the power to transform lives.  We cannot forget our origins because it defines who we are and we cannot give up our quest for meaning because it is what keeps us able to love one another.  In that sense, the problems of origin and meaning come before the preaching of the cross (as Ricoeur defines it).  They are problems related “al ser y a la existencia (p. 34).”  This brings us to Ricoeur’s attempt to provide the content of the linguistic context or pre-comprehension that is so necessary to the process of hermeneutics (according to Ricoeur who follows Bultmann in this respect).

Ricoeur has three things to say about his interpretation of the human condition with regards to his tendency to forget the ultimate questions of origin and meaning as it relates to his being and existence in the world.  First of all, he introduces us to his philosophical anthropology as the basis for his description of humanity and the human condition.  He claims that “la predicación es responsable de reconstruir siempre ese prediscurso (p. 35).”  In that way, he subordinates the biblical text under his philosophical anthropology.  In particular, Ricoeur believes that philosophy must discuss the relationship between the objectification of creation (and other humans) and the manner, structure and meaning of our existence.  He is preparing a secular metaphysics from the point of view of existentialism and phenomonology.

He even goes so far as to re-interpret the biblical creation story which he finds confusing with all of its supernatural cultural trappings.  “Sin embargo, todo el relato cobra sentido si lo entendemos como la verdadera lectura teológica de una fenomenología de la percepción (p. 36).”  At least his intent is clear.  He claims that “aunque cosmológicamente esta construcción del relato esté superada, guarda toda su vigencia existencial (p. 37).”  It is about mankind, not about God as the creator of mankind, who appears in this world (by whatever means, which doesn’t matter at this point) “en cuyo centro el hombre es ubicado como el ser que debe decidir, optar y jugar su destino (p. 37).”  It is “el verdadero drama existencial (p. 37)” but it is exactly the opposite of the biblical message of creation.  It isn’t about mankind deciding his own future, which in biblical terms is what makes him lost and in need of salvation, but rather that he finds himself in a world created by a transcendent being who calls himself our father and bestows on us his “image” and reminds us that our relationship with him is central to our humanity; anything else is death.  It is the story of man exploring, enjoying and dominating a creation made especially for him and given as a gift on the day of his (and our) birthdays but always under his watchful eye and with the goal of discovering and enjoying his glory and our relationship.  That is the true existential drama.

But for Ricoeur, who has rejected all supernatural elements in the biblical text (and in life), he must find an existential drama based on man’s rejection of God and celebrate that loss of paradise and is now condemned to create his own Babel building projects which always fail because he doesn’t go deep enough into his philosophical anthropology to allow room for a theological anthropology based on a biblical text that is unaffected by his pre-comprehension and presuppositions.

This is the first step in his philosophical anthropology, which is to establish that a “filosofía de la existencia (p. 37),” which he defines as “la fenomenología,” means that “todo aquello que suscita este tipo de lectura primordial de nuestro “nacer-morir-existir-decidir-comunicarse con el otro”, en suma, todo aquello que restaura lo primitivo existencial, pertenece al dominio de la precomprensión (p. 37)” to which he adds “la comprensión del tiempo.”  Is it not strange to use the biblical text as the source for a discussion on the human condition but then claim that this makes up a “precomprensión” that we must have before we come to the hermeneutical task of interpreting the biblical text?  Once again, he uses the residual authority of the bible to justify his own philosophical anthropology without apology and without awareness of the travesty he has committed against his own hermeneutical aspirations.

Ricoeur now moves more specifically to his reinterpretation of the human condition based on his philosophical anthropology.  He calls it “una dirección distinta pero que también me parece acertada (p. 37).”  Apparently, the kerygma of the word of God can only provide an answer to the problem of human existence but there is no room (according to Ricoeur) for the bible to provide its own interpretation of the fundamental problem with mankind.  This is apparently because Ricoeur and, by extension, modern man will not accept the supernatural nature of such an interpretation.  Ricoeur insists that whatever answer is given, it must deal with mankind in his totality.  He says, “la pregunta sobre la humanidad vista como un todo y la meta de la aventura humana total sigue siendo legítima (p. 38).”  He claims that already in the church fathers, people like Tertullian and St. Augustine started to “encerrar un poco la visión de la salvación dentro de los estrechos límites del individuo aislado (p. 38).”

On the other hand, the encounter between theology and Marxism, in particular, has reopened the debate on the nature of evil and the extent of salvation in terms of our economic, political and cultural life.  It has redefined what it means to be lost and to be saved.  Ricoeur goes on to mention Kant and his analysis of the three great passions of human existence; namely “tener, poder y valer (p. 38).”  These are not merely three objects, or virtues or goals but three ways of existing in the world.  The concept of “tener” is related to our economic life.  The concept of “poder” is related to our political life and the concept of “valer” has to do with our cultural life and, in Ricouer’s thinking must be seen as having the priority as a context for the other two.  He says, “nos parece evidente entonces que, para formular la precomprensión que permita plantear la pregunta fundamental acerca del hombre y su destino, no habrá que ejercer la crítica sólo desde el plano político y económico sino también desde la perspectiva del hombre como portador e inventor de signos de cultura (p. 39).”

This second line of questioning, from a biblical perspective, needs to be answered.  On the one hand, the issue of dealing with the totality of life is a deeper issue than it first appears and needs to be discussed further.  On the other hand, the Kantian description of “tener, poder and valer” is interesting because Ricoeur takes it, celebrates it, prioritizes man as the bearer and inventor of meaning through culture by means of language without realizing that it is all this, without God, that is the source of all of man’s problems from a biblical perspective.  Without a relationship with God, our significance is tied up with material possessions and a concern with economics, our purpose is tied up with issues of politics and our value/identity is a self-created meaning ex nihilo.  All of this has been tried countless times before and have always ended in failure, both personally and socially, because the fundamental problem of evil in the heart of man has not yet been dealt with because its source has not been identified as having to do with that very thing Ricoeur celebrates – the will to freedom from divine authority at any cost.

But to return to the earlier issue about “salvation” having to do with all of life and not being restricted to the “isolated individual,” there is more to say.  First of all, there is a dialectical relationship between the goals and purposes of mankind in the world and God’s agenda.  There is a saying that reminds us that “Satan thinks like a man but God thinks of eternity.”  Yes, the source of evil is in the human heart and it is a result of a willful rejection of the loving authority of God in the life of man.  Yes, the restoration of man’s relationship with God takes priority over the restoration of systems and economics and politics simply because this world is in rebellion to God and have exercised their desire to “tener, poder y valer” in ways that were not healthy or loving.  Upon the occasional opportunity of a majority of Christians (or Deists) dominating a society (such as Rome, Holland – under Kuyper – or the United States), the ideals of love in human intercourse where sabotaged from within since the reality of sin and evil remains in us, even if we are committed to the kingdom of God.

The reason for this, according to the Bible, is that God himself has determined that this world has been “cursed” because of the rebellion of man and is therefore, ultimately, lost and must be destroyed before it can be re-created into a new heaven and a new earth.  This eschatological perspective provides a “dialectical distance” between the agenda of the church and that of the world.  From the biblical point of view, this world serves the purpose of calling people to repentance precisely because evil is allowed some room to maneuver so that mankind may look in the mirror of reality and despair of life outside of the paradise of God’s presence.  God is not interested in renovating the pig sty to make it more comfortable for the prodigal.  It needs to stink, and hurt, and fill mankind with despair so that they recognize that the evil is within and that they are the architects of their own destruction.  It is a theodicy rooted in the eschatological goals of God with mankind (c.f. the book of Revelation) and the world does not like it.  Whether it is the social justice of the liberal church or the revolutionary fervor of the Marxist liberation theologians, the cry of mankind is for relief when repentance is needed.  It is a severe mercy but a necessary one.  On the other hand, God, in his mercy, according to the biblical text, does intervene to stop evil in one instance and allow it in another but always with the goal of our ultimate salvation and eternal relationship with him in a new heaven and a new earth.

Most of all, God uses his people, his church, to intervene with grace in the lives of people and right at that point, something must be said.  The problem is that a world in rebellion against God makes a moral claim against his agenda and “theodicy” (the temporal management of evil to accomplish an eternal good) because they do not accept either his existence (and therefore rail against the church directly) or because they do not accept his diagnosis of the problem of the human heart or agree that human existence with its mixture of good and bad is the context for the creation of a new type of humanity that prioritizes their relationship with God regardless of the temporal benefits of that relationship.  Like Job, the ultimate question put before man is the question of evil and whether or not it drives them away from God or towards God.  That will reveal their heart in a way that nothing else will.  It is the question of every human heart for its lover.  Do you love me for the benefits or despite the benefits?  And since that is the very nature of the problem and the very nature of the salvation that we so desperately need, God maintains that open question as the context for the real “existential drama of mankind.”

It must also be said that an understanding of God’s “theodicy” and his commitment to turning temporal evil into ultimate and eternal good (which we all struggle with), does not excuse the church from the direct command of God to love our neighbor and to bring “light and salt” into the world.  As C.S. Lewis points out, God expects us to pursue the “simple” good (as defined by both reason and the biblical text) and do so sacrificially just as Jesus did while, at the same time, allowing God, and God alone, to exercise his right to turn evil into good and thereby accomplish the “complex” good.  In fact, God’s “complex” good depends on us accomplishing the “simple” good and therefore any failure in the imperative makes the indicative in the lives of more and more people more difficult to accomplish.  Even so, there exists a fundamental “dialectic” between what the world sees as their moral claim on God and what God sees as his moral claim on them.  The source and creator of evil is not God but mankind and they will have to live with their rebellion even as they celebrate it.

Finally, Ricoeur gives us his third point, after establishing that a philosophy of existence that deals with the totality of man’s existence on earth is what we need, he goes on to say that we also need an appropriate language in order to make that interpretation come alive.  After all “el hombre es lenguaje (p. 39),” and language gives life to ideas through its impact on human minds and motivation to act.  Ricoeur says, it is “en lenguaje que comprueban, describen y ordenan los hechos (p. 39).”  This is at the heart of the process of secularization which Ricoeur both celebrates and challenges.  This “ser-lenguaje (p. 40)” needs both an existential and historical vision and language which Ricoeur would call the language of faith (but which we would call “the language of a secular faith,” and Ricoeur would not disagree).  This language would fire the imagination and is rooted in an “analogy of being” (St. Augustine, St. Thomas) that all of mankind shares.  It is a language that would open up the possibilities of a new way of being human rooted in a love for the individual that reminds us of what it means to be truly human.  “En este sentido, la imaginación es el instrumento de una verdadera exploración ontológica y ella requiere a su vez el lenguaje de una conceptualidad justa (p. 40).”  This is the language of understanding, truly understanding who we are, why we are lost and how to save ourselves.

Jesus called it “the blind leading the blind,” but since Ricoeur doesn’t accept the supernatural interpretation of the human condition from the biblical text, it is difficult to know how to answer this great, utopian, optimism that exists in the new linguistic analysis as a hermeneutical tool in the hands of the modern philosopher to deal with the ultimate questions of life, such as the origins of man and the meaning of his existence.  Having debunked the speculative/classical side of philosophy in favor of linguistic analysis, while realizing that, even then, according to Heidegger, we are still ultimately faced with the question of metaphysics.  It is inescapable and Ricoeur proves it once again.  The problem is that Ricoeur has fallen, once again, into the positivism and optimism that was so much in favor a generation or two ago.  But here it is again in the guise of linguistic analysis as it is applied to questions of metaphysics.  There is some truth to the fact that life is defined and described by language but that is precisely the point.  It is both “defined” and “described” but in a world that has turned its back on the objective reality of life (at least among philosophers), language as “description” has fallen on hard times and all that is left is language as a way of “defining” life.  But why is this so?  It is because the human mind, in the process of objectifying, evaluating, exploring and harnessing the powers of this world in the area of science and technology has experienced over and over again the need for new language to “describe” and “define” what they were discovering.  Ricoeur, himself, warns us not to extend this rational exercise into every area of existence but does so himself, safe within his own certainty as a self-creator of meaning.  We would not try this in the field of science and technology.  It might blow up and kill us.  Reality has a way of doing that.  We are discoverers and secondary creators using the tools and materials that life has given us to work with.  We do not create reality with our language, even in the imagination of man.

But it is true that we can motivate man to action with our words but, even then, it is not simply the language that motivates but the reality that the language “describes” or “defines.”  Belief must be rooted in a shared reality that objectively exists or it loses its power to motivate.  The “ought” alone has never been enough,  nor is the self-generated will power of mankind, even in their own best interest good enough.  There are isolated cases of limited success but the fundamental evil of the human heart is that in a difficult and dangerous world we prioritize our own immediate felt needs even when we know that in the end it isn’t good for us.  That is our existential legacy and Ricoeur recognizes that truth but celebrates our “freedom to choose” even if it is a selfish or evil choice over the greater “slavery of love” which is the true freedom that mankind seeks.  When it comes to the question of existence, we are not God and we cannot create our salvation with mere words.  It is the “power” of God to act upon his “words” that created the world.  It was the power of the Holy Spirit of God, “hovering over the waters,” that put into action and gave life to the creative work of the “logos” or “intention” of God made incarnate in Jesus Christ.  Without that same Holy Spirit to give “power” to our words, language/religion/ideology is condemned by Jesus as “having the form of religion but denying its power.”  But that is, once again, a supernatural explanation based on the biblical text.

All of this brings Ricoeur to his redefinition of philosophy and its task as a hermeneutic of existence.  Given the need for a philosophical anthropology to interpret the human condition in all of its totality while celebrating the fundamental necessity for human freedom so that mankind can decide his own destiny, and recognizing man´s ability to assign value through culturally significant symbols and myths and thereby create meaning ex nihilo, there is a special place for philosophy in this grand project.  Still, Ricoeur starts by pointing out that there is “el problema de la filosofía como hermenéutica (p. 41).”  Rather than trying interpret existence through speculative/classical approaches to philosophical and natural theology to define such metaphysical mysteries as the existence of God, the freedom of the will or the immortality of the soul, “la tarea filosófica consistirá, a mi ver, en la elaboración de una teoría general de la interpretación, es decir, realizar a posteriori de Marx, Freud y Nietzsche la tarea que comenzara Schleiermacher y que fuera continuada por Dilthey.  Esto significa extender el problema exegético de la comprensión de textos, a la comprensión de todos los signos susceptibles de ser considerados como textos.  Se trata por lo tanto de lograr que la hermenéutica no se reduzca simplemente a la reflexión sobre las reglas de la exégesis, sino que se transforme en un exégesis generalizada (p. 41).”

It is worth quoting Ricoeur at length at this point since he is re-defining the task of philosophy in existential and phenomenological terms as the elaboration of a general theory of interpretation.  In general, it is a worthy task and would create much needed understanding about epistemology and how we know what we know.  Reformed Epistemology has already benefitted from this change of focus in philosophical circles.  But problems still remain since the assumption is that this general view of interpretation (on rational terms) would also be applied to the biblical text.  It assumes that the biblical text has already been demystified of its supernatural cultural trappings and therefore would be subject to the same general principles of interpretation as all other texts and symbols of meaning in human culture.  That is an interesting way for philosophy to slip in the back door of the house of metaphysics and make claims about ultimate issues that the world still sees as a necessary context for life.  Metaphysics matters and therefore cannot be ignored.

At the same time, many of these general principles of interpretation developed by this new focus of philosophy may have some benefit for biblical hermeneutics (which also is not limited to merely the rules of exegesis) but will have to be re-interpreted within the bounds of a supernatural understanding of the biblical text/message.  Within a supernatural context, linguistic analysis and even general rules of interpretation are welcome but there is a further problem.  The biblical text with its supernatural origin and nature also warns us that there are what is called the “noetic” effects of sin to deal with.  Our rebellion against God is like an addiction to freedom at any cost, and therefore carries with it a blindness and distortion of our thinking that is analogous to someone with an addiction.  Entire scholarly studies have been dedicated to unraveling the various elements of the effects of sin on our ability to think especially about ultimate issues but even our ability to know anything in general.  Without going into details, we can at least point out that modern philosophy has already pointed out many of these weaknesses which all need to be filtered through the supernatural revelation of God who interprets our human condition from the divine point of view.

Taking all of that into account, one can only wonder at Ricoeur’s positivism with regards to the hermeneutic of existence by means of a general theory of interpretation to answer the deepest questions of man’s existence in the hope that it will motivate modern man to find a better balance between the necessary objectifying of creation in order to understand it and harness its power for human good and doing so with a keen eye on the self-imposed limit of love for the individual (an existential value in opposition to power or possessions) as a way of remembering our true humanity.  If it sounds utopian, it is.  It ignores the power of sin and evil in the human heart and the almost impossible task of getting the majority to accept this moral value of the virtue of love as a higher priority than power or possessions.

Ricoeur defines two tasks as belonging to this new philosophical discipline.  The first has to do with “el trabajo de convalidación” and the second has to do with “una tarea de arbitraje (p. 41).”  What he means by “el trabajo de convalidación” is basically the justification of symbolic language as the vehicle for a language of faith (and all forms of thinking).  Without going into detail about Ricoeur’s proposal for the use of symbolic language, let it be said that even this proposal as applied to an understanding of metaphysical issues is faulty at best.  In one sense, all language is symbolic in the sense that it stands for something else; language “describes” and “defines” reality (or the appearance of reality, as Ricoeur would say).

But in another sense, all language is not symbolic in the same way.  The scientific method uses “symbolic” language in a particular way.  The historical method uses “symbolic” language in a related but different way.  The literary method uses “symbolic” language in a third way.  All of them integrated and even dependent on each other but with their own idiosyncrasies and unique applications.  The problem with Ricoeur’s use of symbolic language and poetic discourse as the foundation of the language of faith is that it is weighted down with pre-conceived bias against the supernatural and especially against the supernatural as breaking into and intervening in human history.

In addition, the concept of symbol as both hiding and revealing its meaning is true of all language but in different ways and to different degrees.  The language of faith based on the biblical text is not a Gnostic revelation that opens its meaning only to the philosophical initiate, but rather it uses the plain, pointed, everyday language of the marketplace while talking about extra-ordinary events which have broken in on human existence and calls us to action.  Certainly there are deeper levels to the mystery of God and his revelation, but his message is clear and his call is not obscure.  The language of everyday life is sufficient even for modern man.  Ricoeur uses this otherwise legitimate concept of symbolism as the main vehicle for a language of faith and a justification of his existentialist philosophical anthropology.  Using the categories of symbol as laid out by Freud, Ricoeur says, “lo que resulta significativo es que bajo los tres aspectos mencionados: onírico, cósmico o poético, el símbolo presenta la siguiente estructura semántica: a través de un primer sentido inmediato generalmente de carácter material y físico, se apunta hacia un sentido existencial (p. 42).”  This self-serving re-interpretation of the biblical message has no validation outside of Ricoeur’s own opinion nor does it provide any criteria of evaluation since Ricoeur denies the biblical text the respect all texts deserve to interpret themselves within their own historical/cultural and linguistic context, even when the message is hard to believe.

By redefining the two levels of meaning that are inherent in all symbolic language in terms of existentialism, he justifies his own philosophical anthropology in counter position to the supernatural/spiritual/biblical worldview.  In addition, Ricoeur claims that symbolic language does not have “una significación univoca,” but rather “significaciones multivocas (p. 43),” which are ultimately “inagotable.”  For Ricoeur this makes sense because he is not trying to discover meaning in a supernatural revelation from a God who is actually there, but rather using the biblical text as a vehicle to express multiple definitions and revelations about human existence that is available to serve the needs of mankind in various situations and cultures and throughout all time.  It is the relativism of the symbol without limits that is the very thing that should be celebrated as a useful tool in the hermeneutic of existence without God.

It is at this point that Ricoeur arrives at his concept of “precomprensión.”  He says, “de la misma manera, justificar y convalidar en el marco de su estructura semántica al lenguaje simbólico, consiste en mostrar cómo éste verbaliza y articula el dominio de la experiencia que pertenece a la precomprensión (p. 44).”  But it is important to keep in mind that language can be imprecise or even misleading on the one hand and yet be rich in meaning on the other.  With that in mind, Ricoeur claims that “la tarea de la hermenéutica entonces, consiste en luchar contra el olvido – al que nos refiriéramos antes – para retornar a los lenguajes ricos de sentido.  Sólo este tipo de lenguajes sobredeterminados que quieren decir más que lo que dicen, guardan una equivocidad de superficie y su sobredeterminación de sentido puede ser reveladora de un trasfondo existencial (p. 44).”  Although it is understandable why Ricoeur has chosen this path to a secular language of faith, it is nothing more than a Gnostic revelation in the hands of mankind in rebellion against the God who is the revealer of all truth and knowledge and meaning.

But now Ricoeur turns to the second task of his newly defined philosophy of hermeneutics which he calls “arbitraje.”  “Su objetivo – el que hasta ahora sólo hemos entrevisto – consiste en tomar conciencia acerca de la unidad profunda que existe entre destruir e interpretar (p. 44).”  This “arbitraje” is the bridge, the language of faith, that one needs to move from a critique of society/religion/mankind to a new understanding of the fundamental affirmation of the value of human beings.  Ricoeur uses the biblical language of “casting down idols” to describe the process and even quotes the prophet Isaiah and “la lucha contra los baales (p. 45).”  The problem is that even the Devil can quote scripture for his own ends and Ricoeur does the same.  He uses the teaching of the Bible within its supernatural/spiritual/biblical worldview and strips it of its meaning and replaces it with other idols which he claims is the very supernatural/spiritual/biblical worldview that he just quoted from.  Whereas the biblical text would call his secular agenda the “baal” of our modern age, Ricoeur calls the supernatural trappings of the person and work of God the “baal” of our modern age.  Whereas the bible deplores mankind´s ongoing decision to choose freedom over love as the heart of evil, Ricoeur celebrates that freedom as the “maturity” of modern man.

With the use of “myth” and “symbolic language,” Ricoeur proposes that philosophy create a general theory of interpretation along the lines of Kant´s Critique of Pure Reason or Critique of Practical Reason, as if it were something more basic, such as a Critique of Knowledge, and would include all areas of inquiry into the human condition and evaluate all types of hermeneutics on the basis of whether or not it meets the criteria of a general theory and method of hermeneutic and interpretation of human existence.  He says, “Frente a él, la modestia de la reflexión filosófica relacionada con el teólogo y el exégeta, consiste en señalar que es el exégeta quien nos enseña a descubrir qué cosa es leer un texto.  Si llegamos a comprender que la existencia humana en su totalidad es un texto que hay que leer, nos encontraremos en el umbral de aquella hermenéutica general por medio de la cual he intentado definir la tarea de la filosofía futura (p. 47).”  Philosophy, so understood, would become the foundation of all theology and exegesis and would define what is a proper hermeneutical  method without distinction for the supernatural origin of the revelation of God through the biblical text.

Finally, Ricoeur tries to address the “ateísmo fundamental de nuestra cultura contemporánea (p. 47).”  Addressing his three masters of suspicion and their effect on modern society, he reminds us that it wasn’t their suspicion of religion on the one hand, or their reductionism on the other that matters so much as their affirmation as free beings in a world that is theirs to dominate and control and which demands (or necessitates) an “amor del destino (p. 47),” which is to say a “love of determining his own future.”  In fact, Ricoeur suggests that there are three basic positive affirmations about mankind that we should celebrate according to the masters of suspicion.  “El hombre, dicen ellos, debe llegar a amar la necesidad – amor fati -, amar las cosas tal como ellas son y aceptar que su vida desaparece, que la realidad continúa, anónima y muda.  Esta es la afirmación atea de nuestra cultura (p. 47).”  Nothing more can be said except, “how sad!”

But Ricoeur is not done.  He, himself, cannot remain there in that despair.  He plants the question “¿cuál es el lugar y el origen de la posibilidad? (p. 48).”  From his point of view, he says, “esta es a mi ver la temática fundamental de la revelación y que consiste en un llamado a la “imaginación de lo posible” (p. 48).”  Although this sounds good, Ricoeur reveals what he really means by quoting Feuerbach, “el maestro común de todo ateísmo nos dice:  devolvamos al hombre lo que él ha dado a Dios y de esta forma, que el hombre vuelva a apropiarse de aquello que ha volcado sobre lo sagrado vaciándose a sí mismo (p. 48).”  Love does not empty you but, rather, fills you to overflowing but try telling that to someone who is single, likes being single and fears the “ball and chain” of marriage precisely because they have been damaged within and no longer have the capability to love unless someone else bridges the gap and loves them anyway.  That is the source of healing and power that modern man so desperately needs.  Ricoeur provides an interesting counterpoint in the discussion of the human condition and the solution that a secular world provides and the supernatural/spiritual/biblical worldview offers.

Ricoeur ends this section by stating that the ultimate question (to which he still doesn’t know the answer) is “¿qué es el hombre? (p. 48).”  He thinks it has something to do with language and the creative power of the imagination and refuses to stay in the resignation of modern atheism.  The good news is more than a possibility, it is an act of God in history that changes everything.  The problem is that it starts with humility and that is precisely what modern man lacks.

  1. ¿Qué aspectos no entendí?

Paul Ricoeur´s discussion of symbolic language and the mythic-poetic center of man as the creative engine of his imagination is interesting but when he applies it to the biblical text, it becomes largely useless.  More work needs to be done to understand this aspect of his thought.

  1. ¿Cómo se puede aplicar el contenido a la tarea hermenéutica?

Very little of his hermeneutical method is of any use to a biblical exegete in the Evangelical tradition.  This is a secular approach that denies the supernatural nature of revelation and therefore is limited in insight into the hermeneutical task.

Bert Amsing

Master’s Program – FIET

 

 

Review of La Critica de la Religión y el Lenguaje de la Fe (Part 1) by Paul Ricoeur

03 Saturday Sep 2016

Posted by Bert Amsing in Hermeneutics

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Book Reviews, Critique of Religion, Hermeneutics, Language of Faith, Paul Ricoeur, Philosophy

  1. Nombre y apellido del alumno Bert Amsing
  2. Fecha June 17, 2016
  3. Título del texto leído Paul Ricoeur

La Crítica de la Religión y el Lenguaje de la Fe (Part I)

  1. ¿De qué trata el artículo o capítulo leído?

Paul Ricoeur, in his chapter “La Critica de la Religión y el Lenguaje de la Fe,” from his book El Lenguaje de la Fe, lays out the Hermeneutical task of the biblical exegete by looking at both the “destrucción”  and the “interpretación (p. 16)” of religion.

  1. ¿Cuál es la idea central del autor?

On the one hand, Ricoeur believes that the “tres maestros de la sospecha: Marx, Freud y Nietzsche (p. 17)” play an important role in the “desmistificación” of religion but on the other hand, his own philosophical anthropology based on a phenomenological understanding of the human condition, provides the “precomprensión” that is necessary to reinterpret religion in terms that make sense to modern man.

  1. ¿De qué nos quiere convencer?

Ricoeur wants to convince us of a particular way of fulfilling the hermeneutical task that validates the role of religion and “el lenguaje de la fe,” when properly interpreted, as a necessary counterbalance to a rationalistic secularism that “olvida” the value of the individual and the power of love as an integral part of human existence.

  1. ¿Cuáles son los puntos fuertes y los puntos débiles del texto?

There is so much to deal with in this important article that we have separated our comments into three different reviews starting with “La Critica de la religión” and then moving to “El Lenguaje de la Fe,” and finally, “Lenguaje y la teología de la palabra.”  Obviously, all three topics are related, the first two especially, but the last one as well, as a further elaboration on the language of faith.

Since the first part is about the entire project that Ricoeur is proposing for the biblical exegete, we will deal with that in detail.  In general, it needs to be said that Ricoeur’s validation of the role in secular society of the language of faith in specific and religion in general is refreshing, but that only begs the question as to what that role should be and how it should be developed.  Ricoeur still suffers, from the present authors point of view, from modern presuppositions that are at variance with the biblical worldview as well as his own hermeneutical method as we will show in this review.  He begins by talking about the relationship between the two elements of his presentation, namely, the critique of religion and the language of faith and how, in fact, the two are indivisible and inseparable.  He recognizes from the start that religion, in general, presents a problem to secular society but provides an answer based in language itself.  He says, “el problema de “la afirmación” religiosa”  must be solved “desde un plano bien determinado: el lenguaje (p. 15).”  Whether or not language, by itself, can support the infrastructure of revelation and religion remains to be seen, but the fact that Ricoeur is making the attempt is appreciated.

He makes the claim also that he is not trying to “discutir el valor o la veracidad de la experiencia religiosa (p. 15)” but rather deal with the “problema de la significación (p. 15)” of religious language which he sees as “un problema anterior (p. 15).”  He is interested in dealing with the modern difficulty with religion “por la vía del discurso, analizando la naturaleza del discurso religioso (p. 15).”  But, right at the beginning, there is a problem in how he frames the problem/question since the meaning of religious language can only be determined by those committed to the values and relationships that the religious language calls us to in the first place.  Ricoeur recognizes this element of the hermeneutical task to some extent and places himself within the religious tradition with his protestant background and ongoing commitment to a religious (even if not biblical) worldview as re-interpreted through the eyes of his phenomenological presuppositions.

But that is exactly the problem.  The biblical worldview is not the same as a religious worldview and a general religious, even protestant, upbringing is no substitute for someone who is “grasped” by the conviction of the inspiration and authority of the biblical text as the divine vehicle by which God speaks to man today.

Ricoeur betrays his commitment to a modern secular worldview (even as he is also a critic of that same ideology to some degree) when he accepts Bultmann’s demythologizing program as the means of discovering Barth’s kerygma as re-interpreted in the light of a “precomprensión” of the human condition/problem as defined by his own philosophical anthropology rooted in a phenomenological approach.

More will be said on this later, but it is worth mentioning right at the beginning that Ricoeur’s entire approach to a biblical hermeneutic, in fact, denies the value of the biblical text as being “la Palabra de Dios (p. 15).”  In his own words, he says that his approach to analyzing the nature of religious language “debería ser aceptable tanto para el creyente como para el que no lo es, ya que cuando el creyente habla de Dios, ello se debe a que en principio él se refiere a la Palabra de Dios y ese término “Palabra”, aunque lo escribimos con mayúscula, tiene relación con aquello que llamamos la palabra, es decir, el atributo del hombre parlante (p. 15).”

Ricoeur will speak more about his theology of the Word in the last chapter but he already betrays his presupposition that God, as an independent transcendent being, does not exist and that the “God” language is really about man and his existential needs, since mankind is a species that speaks, communicates, exists within and through his words.  Ricoeur tries to make it into something “objective” outside of man when he says that “la Palabra de Dios entra en nuestro discurso y se anuncia como Palabra de Dios por medio del testimonio del creyente (p. 16).”  But that is only to move the loci from the individual to mankind as a whole which will become more obvious later on in his discussion.

The point of his first observation on the project that he is proposing to bridge the gap between religion and secular society is that “language” and what it means is common to both.  That is true, but it is not enough.  Language must reflect reality and faith, in order to motivate people to action, must be believed precisely because it is a faith rooted in the reality of God’s intervention in word and action not just in secular society but in a secular society that wants to build a Babel without God where man, in the maturity of his responsibility to dominate his world, seeks not the kingdom of God but the kingdom of man however defined.  At the end of the day, for all of his good intentions, Paul Ricoeur is simply another engineer in the construction of Babel and therefore must also come under the critique of the Word of God which finds his efforts sadly wanting.

Ricoeur’s second observation is also worth discussing.  Another common thread between the two sides of his hermeneutical approach of “destrucción/critica” y “interpretación/afirmación” is that they are two sides of the same coin, both held in tension and with integrity as complimentary.  He characterizes his approach as a way to enter into “una era posreligiosa de la fe (p. 16).”  He refocuses the dialogue as not only between the believer and non-believer but a dialogue with oneself.  Since theology/religion is about human existence, in hiedeggerian terms, then it is each one of us that is “destroyed” and “re-interpreted” since it is the human condition that is the focus of this hermeneutic task.

Here is an example of Ricoeur’s flirtation with the biblical worldview and the possibility of truly entering into the possibility of becoming a “new being.”  His language is enticing and, even exciting, but lacks biblical substance.  We must take his characterization of his hermeneutical approach as an “era posreligiosa de la fe (p. 16)” seriously in terms of suggesting an entirely new way to understand the Christian faith.  When he speaks of religion, he means to include all religion in general but Western religion (Islam, Judaism and Christianity) in particular.  Even more, he is speaking specifically about Christianity.  We would agree that “religion” needs to be critiqued and even destroyed, but in the Evangelical/Reformation tradition, we are wary of institutions and politics and even a “religious spirit” which often invades the church.  We would even agree that we, as humans, need to be re-interpreted, re-affirmed and re-focused on the possibility of a new way of being human within modern society.  But that is based on a “relationship” with God, made possible through the substitutionary death of Jesus Christ and empowered by the Holy Spirit as testified to by the Word of God and the experience of the saints throughout history.  In that way we can rid ourselves of religion and return to the simplicity of faith.

The problem is that Paul Ricoeur does not believe in any of this.  He is not suggesting that we make the old truths more understandable to the modern age but rather that we re-interpret the truth into something new that is both more acceptable/credible to modern man while at the same time calling him to not forget what makes us truly human: love for each individual.  Still, it is true that each one of us must be “destroyed” and “re-interpreted” by the biblical text on its own terms.  The problem is that Ricoeur imposes a meaning on religion through “pre-comprehension” beliefs about the human condition that distorts the biblical message and gives the lie to his own hermeneutical method.  If Ricoeur were to respect the biblical text as a foundational source of meaning and apply his method, in general, to a hermeneutic of its message before he commits himself to an understanding of the human condition based on his philosophical anthropology, he may have discovered a deeper biblical truth that is the true source of this mysterious motivational force that has transformed lives, and to a lesser degree, cultures for the past two thousand years.

His third observation concerning the relationship of the two sides of his approach is shorter but interesting.  There is a sort of dialectic between “destrucción/critica” and “interpretación/afirmación” that cannot be ignored.  He says, “por lo tanto desearía mostrar a partir de hoy cómo en el movimiento de destrucción esta presente un factor que para mí es un movimiento de la fe (p. 16).”  Even in the midst of our critique of religion, institutions, ideologies and the human condition in general (all of which require a hermeneutical approach), we may be tempted to despair and meaninglessness, but the kerygma of the Word of God, calls us not to forget what makes us truly human: love for the individual.  That is an act of faith.  It is the intelligence of faith and it can call us into an entirely new way of being in this world.

Lofty words indeed but again without much substance.  It is true but not sufficient.  To know that love is the answer is not to yet defeat evil within oneself or within society.  In fact, one could argue that our moral obligation to others within society is a basic building block of our individual and social conscience.  Perhaps it is part of that fundamental awareness of God and our guilt before him precisely because we know of our responsibility and yet do not fulfill it.  In other words, the biblical text tells us that the problem is not “forgetting” it but “suppressing” it and thereby creating a primordial guilt before God and man that forms the relational problem at the heart of the gospel.  The problem of evil is not defeated by remembering the solution and believing that somehow, someway, man will rise to the occasion and do something about it.  That is the point of the problem of evil:  when the chips are down, we choose ourselves and not the other.  Evil is first of all within and first of all relational.  Having cut ourselves off from our creator, we have prioritized ourselves over others and alienated ourselves from the source and purpose of all love: to please God above all and love our neighbors as ourselves.  The words are not enough.  Words have meaning and meaning can be comprehended and even agreed to but we still have not yet dealt with the sin or changed anything.  A utopian anthropology from a scholar who believes that the will is defective and in need of repair, needs something more substantive to show how language, imagination, even hope, impacts the will and makes a real change in ontology beyond simply a new self-awareness of our potential.  If he cannot do so, he might consider the biblical answer before he begins his project of “demistificación.”

At this point, after making his three observations of how the two movements he proposes are linked through language, existence and hope, he describes his overall approach.  On the one hand, he will review “la critica externa” of religion by the “tres maestros de la sospecha: Marx, Freud y Nietzsche (p. 17).”  He calls this process “desmistificación.”  On the other hand, he will propose his own “critica interna” which is, in his view, “una critica de la religión por medio de la fe (p. 17).”  He calls this second process “desmitologización.”  Both of these movements make up the first part of his approach which is a critique of religion from without and within.  At the end of the discussion, he will reveal for us the power of “affirmation” which lies within the critique and which takes an act of faith to move boldly into the second part of his hermeneutical approach.  Whether or not, from an Evangelical point of view, he succeeds in his efforts remains to be seen.

He begins his explanation of “desmistificación” by defining and reducing Christianity to a kerygma, or proclamation to a particular audience.  He claims not to be offering a critique of the content but rather the context or form in which the proclamation comes.  He says, “estamos entonces en presencia de un problema ligado a la ilusión del origen (p. 17).”  It’s like a letter that comes in the mail, he says, with great content and meaning, that you thought came from one person but in fact came from another.  The biblical text falls into the same problem.  You thought that it came from a supernatural source but, it is really just from other human beings.  The content is still significant and meaningful and that is what needs to be the focus.  You were under the “mistificación” of a belief of origin and now you need to have that belief “desmistificado.”

As a first response, I would say that it makes a lot of difference whether the letter came from my father or not, even if the letter spoke eloquently about my future possibilities and what it means to be me.  But, since in this case, the father in question is “supernatural” and I have never met him in person or know for sure that he exists, I suppose Ricoeur’s advice is understandable that the content is all I have to go on.  But don’t tell me that it doesn’t make a material difference in the interpretation, validity and authority of the content, because it does.  Even more, since the fundamental question is “Who am I?” and why am I both “originally good, but radically evil,” it would be wise, if I trusted the source of the content as my father/creator, to allow the content to interpret me before I tried to interpret the content.  In other words, by calling the origin of the content an “illusion,” he has not made things more intelligible to modern man but rather less.  By taking away the authority of the content, he has weakened its ability to change the human heart and make inroads on the problem of evil that faces us all.  Still, he accepts this approach at face value and introduces us to the three masters of suspicion:  Marx, Freud and Nietzsche.

Ricoeur states that “quisiera entrar en este nivel crítico por medio del análisis de la función de la “sospecha” entendida como el instrumento crítico de dicha desmistificación y así tratar de comprender lo que tal sospecha representa para nuestra cultura (p. 17).”  It is worth looking at this statement in more detail.  It is important to distinguish between the content of what Marx, Freud and Nietzsche proposed and the methodology of “suspicion” as a hermeneutical tool that they used.  Ricoeur says that he wants to analyze the “función de la sospecha” as a critical tool in the process of “desmistificación.”  He then connects that suspicion with the central problem of our secular culture with religion in general.  He claims that these three masters of suspicion “pertenecen a nuestra cultura y con los que estamos parcialmente ligados (p. 17).”  On a cultural level, suspicion of the validity of religion is the central problem which Ricoeur wants to overcome by the use of a new language of faith rooted in this “desmistificación/desmitologización” process of his hermeneutical approach.  On a personal level, he admits that he is “partially” connected to their point of view but has gone beyond it to affirm something new about human nature.

Ricoeur claims that all three were involved in a hermeneutic of existence.  Marx through our economic existence, Freud through psychoanalysis and Nietzsche through the evolution of morality and the false conscience.  Since they were all involved in a hermeneutical task and the purpose of hermeneutics, according to Ricoeur, is to reveal what is hidden beneath and behind the obvious, superficial message, there is a natural process of “desmistificación” that takes place through a critique of “appearances” to the deeper ideologies hidden beneath it.  There is not only a “conciencia falsa” (Marx) but a “conciencia enmascarada” (Nietzsche).  Ricoeur says, “precisamente esta relación entre lo que se oculta y lo que se manifiesta convoca a una tarea específica, a una hermenéutica (p. 17).”  He goes on to say, and demonstrates it in the second half of his article, that the appearances are false and the hidden meaning is true and that it is the job of the exegete to reveal that truth.  Again, true but not sufficient, at least in the view of the present author.  To transpose a critique of society and culture where truth is not always apparent and falsehood often intentional to the biblical text and the hermeneutical task of the biblical exegete is nothing short of misrepresentation.

Of course, if you strip the biblical text of its supernatural origins and define it solely in human terms, then truth and falsehood, transparency and hiddeness play a larger role.  The biblical text itself invites us to consider its supernatural origin and therefore inspired and authoritative status as a hermeneutical principle that believes in the perspicuity of Scripture, while maintaining its “mystery” (requiring a deeper “brokenness” and humility, understanding and commitment) to reveal itself fully.  Much in the same way that God himself is both “obvious” in that he revealed himself to us and therefore is capable of making himself understood in all times and cultures, but he is also “hidden” and reveals himself progressively as the relationship with the “seeker” develops.  Much like any human relationship over time.  The problem, in the case of the biblical text, is not in the text itself but in the exegete who wishes to go deeper but finds that he himself is both “destroyed” and “interpreted” by the God who speaks to each of us through the biblical text empowered and enlightened by the Holy Spirit.  In fact, it is not God, nor the biblical text that wears the mask, but rather us.  Ricoeur says that it “es una manera de descubrir el sentido debajo del sentido.  desvelar lo que estaba velado, en otras palabras, quitar las máscaras. (p. 20).”

But, because the supernatural origin of the biblical text is nothing but an illusion, Ricoeur comes to the biblical text from a position of suspicion and therefore needs a hermeneutic of suspicion.  If he reversed the process and started with a supernatural origin to the biblical text and allowed God to define the human condition and reveal his solution in the person and work of Christ, then we can look at our present situation and be suspicious of ourselves and our culture and institutions and make a distinction between truth and falsehood, appearances and hiddeness in mankind and the world systems that needs to be revealed and changed in the light of Scripture.  Now we are on the right track.  But Ricoeur refuses to go there and puts his entire “external critique” of religion (which may not be so bad) on to the biblical text as if the two were the same and that religion is a natural consequence of the biblical text (which almost no one would agree to).  It is simplistic and patently false to equate the two.  Yet Ricoeur states that “sobre esta relación entre lo oculto y lo manifestó habrá de construirse un método de destrucción completamente nuevo (p. 20).”  He then goes on to analyze the contributions of Marx, Freud and Nietzsche to this new critique of religion.  His entire edifice crumbles at the foundation.

All of this begs the question of what Ricoeur is actually trying to accomplish.  It smacks of a new attempt at natural theology starting not from the existence of God but from the existence of Man and a basic understanding of the human condition.  But more on this in the second half of his presentation.  In the meantime, suffice it to say that, from an Evangelical point of view, Ricoeur provides no value in his critique of religion to the degree that he applies this “external critique” to the biblical text as if religion is always a natural and accurate outcome of the reading of foundational texts.  On the other hand, a hermeneutic of suspicion of religion in general, and even Christianity in specific, may be useful since human sin and evil tends to distort the message of the Word of God or ignore its implications for human society.

At the same time, it must be said, that the suspicion of Marx, Freud and Nietzsche was clearly directed at Christianity (and religion in general) without distinction or respect for the biblical message.  Marx had no place for religion in his understanding of the world and his anthropology suffered for it, leading to mass killings and ineffective policies within the various communist movements based on his work eventually leading to ultimate failure of his utopian ideal.  Freud believed that religion was an illusion and an escape from the real forces that drive human motivation.  Nietzsche, at least, was led to despair when he claimed that the idea of God was dead in our modern world (and rightly so).

Now scholars like Ricoeur are attempting to find a place for religion in our secular society but only at the price of “desmistificación y desmitologización.”  This attempt will also fail because it attempts a bridge between the believer and the non-believer on something other than the gift of faith that only a supernatural God can provide.  It is something akin to being a matchmaker by packaging both the man and the woman in acceptable and enticing clothes but not dealing with their basic need to connect and fall in love.  The matchmaker can wax eloquent about the virtues of love and even describe its benefits but cannot create it.  Without a supernatural origin to the incredible content of the biblical message, no bridge will ever make it to the other side unless it comes from the source of love itself.  But that would be too much for Ricoeur’s rationalistic foundations, even though it would be true to his hermeneutical “intent” (as we will see later on), providing a critique of his own approach and presuppositions and potentially affirming his value in relationship with God and leading him into an entirely new experience of what it means to be human filled “ontologically” with the presence of God.  Sadly, that is no longer an option for him.

This question of “affirmation” deserves more clarification as well.  This is the third aspect of this “destrucción/critica” which he calls “la intención común de afirmación (p. 21).”  The question of what is affirmed is central to the rest of the hermeneutical task.  He says, “más allá de la duda, más allá del trabajo de desciframiento, debemos luchar dentro de nosotros mismos con esta afirmación (p. 20,21).”  He even goes so far as to say that these three masters of suspicion are, finally, “pensadores positivos” because they intend to “restaurar fundamentalmente los valores positivos del hombre (p. 21).”  But, to be clear and fair, what he really means is “los valores positivos del hombre sin Dios” which is to say, without the trappings of belief in a supernatural God, transcendent and independent of our world while integrally involved in it.  From a biblical perspective, these are not “positive” values but rather “negative” ones that are at the very heart of the problem of man’s separation from God.  Ricoeur even goes so far as to quote Feuerbach´s definition of man’s fundamental problem with religion as the “disolución del hombre en lo absoluto (p. 22) which Feuerbach understands as a loss of substance (which Ricoeur would not agree with as an attribute of the essence/existence of man).  Still, he goes on to say that “de ahí que Feuerbach reclame, como tarea del hombre, la recuperación de su propia sustancia y detener así su “hemorragia” en medio de lo sagrado (p. 22).”

When you add that to Marx’s interpretation of Feuerbach in terms of “la necesidad a la libertad (p. 22),” you have a picture of man’s fundamental problem of wanting the freedom of liberation from any moral or relational dependence on an authority higher than ourselves that we simply don’t trust.  We sound like a “player” or “womanizer” who is dedicated to his own freedom as a single guy who can play the field looking for some ever fleeting satisfaction in the superficial sex and egoism that so characterizes our modern age, not realizing that what we really want is the fulfillment of a “love-connection” with someone we can trust because that person knows who we are with all of our flaws and imperfections and loves us anyway (or, to use the biblical perspective, “makes it possible for us to be loved anyway.”).  Given Ricoeur’s sensitivity to the necessity of the religious affirmation of life by remembering that the love for the individual is what makes us truly human, makes all of these comments so hard to swallow.  He is so close to the truth but his basic premises and presuppositions keep him from seeing it clearly.

Ricoeur goes on to talk about the idols of money, power and desire that these three masters of suspicion have uncovered in their critique of religion.  But once again, even though the details are interesting, it isn’t the existence of idols as a specific expression of evil in society that is important.  The Bible has revealed these idols to man centuries ago.  The existence of evil or their expression in terms of institutions and systems of action and thought in society isn’t anything new (other than perhaps some aspect of their external form in our modern age).  The question at hand is what to do about them.  It is a question of power not of language.  To name the evil may have some superficial benefit but to harness the power to defeat that evil is the purpose of the hermeneutical exercise.  It is the power of the indicative expressed in the imperative by defeating the power of sin and evil in the human heart and then working together to defeat it in society, even as we broaden the circle of those who have been personally impacted by the power of the Holy Spirit in their lives as an expression of the new relationship with God made possible by the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ.  Without that objective reality, faith as a vehicle for motivational power fails miserably.

Ricoeur even suggests that the three masters of suspicion provide their own “myths” for the modern world.  He says “no es tarea fácil comprender plenamente estos tres mitos mencionados: la sociedad sin clases o la necesidad asumida, el eterno retorno y el principio de realidad (p. 23),” which combat the idols of money, power and desire as demonstrated in the institutions and systems of modern society.  Ricoeur tries to tie even these three “myths” or “affirmations of the possibilities of the future” together when he says, “lo que tal vez ellos tienen en común es una cierta manera de destacar la realidad tal cual ella es, como una forma de celebración del poderío libertador de la necesidad (p. 23).”  This concept of reality as being its own truth and should be celebrated as such smacks of pragmatism and suffers from the same ultimate fate of “might makes right” that characterizes so much of modern life.  It is not a solution even if it is limited to a freedom from religion, or the sacred, or God as traditionally defined.  If the other two “myths” belong to the same category as the principle of reality and the freeing power of doing what is necessary as dictated by that reality, then all moral intent is founded on utilitarianism, which, in itself, needs an organizing principle to define what is good and what is evil for the people in question.  Between the twin “idols” of pragmatism and utilitarianism is the abyss of a freedom without limits.  Ricoeur seems to have forgotten the fundamental problem mankind which is the discovery that we are “originally good but radically evil” and that only a deeper understanding and radical transformation of who we are will fix the problem.  These modern myths will lead us deeper into the abyss and further from the “love for each individual” that was clearly demonstrated by a God who became man and died so that we could be saved from our “sin.”  The evil is within and it is relational.  That is the exact opposite of what Ricoeur and the three masters of suspicion celebrate in their critique/destruction of religion and the biblical text/worldview.

Perhaps Ricoeur is more aware of the implications of his approach than he seems.  Speaking of the three masters of suspicion, he claims “porque lo que tienen en común es la iconoclasia, la lucha contra los ídolos, es decir, contra los dioses o si se quiere, contra el Dios de los hombres (p. 24).”  Obviously, Ricoeur doesn’t believe that there really is a God that exists as an objective reality that he is fighting against, but even if we interpret him as meaning “the word “God” which represents all of traditional belief that needs to be stripped away,” his intent is still clear.  He equates the idols that need to be defeated as the belief in the supernatural God of the Scriptures.   This is what he means by a “mature faith” for modern man.  He believes that the historic faith in a supernatural God that has revealed himself through history and spoken to us through Scripture has resulted in the idols “de miedo, de la dominación y del odio (p. 24).  This truth was revealed to us through the “critica marxista de la ideología, crítica nietzschearia del resentimiento, crítica freudiana de la debilidad infantil (p. 24).”   It is in the details of each of their hermeneutic that these truths and their logical, rational basis in the poison of religion in the history of Western Civilization is evident.

Even if that were true, which not everyone finds convincing, we are speaking of “religion,” even Christianity, as an institution and a system of belief, politics, economics, morality etc.  Where is the justification for equating that “religious” system with the biblical message which stands over all of us to destroy us and interpret us from the perspective of God?  When someone has a problem with the church, the assumption always is that the church accurately reflects what God desires or teaches.  Not true.  God is committed to the church but he doesn’t always agree with it.  God can use an individual or organization but not approve of him (or it).

Ricoeur now moves on to the “internal critique” of religion (i.e. Christianity) by turning to the work of Bultmann (and even Barth).  According to Ricoeur, this “desmitologización” is just as much a part of the process of his hermeneutical approach as the “desmistificación” and external critique of religion.  The two movements must be understood as two parts of one process.  Together they describe “la distancia cultural que existe (p. 24)” between modern society and the language and cultural expressions of the Gospel.  The wording here is important because Ricoeur is claiming that the problem is not one of historical distance between a culture that existed two thousand years ago and our modern, scientific and technologically advanced society.  It is a linguistic rather than a historical distance.  Ricoeur attempts to use Barth’s concept of “kerygma” as a hermeneutical principle for understanding the core message of the gospel.  But rather than letting the biblical text itself determine the core message of the gospel, Ricoeur imposes his own interpretation (even though he uses biblical language).  At first glance it sounds correct to say that “la predicación de la Cruz (p. 25)” is the heart of the gospel message.  And it is.  But it depends on the content of that preaching.

Ricoeur himself recognizes that it “es una locura para el mundo (p. 25)” but he doesn’t quite grasp what that “craziness” consists in.  He claims, later on, that the foolishness of the gospel consists in the reminder that love for the individual is what makes us human and that the preaching of the gospel is there to remind us of that truth in a society which constantly objectifies humanity in terms of their performance or utility.  Although there is some truth here, that is not what Paul meant by the foolishness of the Gospel.  It isn’t the reminder of our true humanity based on love for the individual that is the solution to our problem but rather the historical reality of the cross itself.  If the biblical perspective is correct that we are willfully estranged from our creator and that has created evil in our hearts and sin in our actions, resulting in suffering, pain and death and that the only solution is that our relationship with the very real, transcendent God must be restored, then the foolishness of the cross begins to be revealed.

The world refuses to accept God’s interpretation of the human condition in such exclusive and supernatural terms without recourse to rational argumentation or scientific verification.  God has not left himself without testimony to this reality, both in creation as well as in mankind himself, in terms of his awareness of a being who is the source of all things, and our primordial guilt for cutting him out of our life and becoming gods to ourselves.  In that context, the cross and its necessity as the only solution to our sin and evil, defined in relational terms first of all, both destroys us as well as affirms us.  We are destroyed in all of our arrogance and willful refusal to bow the knee to our creator father but we are affirmed in our basic value to him that he would take the burden upon his own shoulders and fulfill his justice with his own sacrificial love.  This is the divine praxis that is the keystone of all of history and puts every heart to the test.  This is the divine portal that demands “brokeness” but promises “new life.”  It is the necessity of the cross, so defined, that offends us in our blindness.  There is nothing so embarrassing in heaven or on earth than the arrogance of those who ought to be ashamed of themselves.  Sadly, that applies to all of us.  To accept the preaching of the cross is to be taught first of all (by amazing grace) that we are “radically evil” even if “originally good” and there is no way for us to resolve that paradox or return to paradise on our own.  It must come from a supernatural source outside of us and our wisdom and insight.  We may see glimpses of it.  We may even recognize the outlines of the problem but we have no power to solve the problem.  We are the problem.

Ricoeur may be able to use the structure of Barth’s thought by making a distinction between the kerygma of the gospel preaching centered in the cross from its cultural trappings but it is a false dichotomy.  That is not to say that there aren’t cultural trappings and that there isn’t a process of separating out what is incidental or culturally conditioned from what is the clear message of the scriptures.  That is part of the job of the biblical exegete in the process of his hermeneutical task.  But that is not what Ricoeur is suggesting.  He claims that all of the cultural trappings are found in the actual content of the message and that the supernatural aspects of the message are obviously part of a pre-scientific view of the world which is no longer acceptable to modern man.  This is a belief statement accepted by many modern theologians and has lead to a major distortion of the Word of God.  Ricoeur states it in the following way.  He claims that we need to create “un espacio para creer (p. 26)” for modern man.  His goal is “que la locura de la Cruz se va a decir dentro de lo que es creíble para una cultura dada (p. 26).”  Later he will make some modifications to this criteria of “credibility” but, at least here, he claims that it is the criteria for determining what is cultural trappings and what is the heart of the gospel.  He says, “de esta forma los signos se transformarán en milagros, el origen divino de Cristo se expresará a través del nacimiento virginal, la victoria sobre la muerte y la resurrección se transmitirán a través de la tumba vacía o por medio de las apariciones milagrosas.  Pero esta larga y durable amalgama entre la locura del mensaje y aquello que fue la creencia de una época, se deshace a nuestra vista (p. 26).”  Really?  Why?  Just because it isn’t credible to modern man?

Actually, it goes deeper than that.  Ricoeur, along with many others, has already been infected with the hermeneutic of suspicion about the veracity, historicity and objectivity of the gospel through a mixture of half-truths, misunderstandings and philosophical manipulations of the past two to three hundred years.  It is that “body of evidence” that has distanced him from the truth of scripture as given in the biblical text and provides the real justification for the demythologizing project of theologians such as Bultmann.  So, it isn’t the credibility of modern man that is the criteria but rather, given that these elements have been proven to be cultural trappings by the work of scholars over the past two to three hundred years, we should consider getting rid of them so that the preaching of the Cross can clearly be heard and understood by modern man.  It is Ricoeur’s presuppositions about the biblical text that are the problem here.  What is so unnerving is that Ricoeur launches an attack on the biblical text in the name of Christ and the preaching of the cross.  He defines the hermeneutical task in terms of this distance and lack of transparency (however intentional) that these primitive beliefs represent and the need to maintain the scandal of the cross (interpreted as a love for the individual which makes us truly human) as the true meaning of Scripture.

Ricoeur goes on to talk of the hermeneutical task that the Church Fathers were engaged in  while obviously favoring the Alexandrian Fathers with their Hellenizing attitude over those like Tertullian and St. Augustine who maintained more distance from Greek thought in their hermeneutical efforts.  He talks of St. Paul and his re-interpretation of the Old Testament through allegory as if allegory was his only, or even main, hermeneutic tool while at the same time denying the testimony of the biblical text that Christ (and the New Testament) came to “fulfill” the Old Testament, not set it aside, or re-interpret it or somehow provide the true meaning of what went before.  None of that is true to the biblical testimony of the Old Testament as continuous with the New but finding its fulfillment (distinctiveness) in terms of redemptive history in the work and person of Jesus Christ and the establishment of the church.

Of course, if like Ricoeur, you do not believe that the biblical text can interpret itself or give testimony to its own validity, veracity, historicity and inspiration, then there is no way to have a cogent discussion about any of it.  But if that is the case, why should Ricoeur be allowed to use St. Paul’s hermeneutical approach, misunderstand it and misrepresent it and yet still use it to justify his own hermeneutical approach which is godless and inaccurate with regards to the biblical message.

He even goes so far as to claim that for the early Christians, in the light of the preaching of the cross, the Old Testament turned into “una letra obsoleta y envejecida, el viejo Testamento (p. 28).”   On the contrary, when Christ walked with the two disciples on the road to Emmaus and revealed to them how the Scriptures (the Old Testament) spoke of Christ and why it was necessary for him to die and be raised again on the third day, the testimony of the disciples was that their hearts “burned” within them.  Ricoeur is simply misinformed.

He claims that the same thing happened later on in the process of taking the living and active word of Christ and writing it down in the pages of what would become the New Testament which is to say “el que quedará también encerrado en la cáscara de su propio medio cultural (p. 28).”  Not that it isn’t true.  After all, God has determined to use human language within their cultural limitations to speak of things fundamentally unspeakable.  In fact, the existence of the entire Old Testament history and culture was a reflection of God’s intention to create a cultural and linguistic context for understanding the cross and what it means for human life and potential.  If a covenantal/transaction Christology is at the heart of the preaching of the cross, and if that transaction is between God the Father and God the Son (rather than with the Devil or with mankind), then what else could God do but first teach us the language of redemption before accomplishing it.  The very existence of the Old Testament gives credence to the idea that God speaks through human language and its cultural limitations. As the master of language and communication, we believe that God manages to speak clearly and concisely, even if somewhat culturally conditioned, through both the Old and New Testament to our modern age.  The problem is not the language of the message but “the will to be free” (rather than “the will to believe” which is a gift of God).

At the same time, Ricoeur manages to ask some good questions which he sees as the heart of the hermeneutical problem.  He asks, “¿cómo hacer para que el Nuevo Testamento no se transforme en un segundo Antiguo Testamento? (p. 28).”  Leaving aside for the moment his analysis of the Old Testament as obsolete at the coming of Christ, still even Jesus claimed that many in his audience accepted the form of religion but denied its power.  For the Jews, as well as many Christians, the danger is always there that the Old and New Testament can become obsolete and irrelevant but, also like Jesus, we believe that the problem does not lie in the Scriptures but in the heart of mankind himself.

Again he asks, “¿Cómo lograr que no se torne en una simple escritura? (p. 28).”  Meaning that preaching has most often lost its power to establish the new reality of the indicative and motivate people to the imperative of the gospel.  That is also true and needs to be addressed.  Ricoeur believes (without much argumentation or experiential proof) that the power of the Gospel can be regained if modern man understands (or doesn’t forget) the language of faith which speaks of “love for the individual which makes us truly human.”  Even if we interpret Ricoeur’s “not forgetting” with a full-bodied “comprehension and apprehension” (as required by the hermeneutical task), he still provides no assurances that such “apprehension” comes from the efforts of linguistic analysis to create a language of faith that is understandable and credible to modern man even as it challenges him to greater humanity in the context of the objectivization of people in our increasingly technological society.  It sounds good, but does it work?

For Ricoeur, it is this hermeneutical task which makes it possible to believe and belief is essential to the hermeneutical circle.  He says, “yo no puedo acércame a un texto si no comprendo lo que me dice, pero al mismo tiempo, debo ser captado por lo que el texto dice (p. 28).”  So far, so good.  Of course, there probably isn’t anyone alive today, even in modern society, that doesn’t have some notion (however incorrect it may be) of God, man, sin and salvation.  To treat modern society as totally “un-analogous” to early Christians (or Christians throughout the ages and in every culture and race) is simply saying too much.  Is there a problem of credibility in our modern rationalistic culture?  Of course, but the problem is not, first of all, the language of the Bible (although perhaps of the church) but the priority of “freedom from authority” over the “freedom of love” in the heart of man.

Ricoeur goes on to say, “por lo tanto es necesario creer para comprender y a su vez, no es posible comprender sin descifrar el texto (p. 28).”  Almost but not quite.  Yes, we must believe in order to understand but there is an awareness of God, there is a content to the “pre-comprehension” that is necessary in approaching any hermeneutical task (although with very different content than what Ricoeur suggests in the second part of his article) but that is not the issue.  Certainly we cannot understand “sin descifrar el texto,” but just like the Ethiopian eunuch in his chariot in the desert, who was confused by the text, we must not only acknowledge that we need to “descifrar el texto” but ask the essential question.  “Who can explain it to me?”  Certainly the “who” is the exegete, but not just any exegete, rather it is Phillip, one who is filled with the Spirit of God, one of the disciples of Jesus who, by his own testimony, can give evidence to the historicity, validity and veracity of the person and work of Jesus.  The real question is whether or not someone who is not filled with the inner illumination of the Spirit of God and who is not committed to the biblical text as it stands, with its self-testimony to being the inspired, living, authoritative Word of God, whether a person like that can “descifrar el texto” to discover a message that is divine in origin and destined to change the world one individual at a time.  The answer, according to the same biblical text, is “no” – that godless, rationalistic person cannot be the exegete that discerns the true meaning of the text.

Ricoeur anticipates this argumentation by referring to Bultmann and his comment that you cannot reduce this hermeneutical process merely to psychology “como si se tratara de la posesión de la emotividad o la experiencia de la fe como condición para acercarse a un texto (p. 28).”  But that simply begs the question since Bultmann is the very one who suggests the project of demythologizing in the first place since he, himself, does not approach the biblical text from a position of “la experiencia de la fe.”

Bultmann claims that hermeneutics is about “methodology” where “por un lado, el objeto de la fe regula la lectura y por otro, el método de desciframiento regula la comprensión (p. 28).”  Actually, we would agree.   The problem is that the first affects the second, which is to say, that without “la experiencia de la fe,” the exegete will not rightly discern the “objeto de la fe” which is the scandal of the cross as God’s condemnation and affirmation of mankind and his call to new life on his terms through brokeness and restauration (death and resurrection).  If the personal experience of faith is rooted in the object of our faith which is the person and work of Christ as defined by the Old and New Testament, it will lead us to a particular posture of humility (since we have accepted the freedom of being under the loving authority of God) before the supernatural origin of the biblical text within its human language and linguistic limitations, believing that God speaks his message clearly in the basics, but also rewards ongoing commitment, obedience and searching with the deeper mysteries of his will and person.  From there, in the community of the saints throughout time and in all places, we discern from the biblical text itself the hermeneutical tools that are necessary to allow Scripture to interpret Scripture.  That is an Evangelical “hermeneutical circle”:  the personal experience of faith which rightly, and necessarily, discerns the object of its faith and therefore stands in humility before the inspired and authoritative word of God to discover the hermeneutical principles embedded in the text itself and applies these principles to a particular text while fully aware of its historical, linguistic and cultural context with an eye to the needs of modern man as first of all interpreted by that same Word of God and common (by ontological analogy) to all men of all cultures, times and places and as experienced by the people to whom you must preach.  But this is classical hermeneutics and traditional Christianity and, according to Ricoeur, nobody is listening to the barely credible biblical worldview in modern society today.  That is also not true but that is another discussion for another day.

In conclusion, Ricoeur makes a statement at the end of his first section that is at the heart of his hermeneutical approach but also which gives the lie to everything that he teaches.  He says, “El exégeta no es su propio maestro:  comprender significa someterse a los requerimientos del objeto que se halla implicado en el texto.  De esta forma, la hermenéutica cristiana se pone en movimiento por medio de la Proclamación del núcleo de su mensaje (p. 28).”  If Ricoeur would follow his own advice, he would end up throwing his entire hermeneutic approach in the trash.  He, himself, is trying to be his own teacher.  He, himself, is trying to build a hermeneutical method based on his own philosophical anthropology.  He, himself, does not “someterse a los requierimientos del objeto que se halla implicado en el texto,” rather, he redefines the “object of our faith” along existentialist and phenomenological lines which means that he, himself, has missed “el núcleo de su mensaje.”  And this is not merely apologetic, it is a fact that he, himself, would agree with.  Ricoeur would admit that a supernatural approach to the origin of the biblical text would change everything, including the experience of faith, the object of faith, the humility before the inspired and authoritive biblical text and the discovery of the hermeneutical principles embedded there which are all preliminary to the actual task of hermeneutics.

Ricoeur goes on to say, “la existencia del círculo deriva del hecho de que, para comprender el texto, es necesario creer en el anuncio; pero aquello que es anunciado en el texto no se encuentra en ningún otro lugar más que en el acto de descífralo y en ese tipo de lucha entre el verdadero y el falso escándalo, se sitúa en el seno del propio texto (p. 29).”  What beautiful language he uses but it is filled with content that is misleading.  Especially in his last line where he claims that it is “en ese tipo de lucha entre el verdadero y el falso escándalo, se sitúa en el seno del propio texto.”  The problem is that he has the wrong interpretation of the scandal of the cross because he does not situate himself as the exegete “en el seno del propio texto.”  He, himself, does not follow his own hermeneutical approach but rather re-interprets the entire linguistic context for understanding the text before he begins to exegete the text (but we will discuss this further in the next section).

As a final blow to the classical concept of hermeneutics based on a traditional understanding of Christianity, Ricoeur claims that “ese círculo sólo puede ser roto por el creyente como “hermeneuta”, en tanto permanece fiel a su comunidad, y por el hermeneuta como “creyente”, cuando realiza su trabajo científico como exégeta (p. 29).”  Of course, if you don’t believe that Ricoeur’s (or Bultmann’s) hermeneutical circle is valid in the first place, it certainly doesn’t matter whether it is “broken” or not, since such “brokeness” may, in fact, be the correct way of completing the hermeneutical task from a biblical point of view.  Suffice it to say, that, even so, Ricoeur’s attempt at an “objective,” general hermeneutical method (which is the same for all texts without consideration of the distinctiveness of the biblical text) is counter-intuitive to his claims to be a rational, secular scholar who believes in the subjectivity of man as the ultimate reality.  Perhaps that misguided “objectivity” which has no place in biblical hermeneutics, is even expressed in the desire to separate doctrine from philosophy or even discussion about biblical hermeneutics as if it is not appropriate or helpful.  This author would certainly not agree.  Within Evangelical circles (in Protestant and Catholic Christianity) the goal is to show much charity, but outside, where the proclamation must be made, much apologetics (based on biblical doctrine) and prayer.

  1. ¿Qué aspectos no entendí?

More work could be done in understanding the specific perspectives of Nietzsche, Marx and Freud and how they might contribute to an understanding of modern society but, in the process, there would have to be both a recognition of the religious and cultural causes as well as a separation from the biblical message itself.

  1. ¿Cómo se puede aplicar el contenido a la tarea hermenéutica?

Ricoeur served more as a goad to understanding the classical hermeneutical process in terms of traditional Christianity than as a contributor to the hermeneutical task in and of itself.  Still, the issues he raises are valuable even though his answers are not.  At the same time, thought must be given as to whether the way that he frames the hermeneutical problem in the first place is entirely correct from an Evangelical point of view.

Bert Amsing

Master’s Program – FIET

 

 

 

Review of El Carácter Hermenéutico Común a la Fe Bíblica y a Filosofía by Paul Ricoeur

03 Saturday Sep 2016

Posted by Bert Amsing in Hermeneutics

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Book Reviews, Hermeneutics, Paul Ricoeur, Philosophy and Theology

  1. Nombre y apellido del alumno Bert Amsing
  2. Fecha June 15, 2016
  3. Título del texto leído Paul Ricoeur

El Carácter Hermenéutico Común a la Fe Bíblica y a Filosofía

  1. ¿De qué trata el artículo o capítulo leído?

Paul Ricoeur, in his final chapter “El carácter hermenéutico común a la fe bíblica y a filosofía,” found in his book Fe y Filosofia – Problemas del lenguaje religioso, discusses the hermeneutical foundation in common between Biblical Faith and Philosophy.

  1. ¿Cuál es la idea central del autor?

Paul Ricoeur claims that there is a common hermeneutical basis to both Biblical Faith and Philosophy and provides three dialectical areas in which this can be seen.

  1. ¿De qué nos quiere convencer?

He is trying to convince us that there is a necessary and desirable effect that comes from a conception of biblical faith as an intelligence of its own that provides motivation and insight into human existence from the side of the imagination and love which balances the argumentation and justice concerns of philosophy.

  1. ¿Cuáles son los puntos fuertes y los puntos débiles del texto?

The topic of faith and philosophy is already of interest to theological students but to add a chapter on the relationship of biblical faith and philosophical anthropology makes for very interesting reading.  In terms of the history of philosophy over the last couple of hundred years, metaphysics and the supernatural, much less natural theology and the historicity and objectivity of the biblical text has been under continual attack.  To return to the question of the relationship between Athens and Jerusalem in authors such as Leo Strauss and Paul Ricoeur is a treat not to be missed.  Still, in general, there are misgivings about the entire philosophical approach that distinguishes Athens from Jerusalem, Reason from Faith, or even love from justice.  It appears to the present author that the distinctions are too sharp and the dichotomy too strong, even though the attempt at harmonization or, at least, a clarifying of roles is welcome.  But let’s start at the beginning.

Paul Ricoeur starts by making some clarifications about the hermeneutical character of both biblical faith and philosophy.  He appears to agree with Paul Tillich, at least in general, when he claims that the ultimate purpose of philosophy and theology is to understand the human condition/existence.  He says, “así considerada, la filosofía es fundamentalmente una antropología filosófica..(p. 222).”  Philosophy is about being, specifically, in Ricoeur’s thinking, human beings (i.e. he makes the distinction between things that exist, things that are alive and human beings in their distinctiveness – awareness, cognition etc.).  Paul Tillich claims that both theology and philosophy deal with the same subject matter – being – but from two different points of view, or two different starting points.  A similar point is being made here by Ricoeur and therefore deserves at least some of the same argumentation.  Since the secularization of philosophy, even being can no longer be understood in terms of an objective substance that humans have but rather an essence that they live out in the context of time and space.  Metaphysics is out.  Praxis is in.  Even Ricoeur defines his philosophical anthropology in non-metaphysical terms.

The problem is the biblical text which is incurably metaphysical and deals with ultimate issues from a supernatural point of view.  It can be demythologized (i.e. Bultmann) or even reduced to kerygma (i.e. Barth) or simply re-stated/re-interpreted in rational terms that are more agreeable to modern man, but the Bible refuses all such categories.  It claims a supernatural origin, a supernatural author, a supernatural message and a supernatural calling.  Yes, it is about being, especially human beings but it claims a metaphysical and supernatural origin and purpose to man that challenges any attempt to reduce it to a rational description of man’s thoughts about himself throughout the history of the Jewish/Christian Biblical history.

So, right from the start, the categories are too mutually exclusive, too distinct, too structured.  It isn’t Jerusalem against Athens, but rather Jerusalem (Paul) in Athens, calling them to repentance and faith.  Yes, Jerusalem (biblical faith) will always be a stumbling block to the Jews and foolishness to the Greeks, but that is nothing new.  The relationship is more dialectical and integrative than Ricoeur allows for in his discussion.  It is more dialectical because Athens will never understand or accept Jerusalem on equal terms (or on any rational terms at all) and more integrative because Jerusalem will not accept anything less than the full surrender of Athens so that reason can function fully and properly only in the context of faith.

Paul Ricoeur claims no role for philosophy as a “cripto-teología,” but does allow for the biblical faith to have a role as a “cripto-filosófia (p. 222).”  A role in philosophy, similar to a historical role in science, as “the god of the gaps,” but this time because there are real gaps that only biblical faith can fulfill.  Things such as the origin of evil and the historical pride of philosophy as having the only claim to ultimate truth, are mentioned by Ricoeur.  There are many others.  Ricoeur explains himself by saying, “A este respecto, me cuido de aplicar a la relación entre filosofía y fe bíblica el esquema pregunta-respuesta (p. 222).”  He suggests that there are problems in human existence that only “una intelligencia de la fe (p. 223)” can give an answer to precisely because it has, according to Kant, the power of “la regeneración de nuestro poder-hacer (p. 223).”

Ricoeur, himself, would go beyond merely the ethical dimension to include other elements of the imagination and creative powers of our being that allows Ricoeur claims that this relationship between the reader and the text that results in the gift of a “new being” able to take action in a dangerous and difficult world, even at the level of dealing with evil, is worthy of being called a hermeneutic (p. 224).”  He even suggests that there is a hermeneutical circle between the community of interpreters of the biblical text through history and the foundational texts that results in an intelligent faith that thinks and acts on a level that philosophy can never attain to.

Having established the general hermeneutical character of the biblical faith as an interpretation of life on the basis of foundational texts, Ricoeur now elaborates more specifically on the relationship between the “hermenéutica filosófica y hermenéutica bíblica a fin de dar un giro más dialéctico (p. 225).”  Of course, this begs the question about the accuracy of the title which claims that biblical faith and philosophy have a common hermeneutic.  What is common, according to Ricoeur is that they can both be considered a hermeneutic.  It appears that the “dialectic” relationship between the two is stronger than what they have in common.

Without going into details, suffice it to say that Ricoeur speaks about “las tres dialécticas que acabamos de recorrer – en el plano metódico, en el plano existencial, en el plano conceptual – no anuncian ninguna nueva confusión entre filosofía antropológica e inteligencia de la fe (p. 229).”  In other words, “es perfectamente inútil oponer Jerusalén a Atenas (p. 228).”  Leaving aside our earlier comments about the incompatible dialectic as well as the integrative nature of these two poles/horizons, still Ricoeur seems to generate conceptual difficulties out of thin air.  In dealing with the conceptual issues, he claims that “la teología no ha podido alcanzar tales cumbres sin tomar préstamos considerables de la filosofía, principalmente neo-platónica y más tarde aristotélica (p. 228).”

What a strange thing to say, as if all of theology can be summed up in Thomism (or even neoThomism) on the one hand, and that all of Patristic (especially St. Augustine) thought was a synergistic, unthinking, mixture of Hellenistic philosophy and Christian theology.  Apparently, even philosophers like to make proclamations on generalities without doing their homework.

Still, his suggestion that “¿no ha llegado el tiempo de reconducir la inteligencia de la fe a su origen, sobre una base más exegética que teológica, mientras que la filosofía por su lado ha de ser intimada a renunciar a su hybris totalizante y fundacional? (p. 228), ” is welcome and mostly on target.  On the one hand, the philosophical “hybris” is muted by Ricoeur’s own redefinition of philosophy as “filosofía antropológica.”  On the other hand, his definition of “the intelligence of faith” as “una fe pensante,” is also welcome but deserves a bit more attention.  The problem is not in the general idea but in what Ricoeur means to say by it in specific terms.  He calls us back to “una base más exegética que teológica.”  That is always a good thing and Reformation thinking has always submitted theology under exegesis and the biblical text itself.  No problem.  What is suspect is that this call to prioritize exegesis over theology is, in reality, a call to abandon a supernatural theology rooted in a hybrid metaphysics based on the mixture of Greek thinking with the Christian faith.  If that is so, many theologians are willing accomplices (and even many good Reformed theologians are at least willing to give up any pretensions of an effective natural theology).

But a closer look at the Christian faith and its relationship with Greek thought will reveal a different story.  On the one hand, the Christian metaphysics and supernatural origin is independent of Greek thought (even though, where appropriate, Greek thought supported or expanded ideas already within the biblical revelation).  On the other hand, in the plurality of approaches to theology throughout time, including the hellenization of Christian thought by the Alexandrian fathers and the later marriage of Aristotle to the Biblical Revelation by St. Thomas Aquinas, does not justify the conclusions of the philosophers who use these approaches to justify their own conclusions.  A true understanding of the Christian message based upon the authority and inspiration of the Word of God culminating in a hermeneutic based on Scripture interpreting Scripture, means that even the philosophers must distinguish between a hermeneutic (and theological approach) that is true to the biblical text and one that is not.  Any conclusions made must take into account that fundamental distinction within Christianity.

Finally, after all of the modifications and discussions and misrepresentations made about the biblical faith in relation to the role of philosophy, even so, the attempt by Ricoeur to struggle with these issues from a rationalistic point of view and worldview is appreciated if for no other reason than to provide a good counterpoint for the Christian and Evangelical point of view.

  1. ¿Qué aspectos no entendí?

Ricoeur speaks of the language of faith as a “poetic discourse.”  Right from the start, this is problematic for Evangelical scholars but, giving Ricoeur the benefit of the doubt and attempting to understand his language within his particular lexical context, we could understand what he wants to say in existential terms rather than in terms of the historicity or objective truth value of the biblical text (both of which he would deny in any event).  Needless to say, this was my first encounter with Paul Ricoeur and I am sure that his other writings will clarify things considerably.

  1. ¿Cómo se puede aplicar el contenido a la tarea hermenéutica?

There wasn’t anything specific to apply to the hermeneutic task other than a general understanding of what Paul Ricoeur believed makes up the hermeneutic task of biblical exegesis.

Bert Amsing

Master’s Program – FIET

Review of ¿Es Posible una Exégesis sin Presuposiciones? by Rudolf Bultmann

03 Saturday Sep 2016

Posted by Bert Amsing in Hermeneutics

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Book Reviews, Exegesis, Hermeneutics, Objectivity, Presuppositions, Rudolf Bultmann

  1. Nombre y apellido del alumno Bert Amsing
  2. Fecha May 18, 2016
  3. Título del texto leído Rudolf Bultmann

¿Es Posible una Exégesis sin Presuposiciones?

  1. ¿De qué trata el artículo o capítulo leído?

Rudolf Bultmann, in his article, “¿Es Posible una Exégesis sin Presuposiciones?” claims that the answer is both yes and no.  He then takes the time to explain what he means in terms of “prejuicios,” and “presuposiciones,” and “precomprehension.”

  1. ¿Cuál es la idea central del autor?

The central idea is that the exegete must be aware of the historical and intellectual baggage that he comes with to the text.  Bultmann insists that we must allow the text to speak for itself.  Whether or not following Bultmann’s advice really allows the text to speak for itself without interference and whether the message is comprehensible, definitive and applicable over time are questions that still remain open.

  1. ¿De qué nos quiere convencer?

He wants to convince us that it is part of the task of the exegete (a hermeneutical task) to be aware of the historical/cultural/intellectual baggage that we bring to the exegesis of a biblical text.

  1. ¿Cuáles son los puntos fuertes y los puntos débiles del texto?

There are so many things to say about this approach that the best thing to do is simply start at the beginning and make comments as we go along.  Hopefully, at the end, we can produce a conclusion that will give us insight into what Bultmann brings to the hermeneutical task.

The first thing that needs to be said, in general, is that few people nowadays would disagree with Bultmann’s answer to his own question, “¿Es Posible una Exégesis sin Presuposiciones?”  His answer is “yes, and no” and everyone would agree in principle.  The truth is that his own presuppositions affect his answers to this important question and therein lies the problem.  We might all agree that the answer is “yes, and no” but we would probably disagree in what way the answer is “yes” and in what way the answer is “no.”  Especially from the point of view of the general Evangelical position on exegesis/hermeneutics/homiletics, there are a number of differences of opinion with Bultmann in specific even though we, also, would agree with him in general.

Since Bultmann, himself, presents his thoughts on the basis of five thesis, we will do the same.  He spends the majority of his time on the first two but makes comments on the last three as well.  But in order to do that we need to start at the beginning of his argument where he introduces the fundamental question.  “¿Es posible una exégesis sin presuposiciones?”  As we have said, his answer is both yes and no.  Yes, it is possible if we consciously come to the text without any preconceived notions of what the text wants to say, if we have recognized and removed from consideration any theology/doctrine/dogma or preconceived notions of what the text wants to tell us.  In general, that is noteworthy but in practice, impossible.  No one comes to the text as a “blank slate” as he himself would point out (referring, in his case, to the biblical text but meaning the same thing).

Neither the text nor the interpreter is without preconceived notions of what they will find when they come to the biblical text.  Nor should they.  Perhaps right here at the beginning we should point out that it is impossible for someone to come to the biblical text with no idea of what it wants to say (and most of the time without a well articulated set of authentic questions either) and with no concept of what it is all about.  Sometimes, in our modern age, we encounter someone with seemingly no prior knowledge whatsoever of the biblical story and characters and meaning of Scripture but it is rare (and not helpful).  The very act of having presuppositions based on faulty interpretations of the past and being made aware of them is the “dialectical-dialogue” (Barth/Bultmann) nature of the educational process which God, himself, is well aware of and has accounted for by making the community of believers over time the incubator and foundation of our inquiry into the text.  Bultmann himself makes a similar point later on in his article.

So, even here, right at the beginning, the answer is neither “yes or no,” and yet both “yes and no.”  No, we cannot come to the text without some prejudice and pre-interpretation (both existentially, historically, culturally and theologically/doctrinally).  Yes, we can make ourselves aware of those prejudices in the context of our communal effort to allow the biblical text speak for itself.  We are the ones with the problem (the noetic effects of sin) and, together, in obedience to the imperative as we live out the indicative and in humility before the text as a divine message through human means of communication, we can become increasingly aware of our prejudices and presuppositions and pre-interpretations of the biblical text and seek not simply to remove them but to judge them by the biblical text itself so that, over time, a corpus of concepts, interpretations and even doctrine rooted in the biblical text as determined by the believing, obeying, humble community of believers can guide us into an even deeper understanding and application of biblical truth to our present situation.  Many of these concepts are in “incipient form” in the five thesis of Bultmann but his own philosophical presuppositions get in the way of his laudable attempt to allow the biblical text to speak for itself.

Therefore, concerning his first thesis that “La exégesis de los escritos bíblicos, semejante a otra interpretación del texto, debe ser desprejuiciada (p. 5),” we would agree with the intent but disagree that it is possible or even desirable (given its impossibility).  Better to say that it “debe ser desprejuiciada” in terms of anything that does not arise necessarily from the biblical text itself and that it ought to “ser prejuiciada” by the agreed to “pre-conceptions, perspectives and doctrines” that arise necessarily from the biblical text.  The fact that this is also immensely difficult (given the noetic effects of sin even among those who believe and obey) does not change the fact that this is the true, authentic task of exegesis at least as a starting point.  In the words of St Augustine (but applied somewhat differently), we are “able not to sin” even if we find it rather difficult and we are harassed by both our own stubborn wills as well as the malignant (but often banal and unintentional) wills of those who oppose the Kingdom of God on earth.  It is the sanctification and “renewing of our minds” that will accomplish it.  More to be said on this topic later on.

Bultmann’s second thesis goes in the opposite direction.  He says, “sin embargo, la exégesis no es sin presuposiciones, porque como interpretación histórica presupone el método de investigación histórico-critico (p. 5).”   This is where his answer is “no,” you cannot do exegesis with presuppositions.  Again we would agree and disagree.  First of all, Evangelicals would agree that an “interpretación histórica” is very much desired since, as the biblical text points out so clearly, our faith is based on the historical reality of the resurrection (and therefore the person and work of Christ and his validation of the Old Testament as God’s working out of his historical redemptive purpose over time).  What we would have a problem with is Bultmann’s own philosophical prejudice (however understandable) against the supernatural within the cause and effect nature of historical events.

We might actually agree that “El método histórico, incluye ya la presuposición de que la historia de un continuum cerrado de efectos en el cual los eventos individuales están conectados por una sucesión de causa y efecto (p. 2).”  Before we look at that key word, “cerrado,” we will allow Bultmann a further word about the freedom of the will (a concept central to the existential point of view).  He says, “Esto no significa que el proceso de la historia está determinado por la ley causal y que no hay decisiones libres de los hombres cuyas acciones determinan el curso de los sucesos históricos (p. 2).”  That is a good modification to make but it still presents problems based on his own presuppositions.  If we truly come to the biblical text with humility and openness to what it wants to say to us (a position Bultmann espouses), then there is no way to avoid the “supernatural” character of its message.  That “divine” element is key to the exegetical process (according to the biblical text itself) and must be taken into account.

Bultmann himself, in his third thesis, talks about the “relación-vital” that the exegete must have with the content of the biblical text (although he interprets that relationship in existential terms only).  Still, he himself, says that you can respond to the claims of the text with your own free decision.  It may be the “yes” of faith or the “no” of incredulity.  Exactly.  What Bultmann apparently misses is that only the “yes” of faith can have a “vital” relationship with the message of the text.  He claims that all men, in spite of their own “yes” or “no” before the biblical message, have a “vital” interest in the questions being asked even if they do not have a “vital” interest in the answer being given.  We would disagree.  It must be, by his own admission, a “relación-vital” with the message itself.  How is that possible if your answer is “no.”

Bultmann, as an existentialist, is probably not that interested in a definitive answer that transcends time and culture applicable to all men in every circumstance and probably doesn’t believe that such an answer to the existential needs of men even exists.  It is the search that matters.  All of this is in “counterpoint” to the biblical text itself which claims to have a definite answer and, furthermore, claims that you cannot even understand the answer, much less accept it without the “divine intervention” of God (whether along Armenian or Calvinistic lines).  So where is Bultmann’s respect for the biblical text and his desire to listen carefully without prejudice or presuppositions.  It is his own philosophical presuppositions that trip him up.

If he would allow the God of the biblical text to actually exist and lay claim to the authorship of the biblical text in the first place, then everything would change.  A new hermeneutical factor would have to be taken into account.  The concept of a “closed” system of cause and effect would now be open to other “free wills” of intelligent, sentient beings whose existence is verified by the biblical text itself.  In that sense, both in terms of the indirect effect of these other “free wills” (angelic, demonic and divine) through other “free but damaged wills heavily influenced by outside forces and essentially determined by a fundamental rebellion against the ontological/existential source of their own existence” (humans) as well as their direct intervention in the cause and effect flow of history (miracles), there is more going on between heaven and earth that what Bultmann is willing to accept based on his “predisposition against the supernatural.”

That is not to say that any interpretation of history is now legitimate if it calls on extra-human forces at work (whether true or not) in the flow of cause and effect over time, but rather to say that the existence of these forces arise from the biblical text and it is the biblical text itself that interprets them for us within the context of God´s historical redemptive purpose for history (and therefore little green men and colorful unicorns would not be accepted as intelligent, sentient beings able to exert influence on the flow of cause and effect over time that we call history since they are not part of God’s interpretation of history).  Even further, God himself, as seen in his acts within history, may be an indirect or direct source of causal action but that doesn’t negate the concept of the continuous flow of cause and effect as central to history and our ability to understand it and interpret it.  What is at stake is the “closed” nature of that cause and effect flow to outside forces (such as God himself) when the biblical text demands the recognition that life and history are under the direct and indirect influence of the supernatural as defined by the biblical text itself.

Having said all of that (much in anticipation of the third thesis of Bultmann as well, which is closely connected here), let me say something about the apologetic nature of the biblical text and our approach to dealing with all attempts to interpret it outside of the framework which it provides.  If it is true that a “relacion-vital” with the message of the text is a hermeneutical factor that must be taken into account in the exegesis of the biblical text, then there is an undeniable “apologetic” approach that must be taken towards those who have chosen to say “no” to the biblical message.  There is no way for someone who is not living the indicative-imperative resurrection life (which is the result of a “yes” to the biblical message) to exegete the biblical text with authenticity and integrity just because they are vitally interested in the questions that they bring to the text.

From a “docetic” point of view in which there is a process of enlightment over time, of course, God, in his grace, draws us to the biblical text (often in the context of a relationship with someone who is a living testimony of the power of the indicative-imperative resurrection life which is the result of a “yes” to the biblical message) through the Holy Spirit before we have taken a decision.  That is where the mystery of God’s sovereignty and man’s responsibility in the process of salvation (and the interpretation/hermeneutic which is key to salvation) comes into play.  At what point do you actually make a decision and is that decision based on a realization of the truth of the biblical message (the cognitive/relational gift of faith) that in itself, was not so much a decision as a discovery aided, according to the biblical text, by divine enlightenment?  How much can you discover without that “divine” element?

Certainly a lot of circumstantial and perhaps even fascinating historical facts and ancient wisdom that may have some application to our present situation could be found by the “no” group armed with effective, historical and linguistic, tools.  But the realization of truth that draws you out of your subjective concerns and questions into the objective reality of the divine perspective and which demands allegiance, even love, based on the rupture/reconciliation with the God who is there, is a further step that separates the sheep from the goats.  This “yes” of faith is an ontological/existential dividing point and a hermeneutical pre-requisite to receiving, understanding and living out the indicative-imperative resurrection life that is the answer to our contemporary “spiritual/relational” needs of today.

Therefore, as a further point, there is no other approach to a biblically-based philosophy of education from the “yes” side of the equation than to approach all other “no” positions except “apologetically.”  That is not “merely” apologetic but rather “necessarily” apologetic arising from the nature and message of the biblical text itself (and indirectly attested to by Bultmann).  In terms of language, one can (like Francis Schaeffer) be so gracious in his approach as to provide the historical justifications and misconceptions of someone’s position on its own merits but, even then, it is still “apologetics” though filled with grace, as the biblical text itself bids us to do.

Bultmann in his third thesis, which we have already mentioned, says, “Además, esta presupuesta una “relación-vital” del exegeta respecto al asunto con el cual la Biblia está interesada, junto con su relación, una pre comprensión (p. 5).”  Taking all of the preceding discussion into account, it still must be said that there is some truth to Bultmann’s position that the exegete must be vitally interested in the questions (as well as the biblical answers).

In fact, the fundamental ontological/existential questions (e.g. Paul Tillich) are rooted in our experience of the world.  What is often called the “secular problem of evil” is of daily concern to all humans around the world.  The amoral position of nature and it’s seemingly capricious dealings with us (both in terms of adverse circumstances as well as our own bodies/minds) is troubling.  We have an “estrangement-dependency” dilemma that we try to deal with through “religious” appeasement/manipulation of the “gods” behind (or in) creation who can deal with these forces more effectively than we can.  The fact that it doesn’t work very well doesn’t change the fact that it gives us an outlet for our frustrations and hopes in the face of an overwhelming attack on our own self-value that we perceive as self-aware, sentient beings.

Certainly, that fundamental Fruerbach/Fruedian perspective on the human condition plays well with the existentialist concerns with being-in-the-world (and is not at variance with the biblical worldview).  The point is that existential questions are legitimate and we all should have a vital interest in them even if we find it difficult to articulate or have lost hope for an adequate answer that can transcend evil, suffering and, even, death.  But questions are not enough.  An understanding of, and allegiance to the person and message of the Bible is essential for understanding our plight and the solution to our dilemma from the point of view of the divine.  If we protest that this approach to hermeneutics requires an a priori faith before complete investigation and understanding, we would agree.  You can come to the biblical text without faith and obedience and learn some things (and even provide helpful perspectives that were not apparent from a faith stance) but the biblical text itself, if we are willing to allow it to speak within its own worldview and supernatural presuppositions, demands allegiance before it will reveal all of its secrets.  As an analogy of sorts, this is also true of human relationships and is a necessary pre-requisite to the hermeneutic of another human life.  This “relational” approach to the written text is the natural conclusion to a “faith-stance” that claims there is a “divine” element to this particular text that cannot be ignored.

Bultmann states his fourth thesis (which is an extension of his third) in the following way.  He says, “Esta precomprensión es algo cerrado, sino mas bien abierto, como puede ser un encuentro existenciario con el texto y una decisión existenciaria (p. 5).”  The precomprehension he is talking about here is both the “relacion-vital” with the existential problems of life and its questions we must ask of God if we have moved from the secular problem of evil to the religious problem of evil as well as an acknowledgement of the essential continuity of the human condition (which I call the human-human “analogy of being”).  The structures and content of our existence must have some continuity with the past or there is no way for us to understand or access any information that it may have available for us.  All of which is true.  God chose to use human language within its specific historical-cultural situation, with all of its noetic baggage affected by sin both creationally (man-man) and redemptively (God-man) to get his message across.  Of course, the Holy Spirit would have to be involved to counteract the ongoing affects of sin sufficiently for the message of God “not to return to him without accomplishing the task he entrusted to it.”  And, of course, he would need real human beings with all of their “sin” baggage on their spiritual pilgrimage of progressive sanctification to provide experiential verification of the power of the indicative-imperative resurrection life that an allegiance to the person and message of the biblical text would create in them increasingly over time.  All of these things are part of the hermeneutical process, according to the biblical text, and must be taken into account by everyone who claims to be an exegete of scripture.

Is there a place for the “no” group to learn and discover elements of the truth of the biblical message?  Yes, of course.  But they must no longer claim, on the basis of their own respect for the biblical text, to be the “only” or the “complete” or the “best” approach to biblical exegesis/hermeneutics.  More humility is needed and more authentic integrity required by those who truly believe that the job of the exegete is to “listen” to the text first and recognize that it claims to be more than just another religious writing.  It is the living, powerful Word of the God “who is there” and who wants to enter into a new relationship with his children through the person and work of his son, Jesus Christ, empowered by the Holy Spirit as expressed through the biblical text.  Yes, that is a theological/doctrinal position but it is required by the biblical text itself.

Finally, Bultmann gives us his fifth thesis.  He says, “La comprensión del texto nunca es definitiva, sino más bien permanece abierta porque el significado de las Escrituras se despliega a sí mismo, de nuevo, a cada futuro (p. 5).”  On the one hand, we would agree with him since he is talking about the “comprensión” of the text and not the text itself.  Our full understanding of the message will not be complete until the new age when we will see him face to face.  Of course, Bultmann is talking about the existential basis for understanding truth as a search for meaning that is never fully realized since the foundational elements of the secular problem of evil are with us throughout life and in every generation.  Our understanding of the limits of our “comprensión” (the power of reason to access biblical truth) is based on the noetic effects of sin, the progressive sanctification (and renewing) of our minds, and the incomparable riches of his self-revelation that will not even be exhausted by the length and breadth of eternity.

On the other hand, Bultmann didn’t say that our understanding of the text will never be “complete,” he said that it would not be “definitiva.”  That is another issue altogether.  The biblical text, itself, tells us that the Scriptures have a limited (but vital) purpose which is our salvation (the resolution of the ontological/existential/relational rupture between man and God).  Arising from the biblical text, then, is a definitive (even if not complete) answer to our “existential dilemma.”  If one takes the biblical text at its word as a “divine” text using “human” means of communication, than you cannot avoid the conclusion that the message which demands an answer is definitive.  If it were not, how could we in good conscious give an answer.

Certainly, it is also true, as stated earlier in this review, that every generation must find the biblical answer to their own “intrahistorical” or “transhistorical” questions.  They may articulate the questions differently, but the answer remains the same.  For Bultmann, the new answers are based on the “indefinite” nature of the biblical answer (or our ability to comprehend it) when it should be based on the “ontological/existential/relational” nature of the one asking the questions.  The answer is the same but it is rediscovered not only by each generation but by each individual person as they encounter God (and his message/answer) through the biblical text.

But this is not done in isolation.  There is a tradition, a corpus of previously discovered truths that arise naturally and necessarily from the biblical text, critically assessed and continually challenged within the “yes” community of indicative-imperative resurrection life believers.  This “spiritual” context is also the work of the Holy Spirit even with all of its problems, disagreements, lack of clarity and outright opposition.  Still, there is a core belief system (such as the Apostle’s Creed) supplemented by ever specific confessions of faith and theological interpretations which, despite their variations, fall into one of two categories.  Those who have said “yes” to the message of the gospel and those who have said “no.”  The difference is notable and clear in concept even if it isn’t always so clear in execution or in application to a specific church body or individual.

One other thing could be mentioned here in light of the Jewish approach to biblical interpretation.  Of course, they are focused on the Old Testament (especially the Torah) but also the religious texts of their tradition.  Although there is a fundamental disagreement between their approach and the general Evangelical approach, there are one or two points of convergence and analogy that may be helpful as a general comparison.

The Jewish “accent,” according to author David Hartman, in his book La Tradición Interpretativa, falls on the tradition/community that is undertaking the hermeneutic.  This approach is a necessary correction to the overly “individualistic/rational” approach of Western Christianity and arises as a hermeneutical prerequisite from the biblical text itself both in the OT and NT.  But, from an Evangelical point of view, they go too far and, in fact, place the biblical text “below” or subject to the “interpreting community” which, by definition, cuts it off from its “divine” authorship rooted in objective acts and words originally spoken in a specific historical context and given interpretation through the biblical text.  The fact that we do not have access to that historical basis except through the biblical text which can only be partially verified through historical scientific methods, does not change the fact that the biblical text is accepted, on its own testimony, as having an original meaning and intention within a specific historical/cultural context to the original audience (which shares an essential “analogy of being” and transhistorical and transcultural “continuity” with all people everywhere and in every time).  Without that “rationally/historically partially/completely unverified/unverifiable” foundation in the “divine” nature of the biblical text (doctrine of inspiration) which claims to be rooted in history, any interpretation of the biblical text will lack an anchor that roots it in anything objective.  In that case, all interpretations are acceptable because the only “objective” truth is “the interpreting community.”  That position would deny the viewpoint of the biblical text itself (in the OT and the NT) that our faith is rooted in a God who really, objectively, acted (and acts) in the flow of cause and effect of redemptive history both directly (miracles) and indirectly (through human agents).  That is unacceptable to an Evangelical position on hermeneutics.

This argument can be made even “within” the Jewish context based only on the OT biblical text and given the self-revelation of God from the mountain (whether or not its fulfillment in Christ is accepted).  Given the nature of the biblical text itself, these conclusions are warranted.

That doesn’t mean that it is difficult to understand why and how the Jewish community, in the face of ongoing persecution and with a worldvision grounded in the establishment by God of the original believing community and the resulting “communal/relational” mentality that resulted necessarily from that divine act, developed the “interpreting community” as their major hermeneutical principle and why they allowed it to eclipse the biblical text itself (especially in light of the similar invasion of philosophy into hermeneutics/theology by Aristotelian thought through the Jewish scholar, Maimonides).

     Furthermore, the concept of a “biological” Jew as the only legitimate member of the “interpreting community” is both appropriate as well as misleading from an OT perspective.  It is appropriate in the sense that it was through direct “divine” and miraculous intervention in the course of history that gave birth to the Jewish people in Abraham’s and Sarah’s old age long after the human possibility of giving birth was long past.  Their very existence is a divine miracle.  But it wasn’t their “existence” that is the hermeneutical principle suggested by the biblical text (even in the OT).  Rather it was the “covenant relationship” between Abraham (and his seed) and God that is in view here.  Even in the OT, there is “a cutting off and a grafting in” that clearly gives the covenant relationship priority over the “biology” of being Abraham’s offspring.  That might have been something that Jesus/Paul said, but it is a legitimate “hermeneutical” insight even within the OT context and was the basis for the Pharisaic misunderstanding of the OT scriptures.  The same can be said of the Jewish interpretive tradition today (even though they find it, like the Pharisees did, to be offensive).

Still, there is an “analogy” here that is worth picking up as a hermeneutical principle for us today that is rooted in the OT revelation.  If that “covenant relationship” is the basis for the “interpreting community” (which in the NT would include “gentiles” – the ultimate dismissal of “biology” in favor of “relationship” while recognizing that “biology” and “covenant relationship” was intended originally to be vitally connected as “a light to the gentiles”), then we are back to the “yes” group and their acceptance and experience of the ontological/existential presence of the Holy Spirit in their lives that makes them a “new creation,” possible because of the substitutionary atonement as accepted and valued by the Father in fulfillment of his claims of justice against us and made possible by the Son.  This experience of the “faith-walk” of the indicative-imperative resurrection life is based on the historically/rationally “reasonable” study of the biblical text and validated in our contemporary experience (precisely because we “reasonably” believe that the message is actually and objectively true in history).

As a hermeneutical principle, the concept of an “interpreting community” made up of people in “covenant relationship” with the divine author of the biblical text and who testify to the enlightening work of the Holy Spirit (as verified and validated by the community over time), would be generally acceptable to the Evangelical church but with the humility of the community before the priority of the biblical text and a stronger anchor in the belief (whether completely or partially verified or not) in the ultimate historical and objective truth of the events, actions and words of God in the flow of redemptive history.

      In fact, the contention here is that the Evangelical church, based on this hermeneutical principle rooted in the OT/NT biblical text, would do well to abandon the “individualism” of Western philosophy which is foreign to the biblical worldview and embrace a more comprehensive view of corporate sin and spiritual fellowship as an essential expression of the indicative-imperative resurrection life that we have in common.  That “spiritual” interpretive community may provide a much needed correction to the splintering/dividing nature of the “theological” interpretive community by focusing not on outward organizational/doctrinal expressions but on the essential “covenantal relationship” we have together as the believing community.  A “minimalist/essential” confession (ie. Apostle´s Creed) rooted in the inspiration of the biblical text (generally agreed to by all Evangelicals – and others – even though there is some disagreement over the concepts of  inerrancy and infallibility) , the focus of redemptive history on the person and work of Christ, and the necessity of a true allegiance/obedience to the divine indicative in the power of the Holy Spirit can become the groundwork of our joint exegesis/hermeneutic and “interpretive community.”  Otherwise, our very lack of unity, when it refuses to listen to the “potential” insights of other believers within the believing community, puts us in danger of losing sight of the essential “cross-based” resurrection life that we share in the Spirit which is the only reason we understand anything at all about this glorious redemption we have in Christ.  On the other hand, it will protect us from potentially dangerous views coming from those who do not have that basic hermeneutical experience and approach while allowing us to accept any insights they may have by judging them in the light of the biblical text itself.

In conclusion, there seems to be a clear hermeneutical approach to Scripture from a position of faith and obedience and a clear message (the “perspicuity” of Scripture) that calls us to live out the indicative-imperative resurrection life the biblical text calls us to.  The fact that the “yes” group may be in a minority even among those who call themselves “Christian” is not the issue.  The only issue is whether these delineating lines arise from the biblical text themselves when taken without a “predisposition against the supernatural” on the one hand (which the existentialist philosophical position clearly has) and when “dogmatic presuppositions and principles” are critically and continually challenged in the light of the biblical text itself.  In other words, the Christian faith and message must be validated by itself on the basis of its own faith presuppositions arising from the biblical text or not at all.  Because of the noetic effects of sin and the distinctiveness of faith as a unique “relational” way of knowing (with analogies and similarities to human relationships), reason, by itself, will not and cannot accomplish the task (after all, “practical” reason is not “pure” reason which may have escaped the full force of the noetic effects of sin but since the problem with our practical “knowing” is at its core “relational,” according to the biblical text, that is totally understandable).  That is the only “closed” system that the biblical text will allow in the process of interpreting its message for the modern world.

  1. ¿Qué aspectos no entendí? ¿ó qué preguntas tengo todavía?

There is much about Bultmann’s position which is not entirely clear yet since this is a brief article dedicated to a specific topic.  More work needs to be done by the present author in putting Bultmann’s contributions in its philosophical and historical setting.

  1. ¿Cómo se puede aplicar el contenido a la tarea hermenéutica?

As you can see from the foregoing discussion, much of the structure of Bultmann’s thought is worthy of acceptance but within the theological/doctrinal framework that arises naturally and necessarily from the biblical text.  It isn’t merely an apologetic that is needed but rather a re-interpretation of Bultmann’s thought within the parameters of his own concern with an authentic “listening” of the biblical text.  Instead of de-mythologizing the biblical text, we should re-orient Bultmann´s genuine contributions within the “natural” framework of the biblical text.  Even he should be able to appreciate the attempt even if he disagreed with the conclusions.

Bert Amsing

Master’s Program – FIET

Review of El Circulo Hermenéutico en Liberación de la Teología by J.L. Segundo

03 Saturday Sep 2016

Posted by Bert Amsing in Hermeneutics

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Book Reviews, Hermeneutics, J.L. Segundo, Liberation Theology, The Hermeneutical Circle

  1. Nombre y apellido del alumno Bert Amsing
  2. Fecha May 20, 2016
  3. Título del texto leído Juan Luis Segundo

El Circulo Hermenéutico en Liberación de la Teología

  1. ¿De qué trata el artículo o capítulo leído?  J.L. Segundo, in his chapter on “El Círculo Hermenéutico en Liberación de la Teología,” provides a detailed explanation of how the Hermeneutical Circle is used in the development of Liberation Theology.
  2. ¿Cuál es la idea central del autor?

The author believes that the Hermeneutic Circle must have the goal of bringing the liberating message of Jesus Christ into every situation and every culture which faces oppression.  The exegete must follow four steps which will bring the power of the Christian method to bear on social problems.

  1. ¿De qué nos quiere convencer?

That the four existential steps taken in the process of interpreting the Word of God are a necessary process to close the Hermeneutical circle.  The author gives four examples and evaluates them in detail in order to demonstrate the different steps in the process.

He tells us that the first step is “nuestra manera de experimentar la realidad, que nos llevaa la sospecha ideológica (p. 14).”  He goes on to quote and use Karl Mannheim’s further clarification of this first step where he says, “Un número cada vez mayor de casos concretos viene a demostrar que a) el planteo del problema sólo es posible gracias a una previa experiencia real y humana donde ese problema está contenido; b) al hacer su elección entre una infinidad de datos, el pensador realiza un acto de voluntad, y c) las fuerzas que surgen de la experiencia viviente son muy significativas para explicar la dirección que sigue el tratamiento del problema (p. 14).”  Segundo goes on to show what this means by giving us four examples of people involved in the Hermeneutical Circle.  This first one is particularly significant and a fair amount of time is spent on clarifying the details of what this means.

But Segundo goes on to give us the next three steps as well.  The second step is “la aplicación de la sospecha ideológica a toda la superestructura ideológica en general y a la teología en particular (p. 14).”

The third step is “una nueva manera de experimentar la realidad teológica que nos lleva a la sospecha exegética, es decir, a la sospecha de que la interpretación bíblica corriente no tiene en cuenta datos importantes (p. 14).”

Finally, the fourth step is “nuestra nueva hermenéutica, esto es, el nuevo modo de interpretar la fuente de nuestra fe que es la Escritura, con los nuevos elementos a nuestra disposición (p. 14).”

This is the heart of his presentation in terms of the content that he wants to share with the reader but the true value lies in his use of four examples that may or may not have achieved success with the four steps of the Hermeneutical Circle.

One thing needs to be mentioned right at the start, that this presentation of the Hermeneutical Circle from a Liberation Theology point of view relies heavily on an interpretation of history adapted from Karl Marx’s “historical materialism.”

Does he claim that the Hermeneutical Circle as presented here is the only way to interpret the text of Scripture?  If so, what does that say about everything that has gone before Marx?  Unfortunately, Segundo tries his hand at some historical transference by imposing aspects of the Hermeneutical Circle on people who had no intention of following that process and they are judged the lesser for it.  It isn’t sufficient to say that they are merely examples (bad or good) of how the Hermeneutical Circle works, as the author claims, because he, himself, goes further than that in his own exposition.  He makes value judgments on their efforts.

He also claims not to judge their exposition of Scripture but he makes value judgments on their historical analysis by claiming that they do not have a scientific basis for their conclusions (e.g. Weber).

Furthermore, is he claiming that the power of the Gospel message (often seen in history in social change and transformation) will only come through to the people if there is a completed Hermeneutical Circle that must follow these four steps.  Even though there is much useful insight in this chapter, it is full of logical fallacies and illogical jumps in logic based on misconceptions of the author.  Where does the power come from?  Getting the right message?  Yes, if that message is the objective, historical message of reconciliation with God through Jesus Christ empowered by the Holy Spirit.  Yes, the classical message of Christianity which he disparages as ivory tower, abstract theology.  But that message is empowered by the Holy Spirit, supernaturally, in the lives of his followers and it is not a message that needs to be re-interpreted but rather re-discovered and re-stated anew with all of the passion and commitment of the early church.

  1. ¿Cuáles son los puntos fuertes y los puntos débiles del texto?

If we continue on from the previous point, we could start by making the observation that Segundo uses a particular version of the Hermeneutical Circle adapted by Liberation Theology and based on Karl Marx’s dialectical/historical materialism.  He does not put his treatment of the Hermeneutical Circle into perspective with regards to how this concept has developed over time from Schleiermacher to Heidegger to Bultmann.  He makes one comment about Bultmann when he says, “Espero poder probar, y los lectores serán jueces de ello, que nuestro círculo hermenéutico merece todavía más que el de Bultmann ser llamado así en el sentido más estricto de la fórmula (p. 13).”  Whether or not that has been accomplished remains to be seen but, at the very least, it needs to be said that there is no historical or conceptual context given for the changes made by Liberation Theology to the Hermeneutical Circle.

Certainly, it also needs to be said that that may not have been the purpose of this particular chapter and that the book this chapter is found in may deal with those issues later on.  But it is also true that, in general, Liberation Theology doesn’t seem to be particularly concerned with clarifying its own presuppositions and positions vis a vis the philosophical discussions that have come before.  Their attitude is generally dismissive of the “ivory tower, abstract philosophical thinking” that characterizes everything outside of Liberation Theology.  Their moral authority in dealing with real issues from a place of sacrificial involvement and commitment to transformative social change is laudable but, as often happens, it also has the danger of becoming an “high horse” of “moral arrogance.”  It remains for the reader to decide which attitude is better, but, it often leads to isolation, misunderstanding and the setting up and tearing down of many “straw men” arguments (a logical fallacy).

This has been especially evident throughout Segundo’s presentation in this chapter.  Not only does he not justify (or clarify) the foundation, presuppositions and reasons for his choice of Marxist dialectical/historical materialism as the defining principle behind his Hermeneutical Circle, he also does not make his case that it is a “better” way than Bultmann, or even more importantly, than the classical approach to Hermeneutics.

Although he talks about  being faithful to Scripture or about the necessity of going back to the sources of our faith in the Scriptures, he simply doesn’t do so.  He recognizes that there is inherent risk in his approach that “se pierda la substancia del evangelio (p. 40)” but he gives us no guidance from the point of view of Liberation Theology on how they suggest we mitigate those risks so that the substance of the Gospel is not, in fact, lost.  All he can do is give a motivational talk about risks not detering us from our task.  He says, “Por supuesto que existen muchos peligros hermenéuticos en esta manera de concebir y de realizar la interpretación bíblica, así como los había en el punto anterior.  Pero no hay razón para excluir un método teológico coherente a causa de sus peligros (p. 44).”  Really?  Why not?  That’s exactly what you should do – exclude a theological method because it risks (and promotes) re-interpreting the message of the Gospel.  Unless of course, Segundo provides ways to understand and mitigate those risks so that the Gospel message remains intact.

Perhaps that isn’t possible given Segundo’s own criteria since there is no “objective” Gospel message to maintain.  Between Barth’s “theological rationalization” and Bultmann’s “de-mythologizing” project, there is no objective, historical message that we can rely on.  That is part of the abstract, dead, useless theology of those who live in their ivory towers and don’t participate in the real struggles of people in the real world.  The arrogance is almost overwhelming.

Yes, those are strong words but Segundo’s article is full of these kinds of “straw man” fallacies where he misrepresents the classical approach to Hermeneutics and then shoots it down on moral grounds rather than logical or theological grounds.  Yes, there is some truth to what Segundo suggests in his article but it is so encrusted with misunderstandings, unqualified presuppositions and false innuendo that it is difficult to know where to even begin the dialogue.

Perhaps a good place to start is to ask them not to put their opponents in an ivory tower (even though it is sometimes true) and dismiss everything that they have done over two thousand years as irrelevant or inauthentic.

Perhaps it would be more helpful to understand that the objective truth of the Gospel message in all of its historical truth and validity is what people in the Roman arenas were willing to live and die for.

Perhaps it would be helpful to remember that the majority of the Christians throughout the ages, who have bled and sacrificed and died for the gospel, died for that objective, historical truth of the resurrection that gives hope to so many in their real, spiritual and physical oppression.

Perhaps there needs to be a recognition that the liberal attitude of Liberation Theology which constantly re-interprets the Gospel message by changing the substance of the message does not motivate anyone to lay down their life for anyone else.

People don’t care about all of this theological/philosophical talk of the Hermeneutical Circle and do not trust those who are involved in it to accurately reflect the objective truth of the Gospel message.  They believe in faith in the historical truth of a God who is there, who died for our sins and rose from the dead to give us hope in the power of God to transform this life and the life to come.  The fact that Liberation Theology with their liberal, ecumenical agenda tries to hijack the moral/social high ground from real believers who find the power of God not in how well you can accomplish the Hermeneutical Circle but in the message itself, empowered supernaturally by the Holy Spirit as people commit their lives to a real, live relationship with God through Jesus Christ.

Just because Liberation Theology claims to have an “option for the poor” doesn’t mean that they are the first to have done so.  Just because there are oppressors that use Christianity to justify their abuse of people, doesn’t justify their wholesale rejection of an objective, historical Gospel message.  That is done because of their liberal, existential and secular philosophy/theology and has nothing to do with the true Gospel message which has been with the poor and the oppressor (e.g. high class Romans becoming Christians during the early fourth century and the persecutions that came as a result), transforming lives for two millennium.

Why are they still stuck with issues that were dealt with already by Jesus when he came to earth?  Gabriel, the archangel, tells Joseph, “you shall give him the name Jesus because he will save his people from their sins (Matthew 1:22).”  Their what?  Sins?  No, it should have said “from the Romans.”  That is what the people of God expected their Messiah to do when he came.  They were the original, true Liberation Theologians of the Old Testament.  Even up to the time that Jesus ascended into heaven, they were confused.  They asked him, “Lord, are you at this time going to restore the kingdom to Israel?”  Really?  Not that Jesus didn’t intend to bring transformation to the worldly structures and social realities.  The Kingdom of God is real and practical, but there is a different agenda and focus that is at the heart of the Kingdom and that is the relationship between the King and his people, the covenant relationship.

Yes, this represents a particular understanding of Scripture that can be debated among believers.  But that is the point.  Believers sit down together in humility and try to clarify their presuppositions and pre-conceived ideas/dogmas and listen, together, to the Word of God.  That is part of the classical Hermeneutical Circle.  But their intent, even with any disagreement about details, is to uncover the objective, historical truth of the Word of God and they believe, that by use of their reason within the boundaries of faith and with the help of the Holy Spirit through the communion of saints, that truth can be found and lived out in their Christian obedience.

On the other hand, there are many today who would say that that is all part of the encrustations of the church when they reinterpreted the historical Jesus in the writing of the New Testament.  The real, historical Jesus would want his people to be liberated from the Romans.  That’s why he chose the disciples he chose.   Powerful people who knew how to fight and defeat the Roman armies.  People who were experts in bringing about social change.  People who understood that there was class warfare in the Roman Empire – the slaves against the free, the gentiles against the Jews, the women against the men.  Paul made a comment about that if you recall.  He said, “There is neither Jew nor Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus (Gal.3:28).”  Of course, given where Liberation Theology comes from, that would no doubt be classified as a “use of Scripture to justify continued oppression” which, no doubt, Paul was doing.  Shame on him.  On the other hand, Segundo claims that there is no unified, universal message (or God) of the Scriptures and that partial use of the Scriptures (p. 45) is a legitimate aspect of his hermeneutic.  An Evangelical/Catholic view of scripture as inspired demands a unified view of Scripture since it comes from one author, God himself through multiple human agents within their historical/cultural context.  And no, that isn’t classical Greek philosophy but rather based on the Hebrew experience of God as he revealed himself consistently in covenant throughout Redemptive History.

Liberation Theology can be nothing else than Liberal Theology given its own historical/cultural origins and it has a right to be whatever it chooses but then don’t be surprised that others may oppose you not on moral grounds but rather on logical and theological grounds.  Liberation Theology does not agree with the inspiration of Scripture nor with the classical content of the gospel message or the theodicy of God in confronting evil through the transformed lives of the church or his historical redemptive purpose in history which culminated in the cross as the substitutionary atonement of Jesus Christ for our sins (which is the heart of the relational problem of evil in this world) and so on.  Why treat the symptoms only when God, himself, has treated the cause of the problem and gives us the cure to bring to the nations.

Certainly, a church that lives out that spiritual truth of forgiveness and reconciliation with God first will become a powerful force for social change in the world but not by re-interpreting the message or denying that it has objective, historical validity and power in lives today by the power of the Holy Spirit (not by a Hermeneutical Circle rooted in a philosophy diametrically opposed to God).  There is no humility before the word of God where we can jointly set aside our arrogance, assumptions, presuppositions and come to God through his Word (Sola Scriptura) based on a new relationship with him in Christ (Sola Gratia).

If we start with that humility we will have accomplished the first step of the Hermeneutical Circle.  First of all, you need to listen to God and his interpretation of our situation and why he believed that our situation meant that he had to become flesh and die on the cross for our sins.  So, the first step in a Biblical Hermeneutic is to come in humility before the word of God, which involves hearing the bad news about our sin and the good news of the gospel.  It also includes a personal acceptance/commitment to Jesus as Savior and Lord and finally, a belief in the inspired Word of God as the divinely chosen vehicle used by the Holy Spirit to give us guidance in this life as we fulfill his agenda/purpose which is to reconcile the world to himself (I Cor.5).

The fact that reconciliation with God will often result in liberation of captives, bringing sight to the blind and giving hope to the poor is the outworking of a deeper experience of God in Christ.  “T’was grace that taught my heart to fear and grace my fears relieved” is how John Newton put it (the slaver who was transformed by grace into an anti-slavery proponent).

There are so many problems with Liberation Theology from an Evangelical point of view that it is difficult to know how to have a dialogue with them.  Either we both agree to submit ourselves in humility before the word of God as interpreted by the Holy Spirit through the historical community of faith or we really have nothing to talk about except for the needs of the poor and the social reform that needs to happen.  If it is the second option, we don’t need to involve theology or a Hermeneutical Circle and we don’t even need to be Christians.  We can just agree together to help the poor and make a commitment to change social structures whenever possible.

The sad thing is that Liberation Theology has some powerful insights that would be helpful in the work that stands before all of us as believers, and their prophetic voice would be a powerful corrective to the problems of affluence and prosperity in many churches in other countries.  No doubt.  But that voice is muted and all but stilled because of a lack of humility and commitment to the objective, historical word of God that speaks today first of all to our relationship with God and secondly to our relationship with others, the first expressed in the second but the second dependent on the first.  A redemptive focus within a creational context.  Without that fundamental commitment, Liberation Theology is just another heresy getting in the way of the true work of God in the lives of the poor (and the rich) in the transformation of the human heart.

  1. ¿Qué aspectos no entendí?

As I mentioned before, it would have been helpful to have a conceptual context for the changes that Liberation Theology suggests that we make to the Hermeneutic Circle.  Secondly, when talking about the interpretive process in general from a secular point of view and then discussing what elements would be affected by the position that the Scriptures are no ordinary text and contain a supernatural element as well as a historical basis.  Finally, it would be helpful if Liberation Theology would clarify its own presuppositions and philosophical leanings (pragmatism/utilitarianism) and how it affects their method and process as well as the results of their hermeneutical methodology.

  1. ¿Cómo se puede aplicar el contenido a la tarea hermenéutica?

A number of elements are of interest in the hermeneutic process that Liberation Theology brings up.  What must be remembered is that, as a system, it must be rejected because of its philosophical/theological basis which is incompatible with Evangelical Christianity.  But, in terms of individual elements or clusters of ideas, there are some interesting things that can be imported into a classical hermeneutical method.  Without trying to be exhaustive, but only representative, we can pick out a few items of interest.

The first is the insistence on Christian obedience as an integral and necessary element to understanding the Gospel message.  Agreed.  But that is a two-edged sword.  On the one hand, the concept is exactly right and true but on the other hand, Liberation Theology has a pre-conceived notion of what that Gospel message is (and it is not accurate and essentially flawed) and therefore they, themselves, cannot “hear” the message.  In Segundo’s own words, he fails in step two precisely because his first step is his first step (asking questions about reality instead of listening to the Word of God in humility).  Part of that problem is the arrogance of coming to the Word of God with the a priori belief that it must be re-interpreted (a form of de-mythologizing) so that the “kerygma” of God can come through.  This arrogance in presuppositions comes from their liberal position vis a vis the Scriptures so there really is no surprise.  Still, their attempt to make the imperative of the Gospel an essential part of our ability to hear and understand the indicative of the Gospel is a good corrective and part of their prophetic ministry to the church.

But the question still remains as to whether their way of relating the imperative to the indicative is true to Scripture.  The present author believes not.  They take the liberal approach of cutting off the imperative from the indicative because the imperative inhabits the world of reason (and can be augmented by the social sciences) but the indicative is a leap of faith (Kant, Kierkegaard, even Barth) that is open to multiple, subjective, personal interpretations that should be determined on the basis of pragmatism or utilitarianism in promoting the social good.  In that context, Liberation Theology makes plenty of sense but we simply won’t play in that pond.  The objective, historical indicative (which is the foundation and power source of the imperative) won’t allow us to.

A second element of interest that comes from Liberation Theology, in terms of the Hermeneutical Circle, is the use of the social sciences to help evaluate both the needs and the solutions to the problems of the poor and oppressed.  In the opinion of the present author, the application of the Gospel message to a particular situation is not strictly speaking a “hermeneutical” process but given the necessity of obedience to understanding the Gospel message in all of the fullness of its application, room can be made in the Hermeneutical circle for this aspect of application as well.  Due thought needs to be given to the reality that Christian obedience is relational first of all and therefore has to do with people and their relationship to God and each other despite their historical context.  That includes economic, social and moral elements but, even so, one application of Christian obedience in one historical context cannot become the litmus test for Christian obedience for all people everywhere.  What are we to do who do not live in such extreme situations?  Perhaps we are indirectly or directly the oppressors and we need to repent.  Perhaps we need to move to the “villas” of Latin America to identify with the poor or become “poor on purpose” in our present situations and just dedicate more of our resources to helping the poor or create a “poor church for the poor.”  Christian obedience is required but the form and structure of that obedience may have many faces and express itself in many different ways.

In that sense, the social sciences may be useful in helping us to find effective ways to get the job done.  Still, the Marxist “dialectical/historical materialism” philosophy will have to be carefully monitored and submitted to the dictates of the inspired Word of God to carefully extract strategies and solutions that are in alignment with God’s agenda and his way of getting the job done.  Not everyone will agree, but a Christian consensus has been forged before (i.e. the Reformation) and can be done so again.

Finally,  it would be interesting to study the Word of God in its entirety and unity and ask the question whether or not God, himself, is a Liberation Theologian in his hermeneutic/interpretation of mankind.

Yes, he believes in liberation from oppression but, from his point of view, the fundamental problem is sin (defined as willful rejection of God’s authority resulting in a missing of the mark, morally, socially, relationally) which is the source of all evil (which is a relational concept).

Yes, he has questions about what the situation is and what can be done about it.  God is a realist.  We are the ones who are committed to the fantasy of our own “goodness” even in the face of the existence of the God (Creator/Father) who is there and, by necessity and nature, demands a relationship that we refuse to give him.  In the immortal words of Nietzsche, “Why should he command and I serve?”

Yes, God is fully aware of the demands of justice but he also understands the necessity of love and grace if we are going to be saved from our own primordial folly.  He is fully committed to solving the problem that we created with our rebellion against his rule (a rebellion that cannot be sustained, by definition, since God is the very ground of our being (in creation and providence), the necessary referent that makes our cognitive experience possible, the source of our created personality, the original to our relational essence).  He is fully good, where we are arbitrary, pragmatic and utilitarian, often making more problems than we solve (as history attests to easily enough).  There is nothing more embarrassing in heaven and on earth than the arrogance of people who ought to be ashamed of themselves.  Sadly, that applies to all of us and only God can do something about it.

Yes, he is intimately committed to the solution even in his own body, willing to be born human (and remain human for eternity) and to die on behalf of his children so that the value of his life can fulfill (not set aside) the demands of a necessary justice (based on the nature of God, himself).  And yes, that incarnation and sacrifice are the essential building blocks of our social contract as the people of God (but few are willing to put it into practice).

Yes, he is willing to “turn the other cheek” and “love his enemies” and pray to God to forgive the oppressors who were nailing him to the cross.  That is why Paul can encourage slaves “to obey their masters” even though it gives power to the oppressors to continue to oppress because the power of God is within and will tear down the “principalities and powers” (spiritual and secular) that are behind that oppression and ultimately bring the them to its knees through the life and blood of the saints.  That is also why Wilberforce could fight to abolish slavery in the English Empire, knowing that the power is not in the social change but in the willingness of even one individual to stand up and champion the cause of the poor on their behalf (not call them to violent (or non-violent) revolution against their oppressors).

Yes, God is willing to re-interpret the story of mankind, the book of humanity, written in the blood, sweat and tears of those who are opposed to God and need to be brought near by the blood of Christ (both the oppressed and the oppressor alike).  He re-writes the history of mankind in his own blood and in the blood of the saints (cf. Revelations).

That is the true liberation of God and is the only Liberation Theology that is empowered by the Holy Spirit and for which the church of all ages has willingly given their lives.  Yes, God is the great Liberation Theologian and it would be wise to let him lead.  If we follow him, anything can and will happen (but probably not what we think should happen).  Satan thinks like a man but God thinks of eternity.  Perhaps God wants to  transform the poor and oppressed into a prophetic voice of good news (and judgment) to call people to a new relationship with God by exposing their sin and evil and allowing it to become even more evil until God brings his judgment upon the “beasts” of political, secular, systems and structures that are constructed by ungodly men in rebellion against the will of God (cf. Revelations).

But that role for the people of God (often ending in persecution and sword) would take a personal encounter with the God of the Scriptures through the Holy Spirit and an entirely new approach to Scripture and a submission to his will and purpose that stands behind, above and within all oppression, difficulty and evil.

It is the story of Job who refused to “curse God and die” even though he had every right to complain.  He learned what it means to submit himself before God (and let God be God) even when he didn’t understand what God was doing, especially in the face of pain, suffering and imminent death.  What a great man of faith, a faith that can move mountains.

It is a desert theology that understands the outworking of God’s theodicy in redemptive history through his church.  It is the story of the early believers singing hymns and praying for their oppressors (not fighting them or changing the economic structures of society as a prelude to social change).  It is the story of Corrie ten Boom who hid the Jews in her house but was discovered and lost her entire family in the concentration camps but came out of that oppression full of the power of the Holy Spirit, armed with the belief that “there is no darkness where the light of God cannot penetrate, where the hands of God cannot sustain us.”  It is not prosperity theology but covenant theology in a desert context as a witness to the world that we would rather be in the desert with God than in the promised land without him.

That is the testimony of believers throughout the ages that has been used by God to change the human heart of oppressed and oppressor alike and (sometimes) the social structures, overcoming evil through the power of the gospel in the lives (and deaths) of real people who believe in the objective, historical reality of the resurrection of Jesus Christ.  That is the Liberation Theology of God and it is the only one for which I am, personally, willing to lay down my life.

Bert Amsing

Master’s Degree – FIET

Review of Reivindicación del Prejuicio como Precomprensión by Alberto F. Roldan

03 Saturday Sep 2016

Posted by Bert Amsing in Hermeneutics

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Alberto F. Roldan, Book Reviews, Hermeneutics, Prejudice and Precomprehension

  1. Nombre y apellido del alumno Bert Amsing
  2. Fecha May 20, 2016
  3. Título del texto leído Alberto F. Roldán

            Reivindicación del Prejuício como Precomprensión

  1. ¿De qué trata el artículo o capítulo leído?

Alberto F. Roldán in his paper, “Reivindicación del Prejuício como Precomprensión,” analyzes H.G. Gadamer´s contribution to the discussions and development of the Hermeneutical Circle.

  1. ¿Cuál es la idea central del autor?

Roldán shows that Gadamer’s contributions provide a form of justification of prejudice as a necessary pre-comprehension of the text.  This is in contrast to the earlier position of Schleiermacher and the “subjective interpretation” school of thought “que procura detectar la intención del autor (p. 25).”

  1. ¿De qué nos quiere convencer?

It isn’t clear what Roldán is trying to accomplish with this article but the positive analysis of Gadamer would suggest that he is in favor of his “middle road” where he “alcanzar el punto medio entre la objetividad de la distancia histórica y la pertenencia a una tradición (p. 29).”  Roldán would, apparently, even agree that this approach is normative for exegetes of Scripture when he agrees with Gadamer’s statement that “este punto medio es el verdadero topos de la hermenéutica (p. 29).”  By “topos,” Roldán/Gadamer mean “a standardized method of constructing or treating an argument (i.e. normative).”

  1. ¿Cuáles son los puntos fuertes y los puntos débiles del texto?

The topic that Gadamer treats is very interesting and goes in the direction of an Evangelical understanding of Hermeneutics but there are still problems with his overall approach.  On the one hand, the two critiques mentioned in the text are interesting in so far as they go.   On the other hand, there are presuppositions underlying the entire discussion of the Hermeneutical Circle that is problematic from an Evangelical point of view.

Paul Ricoeur’s comment that Gadamer´s analysis of “del concepto heideggeriano de verdad con el concept diltheyano sobre el método” is one of confrontation is interesting but not conclusive.  At the very least, it must be said that Gadamer himself doesn’t see it that way.  He called his book Truth and Method, not Truth or Method for a reason.  Roldán explains that for Gadamer “la hermenéutica no es un método, como lo es el recurso de la ciencia como tal.  Se trata de la búsqueda de verdad en el que el pasado y el presente se encuentran en continua mediación (p. 25).”  Obviously, “la búsqueda de verdad” is also a method, otherwise it could not be “el verdadero topos de la hermenéutica (p. 29).”  Roldán has it right when he qualifies the concept of method “como los es el recurso de la ciencia como tal (p. 25).”  Exactly.  Previously, there was no clarification of the differences in the form and structure of the Hermeneutic task in terms of the nature of the sources being studied and/or the kind of questions being asked.

In fact, in the opinion of the present author, Gadamer doesn’t go far enough.  Even this distinction is only the first step and further distinctions need to be made.  On the one hand, the nature of the questions being asked will certainly affect the form and structure of the Hermeneutical dialogue.  If Paul Tillich is correct and the questions that we are asking are existential ones, that will change the way the Hermeneutical task is done.  On the other hand, if the questions that we are asking are methodological and historical/literary, it changes the form and structure of the Hermeneutical task significantly.  Both of these approaches in turn represent certain presuppositions and pre-conceived notions about the text and how one should approach it.

Further, there is an approach that may work for all other texts but may have to be modified for the biblical text if the exegete determines on the basis of tradition and personal experience/commitment that there is a supernatural element to the source material that needs to be taken into consideration.  Both positions are useful and should be fully explored and explained since the “dialogue” between the two sides of the debate (classical and new) certainly may learn from each other without violating their respective starting points (in faith/tradition and reason).  The role of the Evangelical philosopher/theologian is not to deny his fundamental presuppositions but to clarify them and extrapolate the distinctive nature of his approach to the Hermeneutic task.

The second critique mentioned in Roldán’s article is also of interest.  He says, “otra cuestión critica radica en saber si efectivamente Gadamer ha podido superar el punto de partida romántico de la hermenéutica moderna (p. 28).”  The question begs the answer in the sense that the question itself assumes that Gadamer (and everyone else) ought to “superar el punto de partida romántica.”  Why?  It is assumed that there is something wrong with their insistence on “nature, myth and tradition.”  Roldán describes why Romanticism must be left behind.  He says, “el romanticismo implica cambios: ya no hay una búsqueda de perfección y liberación de toda forma de superstición, del prejuicio del pasado y, por otra parte, adquieren preeminencia el mundo mitico, la vida en una “sociedad natural”, el mundo de la cabelleria cristiana, aspectos que alcanzan un “hechizo romántico”m8MP. 22).”

Certainly there are aspects of “romanticism” (especially in its German form) that must be questioned, but there is an aspect of it that may also be on the right track (even if for the wrong reason).  Even the term “romanticism” is unfortunate since it places it over and against reason in a negative light.  Perhaps it is deserved, but perhaps, also, the irrationality of “knowing” in the context of relationships (which even today we call “romanticism”) can be salvaged and married to the Reformed Epistemological advances to our understanding of faith as a “way of knowing.”  Taking this approach into our Hermeneutical task may reveal new forms and structures that would contribute to an Evangelical approach to the Hermeneutical task.

Now it’s time to look at the presuppositions underlying the entire discussion of the Hermeneutical Circle and to identify why they are problematic from an Evangelical point of view.  The concept of the hermeneutic circle is “new” and stands over and against the “classical” view of hermeneutics.  Whether we talk about the original concept of Schleiermacher or the modifications and changes of other philosophers such as Dilthey, Heidegger or, even, Gadamer, the foundations of the concept is suspect from an Evangelical point of view.  Roldán points out, for instance, that “la crítica de la Ilustración se dirige primordialmente contra la tradición religiosa del cristianismo y, particularmente, la Sagrada Escritura (p. 22).”  Of course, Gadamer makes some much needed corrections with regards to the concept of “tradition” in the Hermeneutical Circle but even he confuses the tradition of the dogma/doctrine of the church with the Word of God itself.  The position of the Evangelical exegete is that even the tradition of the church stands under the Word of God and is constantly judged by it even as it is honored as the interpretation of the saints who have gone before us.

But there are other problems as well.  Perhaps we should begin with the initial premise of Heidegger that the classical approach represents a “vicious circle” and that we are in need of a “new” manner of doing hermeneutics but that isn’t the focus of this article by Roldán.

Perhaps we should take the opportunity to point out that Schleiermacher “procuró desligar la comprensión del texto bíblico de los condicionamientos doctrinales que, en términos actuales, significan la “clausura del texto” (p. 25).”  Gadamer doesn’t disagree with this analysis, although he invites the reader to go further than Schleiermacher’s “interpretación subjetiva” and find a role for tradition as a source of truth.

Furthermore, Gadamer still admits that “la oposición entre la fe en la autoridad y el uso de la razón, instaurada por la Ilustración, tenía su razón de ser…(p. 24).”  Perhaps the word “oposición” is too strong and the dichotomy between faith and reason too black and white for most Evangelical exegetes.  In addition, it needs to be pointed out that our faith isn’t, first and foremost, in the tradition but in the Word of God that we believe the tradition faithfully reflects.  In addition, not everything in the tradition of the community of believers is accepted as a faithful reflection of the Word of God.

Since these philosophers lump the tradition together with the actual Word of God (since they deny the supernatural nature of the Word of God and, therefore, it is all, to one degree or another, human interpretations of reality and mankind), it isn’t surprising that they fail to make these crucial distinctions.

Finally, when Roldán uses Luther as an example of someone who overthrew the “prejuicios por respeto humano” ó “prejuicios de autoridad (p. 23),” he fails to make a distinction between the authority of a tradition that does not faithfully reflect scripture and one that does.  Luther, and especially Calvin, systematically wrote down a faithful interpretation of Scripture that became the “new” tradition of the church by going back to the “old/original” message.  All of these inaccuracies are not helpful to the Evangelical exegete even though it is understandable that the main referent is the Roman Catholic church (which has a stronger view of tradition as a source of truth).

In conclusion, the pre-disposition of these philosophers against the distinctive, supernatural nature of the Word of God as over and against any other text (a statement of faith arising out of the biblical text itself), their belief that tradition limits rather than reveals the truth of the Scriptures, and the lack of understanding of the true role of tradition in relation to the Scriptures, reflects the fact that these philosophers do not approach the question of Hermeneutics from the position of “reason within the bounds of faith” but rather faith and reason in opposition.  It is understandable, of course, given where they are coming from and what their presuppositions are, but it makes their entire project of limited value for a hermeneutic based on Evangelical traditions and beliefs.

  1. ¿Qué aspectos no entendí?

One thing that I found confusing was the purpose that the author had in writing this article.  On the one hand, it is a solid piece of investigation and accurately describes the justification of certain types of prejudice rooted in a tradition as a pre-comprehension of the biblical text.  So far, so good.  And this particular “openness” to tradition as part of the hermeneutical task is welcome in Evangelical circles.  But where is Roldán?  Where is his opinion?  Where is his analysis from an Evangelical point of view?  As an Evangelical philosopher/theologian, one could wonder whether it would not have been beneficial to have an evaluation of this entire discussion based on Evangelical premises.  Since neutrality is neither possible nor desired, an Evangelical philosopher/theologian would be welcome to use his analytical skills and theological grounding to provide some guidance from the “tradition” of the community of believers for the new generation of students faced with the challenge of liberalism and secularism invading the task of hermeneutics.  Sometimes their literary analysis and epistemological insights are helpful but it takes great wisdom and care to distinguish between the helpful elements and the dangerous ones.  Wisdom and guidance are always welcome.

  1. ¿Cómo se puede aplicar el contenido a la tarea hermenéutica?

I found very little to apply to the hermeneutical task that we don’t already do (and much better) in the Evangelical world with respect to the role of tradition.  In fact, it doesn’t go far enough.  If Gadamer (or Roldán) would have made better distinctions between the tradition and the Word of God and the relationship between them, that would have been interesting and helpful.

One area of further study is the comment by Paul Ricoeur on the concept of the “sujeto herido” (p. 27) “que ya no posee la capacidad para aprehender la verdad y hacerse dueño de ella sino que muestra, siempre, su propia limitación y temporalidad.”  The connection with the Evangelical concept of the “noetic effects of sin” is a tantalizing and interesting connection to pursue.

 

 

 

 

Review of Reflexiones Sobre Hermenéutica Contextual by René Padilla

03 Saturday Sep 2016

Posted by Bert Amsing in Hermeneutics

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Book Reviews, contextual hermeneutics, Hermeneutics, Liberation Theology, René Padilla

  1. Nombre y apellido del alumno Bert Amsing
  2. Fecha May 10, 2016
  3. Título del texto leído René Padilla – La Palabra Interpretada

Reflexiones Sobre Hermenéutica Contextual

  1. ¿De qué trata el artículo o capítulo leído?

René Padilla, in his book La Palabra Interpretada, gives us some reflections about Contextual Hermeneutics.  He compares traditional hermeneutics with contextual hermeneutics and talks specifically about the need to “acercar” contextually to the text of Scripture.  He also clarifies what he means by the Hermeneutical Circle and describes the various parts of that process.

  1. ¿Cuál es la idea central del autor?

The central idea of the author is that the context for interpreting the Scriptures needs to be just as much about the contemporary situation as the historical context of the text itself.  In his own words he says, “En el acercamiento contextual se pone énfasis tanto en el antiguo texto como en el contexto del lector moderno (p.11).”  For that reason, the hermeneutical circle includes the historical-cultural context of the interpreter just as much as that of the Scriptures.  That includes the worldview and theology of the interpreter as well.

  1. ¿De qué nos quiere convencer?

The author wants to convince us that hermeneutics is essentially a dialogue.  In his own words, he says, “La hermenéutica tiene que ver con el diálogo entre las Escrituras y el contexto histórico contemporáneo (p.13).”  If it is a dialogue, then our present situation also needs to be interpreted and questions need to be formulated so that we come to the Scriptures with a need which must be satisfied in order for us to change our situations today.  He goes on to say that “su propósito es trasponer el mensaje bíblico desde su contexto original a una situación contemporánea (p.13).”  All of this is based on the fundamental belief that God still speaks today.  He says, “su presupuesto básico es que el Dios que habló en el pasado y cuya Palabra ha sido registrada en la Biblia continúa hablando hoy en día a través de la Escritura a toda la humanidad (p.13).”

  1. ¿Cuáles son los puntos fuertes y los puntos débiles del texto?

The general idea that hermeneutics is a dialogue between the interpreter and the Scriptural text is generally good and describes what actually happens in the real process of interpreting the Word of God.  Also, there is no doubt that the purpose of interpretation is to make the Word of God relevant to contemporary society and there is no doubt that God still speaks today through his Word.  All of that is good and well but there seems to be a confusion of terms and concepts that muddies the waters and makes this proposal difficult to understand and ultimately untenable.

Yes, there is a “docetic” process “from below” that happens when we first come to the Scriptures, in which we ask God questions and interpret his replies through the text of Scripture.  We come with our felt needs but, for some strange reason, we leave with a clearer idea of our real needs.  René Padilla also recognizes this as part of the process although he doesn’t start with it.  He says, “Al recibir las respuestas de las Escrituras es posible que las preguntas iniciales surgidas de nuestra situación tengan que ser reformuladas.  El contexto de la teología incluye, por lo tanto, no sólo preguntas especificas que la situación hace al texto, sino también preguntas que el texto hace a la situación (p.18).”

The question is where we start from.  What is the starting point for our interpretation of Scripture?  In the real world, we may start with our own questions in terms of our learning process but the purpose of the process of interpreting the Bible is to allow God to ask his questions of us in our situation.  There is an “analogy of being” here between us and the original audience in terms of our spirituality (or lack of it).  That “analogy” or continuity allows God to speak in one historical-cultural context and it will be heard loud and clear in our contemporary historical-cultural context because there is a meta-context between the two situations that is spiritual-relational.  That is the starting point.  That is the Biblical worldview at its core.  That is what changes people and changed people change society and situations and problems are dealt with in the real world of our modern age.

When the Pharisees asked Jesus a question from their point of view, he would change the perspective and look at the situation from the divine point of view and his answer would change people who then change situations.  “Who is our neighbor?” they asked.  “Who is a neighbor?” he answered.  Exactly.  We can come to the Scriptures with all of our “felt needs” but if we are quiet and listen attentively we will walk away with the answers to our “real needs.”  Yes, it is a dialogue because God in his grace allows us to ask questions before he tells us what we should really be asking him.  But it is also not like a dialogue because the Bible is the self-revelation of God through his redemptive-historical actions in history and his own interpretation and revelation of those actions through his word.  It is a dialogue by grace but there is one who teaches and another who learns.

This is the great weakness of the approach that René Padilla offers to us in Contextual Hermeneutics.  He starts at the wrong place and his suggestion that “it is possible” that the text may force us to reformulate our questions is not strong enough in my opinion.  It is not just possible, it is a foregone conclusion since the Word of God comes to condemn us as well as save us.  It condemns us for our sin and rebellion and saves us from ourselves, from our sins.  The Bible interprets us.  God proclaims his interpretation of our rebellion against his claims to be the Creator and King over all things.  It is his hermeneutic of us and his solution to our real problems that heals us and guides us in bringing his healing (from the inside out) into the historical-cultural situations of our contemporary lives.

Furthermore, René Padilla claims that objectivity may be achieved but neutrality is not even desired.  He says, “A menos que la objetividad sea un objetivo, todo el proceso interpretativo está condenado al fracaso desde su comienzo.  La objetividad, sin embargo, no debe confundirse con la neutralidad…..leerla desde la perspectiva de la fe (p. 15).”  Although there is still some doubt that any of us can achieve real objectivity, we can at least be aware of our presuppositions and worldview as much as possible precisely because we are not neutral.  We come to the Scriptures from the point of view of faith.  René Padilla clearly distinguishes his approach from a secular-critical point of view and keeps the discussion firmly within the confines of those who approach the Bible from a position of faith.

But that faith must have some content in order for it to be useful as a theological context for the process of interpretation.  At the very least, faith must include a position of humility before the Word of God as the significant self-revelation of the God who is there and speaks to us from the mountain and the cross.  That position of humility, doctrinally, will include a statement about the inerrancy and inspiration of the Word of God which in turn then tells us to take seriously what the Bible says about historical events such as the miracles, resurrection and the person and work of Jesus Christ.  To “objectify” the Word of God as something to which we must submit our own “subjectivity”  means that we need to allow the Word of God to speak to us first of all.  If we listen carefully, we have to come to certain conclusions.  For example, if God is the ultimate author, then the Word of God has a fundamental unity and Scripture must be allowed to interpret Scripture.  If God used men in their historical-linguistic-cultural context, then the Word also has a fundamental diversity and a grammatico-historical approach to interpretation must be part of the process.  Unity in message.  Diversity in communication.

If that is so, then we already have a dogmatic-doctrinal position about the text that comes from a close listening to the message without a bias against the supernatural and allowing the Scriptures to interpret itself.  Starting at that point allows us to “hear” God through the Scriptures and not impose our own questions, issues, pre-suppositions and felt needs on the text.  Starting with that beginning point (which we can call “Sola Scriptura”), we have now defined our basic hermeneutical approach which allows the text to interpret itself within it’s essential unity but also within it’s essential diversity.  That is a different starting point from the Contextual Hermeneutics that is suggested by René Padilla.

Perhaps it is a problem of definitions.  René Padilla rightly says that “el entendimiento y la apropiación del mensaje bíblico, son dos aspectos de un todo indivisible: la comprensión de la Palabra de Dios (p.15).”  He assumes that this comprehension of the Word of God is part of the process of interpreting the Word of God.  If hermeneutics is a dialogue between us and the Word of God enlightened by the Holy Spirit then hermeneutics is interpretation and comprehension (understood and appropriated/obeyed).  Barth would agree that “revelation” happens in us and is not merely doctrine without praxis (“the Bible becomes the Word of God in our experience.”).  The idea is correct but the language is confusing (in both Barth and Padilla).  After all, sin has to be taken into account.  Obviously, the ideal situation is that God speaks and we automatically listen, understand and obey in love with gratitude.  We can even ask questions, once we are in relation to him through Jesus Christ and empowered by the Holy Spirit, in order to know how to build His Kingdom here on earth.  No doubt.  But where is sin in this whole process.  Is it just in our blindness to our pre-suppositions and commitment to our ungodly worldviews or is there a problem with the process of communication itself?  If so, it would affect our process of interpretation, wouldn’t it?

The Bible is the revealed Word of God whether we understand it and apply it or not.  Jesus is Savior and King, seated at the right hand of God, whether we acknowledge it or not.  There is an interpretation of Scripture that can be written down, systematized, dogmatized and still be true (or not) whether or not we understand it or apply it.  There is an “objective” reality to the Word of God and theology is the study of that Word of God.  Obviously, without understanding and application it remains a “dead” (but true) Word for us but that doesn’t change the nature of the Word of God as something “other” than our subjective assimilation of it.  On the other hand, what good is a “dead” (but true) Word to us who so desperately need the living Word of God to speak to our situation.  But our need does not change the nature of the Word of God which in turn dictates its own interpretation.

So, yes, we need the Holy Spirit, in the context of our faith in the inerrancy and inspiration of the Word of God, in order to come humbly to the text aware of our own ungodly worldview and presuppositions and listen first (so that we can come into a new relationship with God through Christ empowered by the Holy Spirit), then in obedience to ask and dialogue.  The problem with much of the contextual hermeneutic movement (even among Evangelicals) is that it leads to all sorts of “theologies” that starts with situations and questions and looks for answers before listening to the fundamental, real need of each human being that all of the social changes in the world won’t make up for.  What good is it to enter the promised land without God? (Exodus 33:15)

  1. ¿Qué aspectos no entendí? o sobre cuales aspectos tengo más preguntas?

Obviously, if I want to interpret René Padilla´s thinking on contextual hermeneutics, I would want to have a better and wider context for his ideas (by reading more of his writing) and enter into a dialogue with him.

  • I would want to start by listening carefully, aware of my presuppositions, theology/doctrine and worldview, and try to understand what he wants to say.
  • Then I would put his approach into a historical-cultural-academic context to understand what his presuppositions, theology/doctrine and worldview are and find points of convergence and divergence with my own.
  • I would try to summarize, synthesize and contextualize his contribution within the broader theological and academic debates about hermeneutics-homiletics (and the indicative-imperative debate in our circles, for example).
  • Then I would want to ask clarification questions as well as “going deeper” questions and enter into a dialogue for better understanding of his position (and my position as over and against his, if necessary).
  • THEN I would look for application points (just like the flow of your questions on this sheet where application comes after understanding) where I could apply what I have learnt (integrating his thoughts with mine whenever possible as we both attempt to allow Scripture to speak for itself).

In terms of application of the truth of Scripture, it is at this point that we need to ask questions and find a point of contact with contemporary culture and situations.  Whether it be the existential questions of Tillich or the materialistic and economic issues of the middle class or the social justice issues of the poor, we need to be attentive to the questions that the people ask because God in his grace allows us to come initially with our felt needs and responds accordingly.  At the same time, he will bring us “further in and further back” so that we can “realize” our true status before God and the true source of our problems and what God has done to save us from our sins.  Whether the questions come as a point of contact in the process of evangelism or a point of discussion in the process of apologetics or a point of ministry in the process of sanctification, they are all points of departure for those who are already deeply rooted in the indicative-resurrection life of Christ and are compelled to live it out as a loving imperative in every area of their lives.

One of the big differences between René Padilla and the Scriptures is that I do not come to his text from a position of faith and obedience.  He is a fellow Christian like myself who is also subject to the sinful “noetic” effects of the fall from grace.  Respect is due but not allegiance.  In addition, he does not claim to make statements of appeal to all of humanity to solve the problems of the world.  The purpose of his writing is other than that.  The purpose of the Bible is often claimed to be exactly that – to be God’s word spoken into the sinful situations of the world that need to come under the kingdom (and kingship) of Jesus Christ.

At that point, I would say that the Bible as wisdom literature for a world in crisis is similar (in terms of genre) to other religious texts.  But that is exactly the problem.  That is not the primary purpose of the Word of God.  The primary purpose is to bring people (not social situations first of all) under the kingship of Jesus Christ and THEN because they are committed to a covenant relationship with God through Jesus Christ empowered by the Spirit they are NOW in a position to speak to and change particular situations empowered as a social unit (the ecclesia) to work as “leaven” in a sinful world.  This approach recognizes that God’s main solution to the problems of man is to change the heart of man first of all rather than social situations (however unjust or morally demanding).

I would be interested to talk further with René Padilla about his presuppositions with respect to the Word of God and its purpose in the world.  The “praxis” of God may revolve around a different “axis” than our own.  It may want to deal with sin in relational terms before it deals with our ethics and morality (the indicative before the imperative, irreversible but also inseparable).  There is more than one approach that can accomplish the clear necessity of bringing the Word of God to bear on contemporary people and culture.  The question is whether or not we will do it the way God, through the Scriptures, says he wants to do it and “plug in” to his anointing and power to get it done.

Obviously, I have a theological/doctrinal context that comes to bear as I enter the hermeneutical process of trying to understand the Word of God.  So does René Padilla.  That isn’t a problem.  It’s an opportunity to discuss with each other our theological/doctrinal presuppositions about the Word of God to see whether they reflect what the Scriptures say about itself (a position of faith in the Word of God as inerrant and inspired to which both of us agree).  If we didn’t have that same basic approach to Scripture which guides and informs our dialogue about our presuppositions and theology/doctrine, then it would be a very different type of conversation (which may still be of some benefit but would, by definition, be more a question of differentiation than similarities).

This is the approach I would take for all of the readings for this course, all the while trying to understand my own position of faith towards God and his Word better as well as learning how to have an appropriate dialogue with other points of view that do not share that same foundational approach.  I wish that there was more time to go deeper with each author and “reading” but, in the meantime, I have a few other questions for Mr. Padilla.

I would be especially interested to read/hear René Padilla’s critique of the Sola Scriptura and Redemptive Historical approach to hermeneutics (which includes an exemplary based applicatory homiletics (continuity of experience) within a redemptive-historical context (diversity/distinction of purpose)).

One of the problems that we always face is the definition of terms.  If we define hermeneutics as interpretation of the text as understood and applied in obedience, so far so good.  But, then, where is homiletics?  Even there, we have an overlap of definitions.  Material homiletics is about “getting the message” from the Word and formal homiletics is about “communicating the message” to the world in various forms and ways.  Where does hermeneutics end and homiletics begin?

René Padilla does not make any distinction between the two but groups them all into one general definition of interpretation.  That is where much of the confusion lies.  In addition, if we understand formal homiletics in terms of “kerygma” (without Bultmann) rather than merely “preaching,” it would also probably enter into René Padilla’s definition of hermeneutics.  With those clarifications, I can live with his definitions.

The problem lies in the relationship between the two.  By making it a dialogue with both starting points of equal value, there is more than a confusion of definitions.  There is a confusion of priorities (and theology/doctrine) and approach to Scripture that is foundational to what Scripture says about itself.  I wonder how his obvious commitment to the Word of God as inerrant and inspired fits with his “unusual” starting point outside of the Word of God.  It seems counter-intuitive at the very least.

Is there a way to maintain the concept of dialogue and maintain a definition of interpretation that includes assimilation (or comprehension) by factoring in the problem of sin and the need for humility and loving obedience as the proper context for understanding and “having” the mind of Christ that declares, “my bread is to do the Father’s will?”  Yes, I believe so but it must start with Scripture alone before it can speak to our spiritual and social situations.  Miracles cannot change the human heart and social solutions based on the wisdom of God cannot change a man (or even society in any permanent way).  Something deeper is needed first.  The indicative comes first, then the imperative necessarily must follow, but secondly, as an overflow of the first.  Otherwise, “what does it profit a man to gain the whole world but lose his very self” (Luke 9:25).

Listen first (to come into proper relationship-covenant with God both in terms of salvation and resurrection life on this earth) and then dialogue secondly (to come into proper obedience-morality/ethics in terms of how we should then live) to achieve the proper indicative-imperative priority so evident in the Word of God.

These are the things I would like to ask René Padilla in dialogue with him about these important questions of interpretation.

  1. ¿Cómo se puede aplicar el contenido a la tarea hermenéutica?

This approach to contextual hermeneutics seems to leave itself open to a concept of “theology” that is very “amplio” and not necessarily tied very closely to the Word of God.  In that case, theology is nothing more than the Bible’s answers to my questions.  Everyone can have his/her own theology.  There can be a feminist theology, a liberation theology, an apartheid theology (each adjective is a situation) rather than a covenant theology, a kingdom theology, a biblical theology (each adjective a biblical theme or an organizational principle).

It is easy to create “theologies” (the Bible’s answers to my questions) but not so easy to truly listen to the “self-revealing theology” of God or his hermeneutic/interpretation of us.  The Bible is already “kerygma” and must be recognized as such before it can become “kerygma” in our hearts and lives. That is the eschatological nature of the Bible as “already but not yet,” (already revealed/true but not yet fully understood or obeyed) and both aspects must be maintained in its proclamation in much the same way that it’s truth is “already but not yet” (already revealed/true but not fully understood or obeyed) in our hearts and lives.  What holds the two together is the Holy Spirit in his capacity of “revealing the revelation” of God in the hearts of men who is also the guarantee of the reality of the new relationship in Christ (2 Cor. 5:5).  It is the relationship we have with God “in Christ,” empowered by the Holy Spirit that holds the indicative and the imperative together and, in effect, guarantees that one will flow from the other as we strive to walk in the Spirit every day.

Although René Padilla talks of the “possibility” of the Bible interpreting us, it is, in effect, outside of our efforts or abilities to make happen.  It is almost “mystical” in the sense that it is God’s work of enlightenment through the Holy Spirit and as such is not within our control or part of “our” approach to hermeneutics.  We can be open to it, but not make it happen without the right heart/relational context and theological/doctrinal humility before the Word of God as it is proclaimed from the mountain and the cross.  Apparently, he doesn’t enlighten all men alike since there are so many “interpretations” (even conflicting ones) of the Word of God.  Something more is needed, some pre-requisite expected to come first, some indicative that must come before the imperative of our efforts.

Perhaps, as Scripture points out, spiritual enlightenment is only for those who live under the “indicative” of resurrection/ascension life and not under the “imperative” of their social/political reality and need.  The second is the approach of liberalism not evangelicalism.  More importantly, the first is God’s approach to hermeneutics which demands a faith rooted in the “indicative” of the “kerygma” assimilated and comprehended and obeyed first (spirituality/relationship), then with the help of the Holy Spirit, an enlightened understanding of how to apply and obey the Word of God (the “imperative”) in a particular situation will become clear within the context of the community of saints (ethics/morality).

One other point needs to be made about the “imperative” nature of the “kerygma” of God in Scripture.  Many people equate the “imperative” with the moral law of the OT together with the specific application nuances in the NT.  Often the “Decalogue” is considered to be the best summary of the moral law covering both the relational aspect towards God and man as well as the practical aspect of actual behavior.  We tend to think of morality and ethics in more abstract terms but the Scriptures make it clear that they are deeply rooted in our relationships with each other and God as a community of believers.

But obedience also has a motivational “skin” as well as a redemptive focus.  It is an obedience motivated by “love” and “gratitude” not by necessity or guilt and it has an evangelistic purpose.  As the proponents of attachment theory would point out, our ability to love as adults is rooted in our experience of strong, loving attachments in our early years.  The same is true for those who must now learn to love God above all, having been dead to him and now brought to life and learning to love him again.  The power of his covenant “attachment” to us (the indicative) is the healing power that teaches us in increasing measure to practice, and fail and practice again the loving obedience of his “imperative.”

If there was no difficulty with our loving obedience, the imperative would not be necessary but, as it is, the imperative of “obedience” teaches us to love again just as the “attachment” of the indicative provides a non-judgmental context for our feeble efforts.  It is a risk of love that God takes, but he also has an ace up his sleeve which is the Holy Spirit within us, made possible by the covering of the blood of the lamb which is the substitutionary atonement declared by God and accepted as sufficient payment for our sins.  That guarantee of love and power empowers our own “life ministry” of reconciliation through the way of the cross in confession, repentance, forgiveness and reconciliation.  He died so that we could learn to love the Father once again in the power of the Spirit.

Morality is a limit to our will but love is the freedom of the will.  In our present state of progressive sanctification, morality is the natural result of love but it takes the spiritual fellowship of the ecclesia to put it into practice progressively.  It is this “skin” and “focus” that holds the two sides of the indicative-imperative together, the order irreversible, the two, inseparable, the progress undeniable since it is the work and gift of the Holy Spirit as we respond, and struggle, and fail and start again as a community of saints on the march towards the New Jerusalem.

The imperative is not a support to the indicative (i.e. Catholic view) nor is it “side-by-side” with the indicative where the imperative proves the indicative (i.e. Fundamentalists-Arminean view), but rather the indicative expresses itself in the imperative in increasing measure, the imperative an effect of which the indicative is the cause, the imperative a response to the initiative of the indicative, (Phil.2:12,13), the two yoked together in an “ontological” union with Christ that creates an entirely new kind of being who can do nothing of himself but everything in union with Christ, empowered by the Holy Spirit in loving obedience to the will and agenda of God.

Therefore, getting back to the main argument at hand, perhaps the best approach to the hermeneutic/interpretation process is to get out of the way so that our sin, presuppositions and disobedience do not tarnish the original and essential proclamation of the Word.  That approach maintains one original “self-revealed theology” of God that we must discover by starting with the Word of God and not create multiple “social-political theologies” of Man that we get by starting with our questions and problems (as legitimate as they may be).  They will best be answered within the right relational context as a second step.  The problem with mankind is not his situation/circumstances but his relationship (or lack thereof) with God through Christ empowered by the Holy Spirit.

So, in my opinion, this approach to hermeneutics leaves open the possibility of many different theologies that may or may not, to one degree or another, reflect the original “kerygma” of God.  In fact, they may find themselves in conflict with God.  If that is the case, then, before we can apply this approach to the task of hermeneutics, we must clarify our starting point.

With the proper starting point and a clarification of terms, we can focus on the assimilation of the “indicative kerygma” and then, within that relational/spiritual context address, as a community, the “imperative kerygma” of God’s Word applied to our particular situation.  The kingdom of God is first of all about our relationship with the king and, from that foundation, we bring the kingdom into the world once again by focusing on the kingship of Jesus in the hearts of people and then, as an ecclesia of called-out ones, we promote change in structures and relationships within the world.

After all, as anyone versed in the field of organizational development and the psychology of change can tell you, the problem is always the people.  It isn’t a question of what (or even why) but how?  And since intrinsic motivation is so difficult, extrinsic motivation using the “fear of loss” or “desire for gain” (the “carrot and stick” approach) is the most common and cost effective way of creating the necessary changes.  Force and obligation even in the service of the common good (as defined by those in power) has led to more corruption and evil in the world than almost anything else.

But intrinsic motivation rooted in a commitment to the will and agenda of God (which  often coincides with the good of the people even from a secular perspective) in the power of the Holy Spirit is a social force to be reckoned with.  Renewal can spill over into revival when the reality of God is seen in the lives of his people. Real change in society is the natural result of changed hearts.

But change can also happen without changed hearts.  Societal change can be effected with a broad based coalition of like-minded citizens seeking the same good, not just believers.  So, what is the difference?  Social change is its own temporal reward but a changed person lasts into eternity, defeating death by overcoming the true source of evil which is in the human heart.  Evil is, first of all, relational, not situational.

What that means is that, even with all of our social effort, we are called to a Redemptive Focus within a Creational Context and we are promised, by Jesus himself in word and example, that persecution and hardship are more likely than permanent success.  Still, it is our “imperative kerygma” creational-kingdom efforts that are a necessary apologetic/evangelistic context to our “indicative kerygma” that brings people into a saving relationship with God through Christ empowered by the Holy Spirit that no social/political situation can erase, change or affect in any negative way (Romans 8).  That is the true salvation of God that is available to us in the desert as we move towards the Promised Land.  Together with Moses, we declare that God is our Promised Land, even, and especially, in the desert (Exodus 33).  That is the true “kerygma” of God from the mountain and the cross.

In conclusion, René Padilla has helped me to clarify my own position regarding hermeneutics while at the same time opening a dialogue on the imperative of true comprehension and relevance in the contemporary world.  Let me finish with a few comments about some of his positive contributions to the hermeneutical debate.

First of all, in spite of his unclear definitions and false starting point, he reminds us that the goal of hermeneutics is to really reach our contemporary audience in a way that is relevant and effective.  No doubt.  The question is how to go about that.

Secondly, even though René Padilla does not start there, he does recognize that the Scriptures hold the power to interpret us.  He says, “cuanto  más profunda y rica sea nuestra comprensión del texto bíblico, tanto más profunda y rica será nuestra comprensión del contexto histórico (incluyendo los problemas que todavía tienen que encararse) y del significado de la obediencia cristiana en un contexto particular (p.18).”

Thirdly, he acknowledges the key role of evangelism as the redemptive focus to our obedience as critical to the process of the contextualization of the gospel in the contemporary world.  He says, “la fuerza motriz en la contextualización del Evangelio en tiempos apostólicos fue la obediencia al llamado de Dios a la misión por parte de la iglesia primitiva (p.16).”

Still, mistakes were made even in the first two centuries, not by the NT writers (who set the standard for contextualization by prioritizing the indicative as the context for the imperative) but by individual leaders in the Early Church who attempted to “hellenize” the gospel to make it more acceptable to Greek and Roman society.  God raised up others to provide a counter-balance and the debate has raged back and forth across the pages of history ever since.  An evangelistic motivation (the imperative) isn’t enough.  There must also be an evangelistic message (the indicative) that invades society and changes it from within much as the persecution of the Early Church resulted in a complete reversal in Roman society within three hundred years.  It wasn’t perfect, of course, but it wasn’t the hellenization of the message that caught the attention of the Roman people but rather the conviction and sacrifice of true believers living out the indicative of the gospel in the imperative of the Roman arena.  That has always been God’s “theodicy” (see the Book of Revelations) and will continue to be the manner in which he confronts evil and establishes his kingdom in the hearts of mankind.

Bert Amsing

Master’s Program – FIET

 

 

 

Review of La Nueva Hermenéutica en Perspectiva by J. Andrew Kirk

03 Saturday Sep 2016

Posted by Bert Amsing in Hermeneutics

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Tags

Book Reviews, Existential Hermeneutics, J. Andrew Kirk, Scientific Hermeneutics, The New Hermeneutic

  1. Nombre y apellido del alumno Bert Amsing
  2. Fecha May 18, 2016
  3. Título del texto leído J. Andrew Kirk

La Nueva Hermenéutica en Perspectiva

  1. ¿De qué trata el artículo o capítulo leído?
  2. Andrew Kirk, in his chapter on “La Nueva Hermenéutica en Perspectiva,” in the book, Introducción General al Mito y la Hermenéutica, gives us a concise but penetrating analysis of the new “existential” hermeneutic. He also provides a strong critique of its presuppositions and philosophical underpinnings on its own merits while maintaining a position as an Evangelical scholar.
  3. ¿Cuál es la idea central del autor?

Kirk contends that the new hermeneutic (especially as espoused by Fuchs) is fundamentally flawed by its own presuppositions.  Without necessarily appealing to any theological/doctrinal position about the Word of God, he shows that the approach, in and of itself, is flawed.  He goes on to state that the traditional classical approach still maintains validity in the face of the defeat of the new hermeneutic by its own hand.

  1. ¿De qué nos quiere convencer?

He wants to convince us that the new hermeneutic is flawed and does not contribute to the exegetical/hermeneutical task for theologians/preachers of the Word of God.

  1. ¿Cuáles son los puntos fuertes y los puntos débiles del texto?

This chapter is part of a series of papers in the book by Cullen et al called Introducción General al Mito y la Hermenéutica.  In that context, there is a fundamentally different interpretation and explanation of the new hermeneutic.  Cullen talks of the new “scientific/literary” hermeneutic whereas Kirk talks of the new “existential” hermeneutic.  Both are denominated as the “new” hermeneutic (Padilla also uses the same terminology to refer to a new starting point in “praxis”).  So which is it?  It appears to have started as an “existential” hermeneutic but has grown into a “scientific/literary” hermeneutic but there is no clarity on the relationship between the two.

In general, I appreciated both the analysis of the new “existential” hermeneutic as well as the evaluation Kirk gave based on its own presuppositions.  That is an interesting piece of work that requires more attention and deeper study.  The question that still lies before us is whether his evaluation of the new “existential” hermeneutic also is applicable to the new “scientific” hermeneutic approach and, if so, to what extent and in what ways.  Food for thought.

Particularly interesting was his statement that “El golpe de muerte para la posición de Bultmann está en el hecho de que la fe de los discípulos no era del tipo que él imagina.  Es decir, para ellos, como Pablo apunta claramente en las evidencias de la resurrección, la fe alejada de un fundamento histórico abierto a la verificación, no es fe, es incredulidad, y muy pronto se convertirá en puro misticismo (p.47).”  The search for a stronger foundation than “a faith without historical basis” by the disciples of Bultmann were also doomed to failure.  Even the attempt to base everything on the actual words of Jesus would not go far enough as Kirk’s evaluation shows.  The historical person and work of Christ is the indispensable foundation of a biblical faith as proclaimed by the text itself.

He goes on to say, “En último análisis la exégesis de la nueva hermenéutica es infalible porque nadie tiene con qué disputarla (p.54).”  We already see this in the church where everybody’s opinion about the text of Scripture is equal to everyone else’s opinion because it matters more that we express ourselves and grapple with our own issues of life/existence than that we listen carefully to the Word of God first to find the answers that we need.  It all becomes more of an “autodiálogo que nadie jamás podrá penetrar (p.54).”  Enough said.

Although I appreciate Kirk’s evaluation based on the intrinsic fallacies of the new “existential” hermeneutic itself, he also demonstrates an affinity for Scottish realism and a theological/doctrinal approach to the Scriptures as the inerrant and inspired Word of God.  Obviously, I would agree but the interesting thing is to see how far one can go on the “human” side based (as per Cullen) on the assumptions of the new “scientific/literary” hermeneutic itself (i.e. such as the “specificity” of the text and the respect it demands in providing the basic approach to listening/understanding its message). More can and should be done here by Evangelical scholars (if not done already).

Still there is, as Kirk points out, a difference between understanding the text and determining its value as it speaks to us.  He says, “Es imprescindible que tengamos en claro dos cosas distintas.  En primer lugar, esta la interpretación del sentido original del texto.  En esto no diferenciamos, en cuanto a metodología, entre las Sagradas Escrituras y los otros escritos clásicos.  En segundo lugar, está el valor que damos al texto en su aplicación a nuestra situación.  Confundir las dos cosas en nombre de una exegesis existencial significa relativizar toda la tarea exegética (p.48).”  Yes, and no, in my opinion.

On the one hand, there is a distinction between the two but there is also a continuity between the two.  The text (the message) itself is a “kerygma” (without the demythologizing of Bultmann) based on historical acts and original spoken words by God interpreted by God himself by means of human language and communicated through contemporary man to others through their life and words.  The text itself tells us what value to place on what aspect of the message, not our present situation or even our contemporary felt need (at least not at first).  Both the sense or original meaning of the text and its value and application to our lives (original and contemporary through an analogy of being over time), are two aspects of the same process of hermeneutics and homiletics.  I would want to be careful to distinguish the two but not separate them.  There is a necessary “divine” element to both that expresses itself in our “human” process of hermeneutical discovery.

I would also, in a similar vein, take issue with Kirk’s blanket statement that “En esto no diferenciamos, en cuanto a metodología, entre las Sagradas Escrituras y los otros escritos clásicos (p. 48).”  Like Cullen et al, his agreement with general hermeneutics as applicable to biblical hermeneutics is too sweeping and inclusive.  There is no way to sidestep the Biblical statements about the need for the Holy Spirit in the process of interpreting and applying the Word of God or the Biblical statements about the noetic effects of sin that have to be taken into account and overcome through loving “imperative” obedience as the necessary context for understanding the evangelistic-missional purpose of God, the moral/ethical character of Christ and the relational/ontological reality that empowers our efforts to please him above all.

At the very least, these theological/doctrinal aspects which arise naturally from the Scriptures when we come in humility before them in acknowledgement of their supernatural nature (beyond nature in origin but through nature in method guided and protected by the hand of God in its transmission) need to be acknowledged and discussed in more detail within Evangelical circles.  Otherwise we are only fighting a defensive battle and leaving the initiative to other various philosophies and approaches to lead the way.

Perhaps in the act of clearly delineating our own approach and stating the foundational presuppositions and process of a biblical hermeneutic, we will automatically put it out of reach of those who are not interested in what God has to say and instead, would rather impose their questions and needs on the self-revelation of God rather than allow him to interpret us and let the text of Scripture proclaim his solution to our need (which invariably will satisfy all human longings, needs and questions in the process).  This approach will also uncover the perennial bias against the supernatural that exists at the foundation of all approaches to hermeneutics that is not a priori rooted in the experience of and obedience to the indicative-imperative resurrection life that God calls us to as a pre-requisite for understanding his Word.

  1. ¿Qué aspectos no entendí? ¿ó sobre qué aspectos todavía tengo preguntas?

I am still unclear of the relationship between Kirk´s concept of the new hermeneutic and that of Cullen et al with respect to existentialism as over an against a scientific approach (which includes aspects of the existential hermeneutic within it).

I also need to do more work on understanding the existential approach to hermeneutics so as to better evaluate what aspects it may have that would serve to clarify our Evangelical position.  Furthermore, there is a sense in which God, by his grace, allows man to come to him with their questions and needs as a first approach and through the church, as we meet those needs and build a relationship with the person, we can witness to the reality of the peace and joy that comes from the indicative-imperative resurrection life within us.

To that end, there is an apologetic-evangelistic context for understanding the existential questions of our contemporary society and provide answers (verbally and existentially through our life ministry).  That is an interesting point of departure not for hermeneutics itself (defined as the interpretation of what God is saying through his word) but for homiletics and even application but always within a solid biblical understanding of God’s answers to modern man.

  1. ¿Cómo se puede aplicar el contenido a la tarea hermenéutica?

This article was more of an evaluation of the new existential hermeneutic and as such was more instructive in what not to do rather than in what to do.  In addition, it provided a much needed rational support to maintaining a classical approach to hermeneutics (although informed by and enhanced by advances in historical and linguistic advances).

 

 

 

 

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